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1 Research Questions 
Credit ratings have for a long time been an important and highly visible feature of financial 
markets. They regularly make headlines and are closely followed by the financial community. 
However, the credit rating agencies which issue these ratings have been on far fewer minds. 
Only after a series of big accounting scandals, Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat, to name but 
a few, has this highly concentrated industry received broader public attention. Although clear 
indications of trouble were visible for quite some time, in falling bond and stock prices, the 
rating agencies did not revise their favorable ratings for these companies until shortly before 
their bankruptcy. 
Recent discussion has concentrated on the business model of credit rating agencies and on 
questions of regulation. For a tabular literature review see the appendix. Many contributions 
have drawn from a wide body of quantitative literature on the impact and quality of ratings. 
What has been missing is a thorough analysis of the underlying economics of the credit rat-
ing industry. Many scholars have discussed important principles, but have as yet not pro-
duced a detailed and coherent picture. This study closes the gap. A better understanding of 
credit rating economics will certainly help resolve important, open questions on regulation. 
The study starts with an overview on the credit rating industry in chapter 2. Among other 
things, it contributes to the discussion by introducing a comprehensive framework for struc-
turing the multiple rating agency functions. The focus of chapter 3 is on a detailed analysis of 
the reputation mechanism which lies at the heart of the credit rating business model. Al-
though reputation is widely accepted as the key aspect of credit rating economics, there has 
been little explicit research on it. In particular, this study is the first to introduce a formal repu-
tation model based on a simple framework by Shapiro (1983) which can be used to explain 
large parts of the industry. The basic question of how the reputation mechanism works, as 
well as adjacent issues such as the transfer of reputation, will be scrutinized. 
Chapter 4 takes a wider look at the industry and identifies the forces behind credit rating 
supply and demand. Several authors such as Partnoy (1999) and Hill (2004) have already 
raised important questions. However, no comprehensive formal analysis of the issue exists 
so far. This study contributes important new aspects to the discussion, identifies the econom-
ic structure in the existing main arguments, links them, and generates several results as well 
as suggestions for further research. In large sections of chapter 4 the reputation mechanism 
is kept as a framework while the open research questions serve as a focal point. Regarding 
demand, scholars disagree on why ratings are so important. Is it merely their information 
value or is it because they are used by the state as a tool in ‘rating-based regulation’? On the 
supply side the logical question is whether the high industry concentration is a ‘natural’ result 
of market forces or is it the result of state interference. The chapter concludes by analyzing 
the results from a classic industrial economics perspective and by drawing results for strateg-
ic interaction between rating agencies. 
Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive review of potential reasons for regulating the credit rat-
ing industry. The area has already received substantial research attention, e.g., by Schwarcz 
(2001), Hill (2004), or Rousseau (2005), although as yet there is no comprehensive overview 
of the subject. In contrast to existing research, this study will build on the full-fledged analysis 
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of the credit rating industry in chapters 3 and 4. This allows for an economic evaluation of 
every major issue which is cited as a reason for state interference, including arguments from 
political scientists and sociologists such as Sinclair (2005), who often dominate practical dis-
cussion. 
Finally, chapter 6 consolidates the results from chapters 3, 4, and especially 5 into an as-
sessment of regulatory options concerning the credit rating industry. Since this topic has al-
ready received a great deal of attention from scholars such as Partnoy (2006), Blaurock 
(2006), or Bottini (1993), as well as from many regulatory bodies such as BIS (2004), or 
CESR (2005), the focus here is not on a detailed analysis but on the main economic prin-
ciples that should guide the state in regulating the credit rating industry. Despite previous 
broad attention, only few authors have systematically dealt with this topic. This study reduces 
the state’s scope to five options, i.e. the use of rating-based regulation, competition, official 
recognition, civil liability, and implementation methods. The economic analysis of these op-
tions leads to specific recommendations for the design of a regulatory regime against which 
the most recent regulatory initiatives by the US Congress (2006b) and the EU Parliament 
(2006) are compared. 
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2 The Credit Rating Industry 
2.1 Functions of Credit Rating Agencies 
Credit rating agencies are in the business of predicting default probabilities for all kinds of 
debt securities and debt issuers1. A rating mirrors the likelihood of timely and complete pay-
ment of debt securities according to standardized quality categories2. The focus is not on 
absolute default probability, but on the relative riskiness of different debt securities. Further-
more, credit ratings typically mirror long-term developments and do not respond to short-term 
market fluctuations; new significant information is reflected in up- or downgrades. Both quan-
titative and qualitative rating methods are employed. In neo-institutional finance theory rating 
agencies can be depicted as information intermediaries. They are consulted in the course of 
a market transaction in order to overcome informational asymmetries between both market 
sides. In short, they create value by reducing information costs in the marketplace. Rating 
agencies are specialized in capital market transactions and are not active in the lending 
business. 
Apart from information intermediation, credit ratings are today generally associated with a 
second major function: ratings serve as a regulatory tool in financial market oversight – one 
speaks of ‘rating-based regulation’. This is often called the certification function. In this view, 
rating agencies not only assign a credit evaluation but they also issue a ‘license’ to access 
the capital markets or to lower regulatory burdens (Partnoy 1999, pp. 683-88). The certifica-
tion function has its counterpart in the private sector. Here ratings serve as a risk manage-
ment yardstick at institutions such as banks or investment funds (e.g., ECB 2004, pp. 8-9). 
Credit ratings often determine the range of eligible assets or are sometimes used as ‘rating 
triggers’. It often makes sense to differentiate between the information and the certification 
function. However, the underlying hypothesis is that without good information provision, rat-
ings are not useful for regulation and risk management3. Therefore, it is advisable to concen-
trate initially on the economics of information provision. 
Every credit contract constitutes a principal-agent relationship. In the process of granting a 
credit, the issuer or agent usually has information (hidden information) superior to the inves-
tor, the principal. The issuer, however, is not able to cheaply convey his information about his 
own credit risk to the investor. Because he may profit from supplying the investor with wrong 
information, investors will generally not trust the reliability of such information. Thus they re-
quire a risk premium which increases the cost of the transaction, i.e. the interest rate paid by 
the issuer will rise. Issuers with a low credit risk but also low returns might not be able to ob-
tain any credit (adverse selection). Rating agencies try to ease this dilemma by providing 
investors with a screening instrument in order to reduce the informational asymmetry and 
reveal hidden information. This in turn lowers the risk premium required by the investors. 
                                                
1  For a widely accepted definition of ‘ratings’ and ‘rating agencies’ see IOSCO (2004, p. 3). 
2  Such categories are, e.g., ‘AAA’ or ‘B’. For an overview of the main categorizations see, e.g., Sinclair (2005, 
pp. 36-39). Ratings of BBB (or an equivalent) or higher are ‘investment grade’, below one speaks of ‘specula-
tive grade’ or ‘junk level’. Ratings are usually published with a commentary. 
3  Partnoy (1999) challenges this hypothesis. From his point of view ratings can fulfill the certification function 
without being informative. The actual link between the two functions will be scrutinize in section 4.1. 
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Furthermore, credit ratings also function as a monitoring mechanism during the debt securi-
ty’s lifetime, easing the moral hazard situation after a credit has been granted. In the ab-
sence of monitoring, an issuer may act opportunistically, taking risk prone decisions in his 
own favor while lowering the investor’s expected return. The issuer’s actions are costly to 
observe (hidden actions). Credit rating agencies invest heavily in monitoring these actions 
and issue periodic updates to their initial ratings. A simple model of the credit rating industry 
with the focus on the information intermediation function can be seen in Figure 2.1: 
Figure 2.1: Information intermediation by credit rating agencies 
The issuer sells a debt security to the investor. The investment received for a given debt se-
curity will be higher in proportion to the assumed creditworthiness of the issuer. At this point 
the rating agency comes into the game. It receives payment and information from the issuer. 
In return, the information is scrutinized by the agency and condensed into a rating of the is-
suer’s creditworthiness. The rating is then communicated to the investors. The investors are 
convinced by the rating because the agency is trustworthy. As a result, their opinion of the 
issuer’s creditworthiness becomes much more certain. Therefore, they are willing to accept a 
lower risk premium for their investment than they would if operating without a rating. As long 
as the price paid by the issuer to the rating agency is lower than the value of interest pay-
ments saved, the issuer will buy the rating. Over the lifetime of a debt security, the rating 
agency will usually monitor it and update the rating as a service to investors who want to buy 
or sell the bond on the secondary market. Issuers also benefit from monitoring and typically 
pay regular fees for the service. They acquire a favorable reputation in the market if they are 
willingly to operate under the credit rating agency’s ongoing scrutiny. 
The basic good produced by credit rating agencies can be described from the issuers’ pers-
pective as a signaling service. In an analytical process the agencies gather financial and oth-
er data and publish a neutral opinion about the true credit quality of an issuer or a debt secu-
rity. These opinions are indicators covering the potential for credit loss resulting from delays 
in payment or the failure to pay. Note that other risks associated with fixed income securities 
 
Issuer 
 
Credit Rating Agency 
 
Investors 
payment, information 
rating, reputation rating, monitoring 
investment (trust in rating) 
debt security (credit rating agency’s reputation) 
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such as exchange rate risks or interest rate risks are not covered by credit ratings (Moody's 
1991, pp. 73, 83-84). Furthermore, rating agencies cannot cover the risk of fraud, as they 
rely on information provided by the issuers. In an investment decision, credit ratings thus can 
only be one input factor among others. Institutional investors often use them as checks 
against their own internal research. 
Looking at the signaling service in more detail, one finds two adjunct components. On the 
one hand, there is the actual generation and provision of information as described above. 
Closely connected to the pure information value of ratings is the ‘reputation value’, which is 
also indicated in Figure 2.1. Market participants will trust the quality of ratings because of an 
agency’s reputation. From this point of view, the reputation itself is the rating agencies’ prod-
uct. Independent of the actual rating, simply being rated serves as a positive signal to capital 
markets (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994, p. 59). The issuers buy a share in the agency’s 
good reputation in order to increase their own reputation in the eyes of the investors. Espe-
cially little known issuers buy ratings to build up their own market reputation (Jappelli and 
Pagano 2000, p. 8). To be rated by one of the broadly acknowledged credit rating agencies 
shows that an issuer takes the issue of creditworthiness seriously and is working together 
with a highly professional external partner. For established issuers who are reputable them-
selves, ratings can be an instrument to distinguish themselves from other market partici-
pants. Credit ratings generally play “an important role for companies when evaluating coun-
terparties (…)” in nearly every business aspect (AFTE 2004, p. 5) In a 1998 study 60 percent 
of surveyed issuers said ratings also play a role in their marketing (Fight 2001, p. 5, 169). 
In this respect, ratings not only convey credit information, they convey the rating agencies 
overall reputation for integrity onto the issuer4 as well. Quite like an auditor, a rating agency’s 
expertise serves as a bond. The reputation value is not only relevant for marketing, but plays 
an integral part in many financial market transactions. Structured debt securities, e.g., are 
especially designed to receive a certain rating (risk profile). The actual rating acts as an ap-
proval of the debt security’s construction. Of course, the reputation value is dependent on a 
high informational quality of the underlying rating service. Therefore, one does not need to 
differentiate between the information and the reputation value in most cases – they jointly 
result from the information intermediation function. 
In general, issuers with a high credit rating from a reputable agency will be able to attract 
many investors and sell their debt securities at a relatively small cost. They have to pay lower 
interest rates than issuers with a low credit rating. Of course it can be assumed that large 
sophisticated investors are able to generate similar information through their own research. 
This, however, would mean a duplication of efforts, as the same information would be pro-
duced many times over. The credit rating agencies, on the other hand, generate the credit 
risk information only once, exploiting vast economies of scale in information production 
(Grundmann and Kerber 2001, p. 269). This is a major reason why the creation of credit in-
                                                
4  Cook et al. (2003) examine the value of reputation empirically in the bank lending market. In a sample of 618 
lending institutions the study finds that reputable banks can generally extract a certification premium from its 
clients which rises with the banks reputation. As details on loans are not published, the premium can hardly be 
traced back to a specific information factor. Thus, the study is a strong indication for an actual and significant 
reputation value in markets with information asymmetries. 
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formation is generally pooled by specialized agencies. Diamond (1984) shows in a formal 
model that the monitoring of credit contracts is most efficiently delegated to some form of 
financial intermediary. In the actual market place large institutional investors still do their own 
credit research, but they use credit ratings as a vital input (Ellis 1998, p. 39). 
Empirical evidence on the information value of credit ratings is mixed. For an overview see 
Boot et al. (2006 p. 101-03), Micu et al. (2006 pp. 3-6), and Norden and Weber (2004 p. 
2816-17). It has been shown that there is a very high correlation between ratings of the major 
agencies and default rates. Credit ratings also have some explanatory power for a debt secu-
rity’s market price5. However, it is not clear to what extent credit ratings bring new information 
to the market. Kliger and Sarig (2000) show that there is definitely at least a small indepen-
dent informational effect: when Moody’s revised its rating categories in 1982, bond prices 
reacted although there were no changes in underlying risks or regulatory benefits. To quanti-
fy the information value, researchers usually concentrate on the question whether credit rat-
ing changes have an impact on market prices. By concentrating on rating changes, aspects 
other than credit risk that have an impact on market prices are largely eliminated. Early stu-
dies from the 1970s produced conflicting conclusions. They either showed significant reac-
tions to rating changes or no reactions at all. Generally, the quantification of the informational 
effect is complicated by potential changes in the regulatory status of bonds which might also 
impact credit spreads. The crucial concept here is the ‘price pressure hypothesis’ (Micu et al. 
2006, p. 5). 
Newer studies often broaden their focus beyond debt securities’ market prices. They also 
look at the reaction of a company’s stock price to a rating change. Such appraisals, however, 
face an even greater risk of distortion by the license value of ratings. If a rating adjustment 
changes an issuer’s regulatory status, this can have a strong impact on the equity value, 
e.g., by lower reporting costs or increasing financial flexibility. It is a principal finding that the 
stock price reacts significantly to a rating downgrade, but to a much lesser extent to an up-
grade. Reactions are stronger for issues of low credit quality compared to issues in the top 
rating categories. Other researchers have observed different reactions of stock and bond 
prices depending whether they were triggered by the agencies’ motive for a rating change or 
by the issuer’s asset structure. Although there have been a great number of studies, the ex-
act information value of credit ratings remains an open question. 
Since the late 1990s, researchers have a new tool to single out the information value of rat-
ings: credit default swaps (CDS). The price of these financial instruments is exclusively de-
termined by the available information on the probabilities of default and loss in the case of 
default. Consequently, prices of CDS only react to rating changes if they bring new informa-
tion to the market. Norden and Weber (2004), Hull et al. (2004), and Micu et al. (2006) are 
among the first scholars to study the impact of ratings from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch on CDS. 
All sorts of rating announcements can cause statistically significant reactions of CDS prices. 
The strongest reaction is seen for negative rating reviews from Moody’s and S&P. On aver-
age, spreads implied by CDS prices climbed 10 basis points on the announcement day. 
                                                
5  It is a logical result that credit ratings only partly explain bond spreads, as these reflect other factors than 
credit risk such as liquidity or taxes, as well. 
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Reactions for other negative events have been far smaller. Studies differ depending on reac-
tions to positive rating events or rating events from Fitch. Generally, the reactions of CDS for 
bonds rated around the investment grade boundary are strongest, i.e. prices have been in-
fluenced by a change in the regulatory status. In sum, available CDS studies suggest a small 
independent information value of credit ratings. To neutralize regulatory effects, future stu-
dies might concentrate instead on bonds rated below the investment grade boundary or on 
ratings from non-recognized agencies. 
Given the weak empirical evidence on the information value, Partnoy (1999) argues that to-
day’s ratings in most cases only reflect information already incorporated into the debt securi-
ties’ market prices. The market reacts to the change in the regulatory status rather than to 
credit risk information. The rating itself is the information and the value of ratings is simply 
derived from the influence on a debt security’s regulatory status. Hill (2004, p. 65-72) dis-
cusses the issue in detail and gives several reasons why Partnoy’s extreme view has defi-
ciencies. Admittedly, the evidence cited can not quantify the relative importance of informa-
tion provision versus the regulatory value. 
Statements by issuers and investors are also not clear on this issue. In a survey around 90% 
of the 41 issuers questioned believe that ratings are very or at least somewhat relevant for a 
broad access to capital and cheaper costs of funding (TBMA 2006, p. 4-8). But it is not evi-
dent if this results from information provision or rating-based regulation. For over 80% of in-
vestors questioned ratings are relevant in their value for internal risk management. But at the 
same time over half of the investors questioned state that their own internal research is more 
important to them than credit ratings, while only five percent say ratings are more important. 
This finding may well reflect the simplicity of ratings, which makes them an easy to use tool, 
whereas it provides no indication of their absolute information value. Future surveys should 
strive to differentiate between the information and regulatory value of ratings. 
Apart from the information/reputation and the certification function, credit ratings fulfill addi-
tional economic roles. It is often mentioned that the relative nature of the rating agencies’ risk 
assessment creates a value by itself, because risky investments of all possible classes and 
countries can easily be compared (e.g., Moody's 1991, p. 75). Some sociologists such as 
Kerwer (2002a) and Sinclair (2000, 2005) have put this into a wider framework. They reason 
that credit rating agencies create a value through standardizing the credit assessment 
process, regardless of the information value of the ratings. The rating agencies constitute the 
credit relationship itself and thus lower general uncertainties between issuers and investors. 
One can argue analogous to Campbell and Kracaw (1979) that rating agencies as financial 
intermediaries provide a mechanism to release private information to the market while main-
taining confidentiality about the information itself. During the rating process, an issuer’s man-
agement is routinely consulted for non-public information. Jorion and Zhu Liu; et al. 2005 find 
empirical evidence that US ratings have gained information value since 2000, when regula-
tion FD provided rating agencies with special access to private information. Yet another pro-
posed function of credit rating agencies studied by Boot et al. (2006) is the provision of a 
coordination mechanism or ‘focal point’ to resolve situations where multiple equilibriums in 
firm investment decisions can be obtained. 
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Figure 2.2 summarizes the major functions of credit rating agencies in three groups. First, the 
information function: credit rating agencies intermediate informational asymmetries between 
issuers and investors by generating information and by providing a reputational bond (regula-
tors are also interested in the information). They also offer a mechanism for issuers to re-
lease private information. Investors and regulatory bodies profit from economies of scale in 
information production. Second, the certification function6: states use credit ratings for rating-
based regulation, which affects investors and issuers alike. Ratings also serve as a private 
risk management tool. Third, the standardization function: credit ratings provide a framework 
for the process of issuing debt and investing into it. Investors can also use ratings for easy 
risk comparison. 
Figure 2.2: Functions of credit rating agencies 
Credit rating agencies can be described as ‘information gathering agencies’ (Millon et al. 
1985, pp. 1403-04). They acquire and process information but do not fund customers in the 
way ‘funding financial intermediaries’ such as banks do. The difference is crucial since rating 
agencies lack a crucial control mechanism: banks are ‘accountable’ for their credit analysis 
because they take a financial stake in the scrutinized assets. The higher the banks’ share the 
greater in turn is their incentive to correctly acquire and process information (Campbell and 
Kracaw 1980, p. 864). Market participants can rely on the quality of the information without 
explicit monitoring. 
The circumstances are different with credit rating agencies. They do not take any financial 
stakes in analyzed debt securities and thus do not have a direct financial incentive to provide 
                                                
6  The reputation function, which has been described as integral part of the information function, might also be 
seen as certification. Here, the certification function has been more clearly defined: A rating serves as a real 
certificate only in that it is used for compliance with explicit public or private rules. The reputation function 
means less: A rating only attests that a debt security has undergone the rating agency’s scrutiny. 
Issuers Investors Regulators 
Standardiza-
tion 
Function comparability of risks 
credit/investment process 
Information 
Function 
Information intermediation: 
 generating information 
 providing reputational bond 
economies of scale in information production 
releasing private information 
Certification 
Function private risk management 
rating-based regulation 
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the best possible service. In other words, credit rating agencies and investors also find them-
selves in a moral hazard situation. Rating agencies may profit from sloppy analysis to save 
effort or they could issue manipulated ratings to either pressure or collude with issuers. 
There are no mechanisms that directly monitor the quality of credit ratings for investors or for 
issuers. Both would need to take the same steps as the rating agencies in order to accurately 
assess the quality of the information. This, if possible at all, would mean a duplication of ef-
forts, the avoidance of which is a major reason for the existence of rating agencies in the first 
place. Typical means to assure quality such as litigation or guarantees are not options for the 
credit rating industry. Although the quality of ratings is observable ex post, it is very difficult to 
hold rating agencies liable. In the USA, e.g., credit ratings have historically been treated as 
‘opinions’ under the First Amendment to the Constitution (e.g., SEC 2003a, p. 4). Guaran-
tees, on the other hand, are not applicable as rating quality is measured against statistical 
default rates. A certain amount of bonds in every class must default in order to reach high 
quality. For cases other than outright fraud, there is no basis to define guarantees for issuers 
or investors. However, there is a feasible indirect solution to the monitoring dilemma: reputa-
tion. Reputation will therefore be the focal point of chapter 3. It will analyze how reputation in 
principal ensures high quality, and which influence it has on the industry structure. 
2.2 Rating-Based Regulation 
The credit rating industry is characterized by the fact that states worldwide use private credit 
ratings as a reference point in rules and financial regulations – ratings gain a certification 
function (for an overview see Sinclair 2005, pp. 42-49). Financial regulation can have many 
purposes; most relevant for rating-based regulation is the protection against systematic risk 
(for an overview of regulatory goals see Balling 2004). The state intends to prevent the ac-
cumulation of too much risk at certain points in the financial system in order to prevent con-
tagious events such as bank runs. The goal is financial stability, which can be defined as “the 
stability of the key institutions and markets that go to make up the financial system” (Crockett 
1997, p. 6). An important component of financial stability is confidence in the system by all 
participants, which can be described as a public good (Dumez and Jeunema 1997, pp. 4-5). 
The state aims to increase confidence since everybody profits through reduced transaction 
costs and increased volumes. There is also a consumer protection side to it, expressed, e.g., 
by rules limiting risk taking by pension funds. 
From a practical point of view it is easy to understand why ratings are an attractive instru-
ment in financial regulation. First of all, credit ratings have proven efficient in their high corre-
lation between risk categories and default rates, regardless of whether they convey new in-
formation7. Second, credit ratings are readily available at no direct cost to all market partici-
pants. This is especially true for today’s common electronic publication. Third, the need for 
continued detailed oversight can be kept at a minimum by matching market recognition and 
regulatory recognition of rating agencies (Brookfield and Ormrod 2000, p. 315). Fourth, rat-
ings are based on reputation and thoroughness, an ideal instrument to increase confidence. 
                                                
7  A general deficiency as a regulatory instrument is the relative nature of ratings. In many circumstances it 
would be more adequate to regulate the absolute level of risk. 
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In sum, ratings are a simple instrument to influence the behavior of participants in financial 
markets. 
By 2002 there were “at least eight federal statutes and 47 federal regulations, along with over 
100 state laws and regulations, reference NRSRO ratings as a benchmark” in the USA (US 
Senate 2002, p. 102). Most EU member states use ratings for a variety of purposes, too 
(CESR 2005, §§ 183-86 and Blaurock 2006, pp.8-9). There is also rating-based regulation in 
many other countries (BIS 2000, pp. 41-44). 
Rating-based regulation can be grouped into three areas (Adams et al. 1999, p. 200): disclo-
sure requirements, investment restrictions, and capital requirements. In the first area, credit 
ratings serve to define disclosure requirements. An appropriate credit rating may lower legis-
lative obligations, or may even be a path to completely avoid supervision. Ratings can also 
be a requirement for issuing special financial products. The goal is to free low-risk companies 
from unnecessary regulatory scrutiny. Secondly, regulators use credit ratings to impose in-
vestment restrictions on certain financial institutions. By prohibiting the holding of unrated or 
low-rated investments, the riskiness of the overall portfolio can be limited. The third category 
comprises all rules concerning capital requirements. Private credit ratings are used in this 
context to determine the riskiness of single assets and the appropriate capital needed to in-
sure against default. The state’s goal is to prevent financial market instability. In all three cat-
egories rating-based regulation has in common that a (high) credit rating either allows a se-
curity to be bought by certain financial institutions, or the cost of holding it to be lowered. For 
the analysis in this study the fact that ratings carry an additional value other than informa-
tional or reputational is of crucial relevance. 
Partnoy (1999) and the SEC (2005) provide a good overview of past and current rating-
based regulation in the USA. Ratings were first incorporated into substantive regulation in the 
United States in the 1930s as a by-product of the then dominant safety-and-soundness regu-
lation that was intended to preserve the systematic stability of the banking system and to 
protect liability holders (e.g., White 2002. p. 51). Most rules were investment restrictions for 
reserve banks, trust funds and saving banks. The term ‘investment grade’, which refers to 
securities rate BBB (or an equivalent rating) or higher, was coined during that time by US 
regulation (S&P 2006, p. 13). 1940 to 1973 was a period with no major introduction of further 
rating-based regulations. 
However, after a credit crisis in the early 1970s new rules explicitly referring to private credit 
ratings were adopted in 1973. For the first time the SEC also introduced a standard definition 
for ratings (SEC 2005, pp. 5-11). Only ratings from ‘Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations’ (NRSROs) can be used to comply with rating-based regulations in the USA. 
The NRSRO designation was important as regulations could now explicitly refer to these 
recognized rating agencies. Since 1975 there have been a large number of new rules, re-
leases and regulations in the USA referring to NRSRO credit ratings in areas such as securi-
ties, insurance, banking, pension or real estate. Rating-based regulation has spread during 
this time to many other countries as well. 
The importance of private credit ratings in regulatory regimes worldwide has further in-
creased with the Basle II Capital Accord issued by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervi-
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sion in June 2004 (BIS 2004). Most countries worldwide are expected to introduce a financial 
oversight framework based on Basle II, to take effect from 2007. The proposals, among other 
things, introduce a regime of differentiated capital requirements for commercial loans based 
on their credit risk. The credit risk assessment can either be provided by internal rating sys-
tems, or by a standardized approach using external credit ratings. Presumably, only bigger 
banks in developed countries have the capacity to create and use internal rating systems. 
Therefore, credit rating agencies could see a boost in the importance of their service world-
wide. With the implementation of Basle II, credit ratings for the first time directly influence not 
only an issuer’s access to capital markets but potentially also its cost of commercial loans 
(Jackson 2001, p. 321)8. 
Rating-based regulation, in sum, is a major force in the credit rating industry. It makes sense 
to explicitly differentiate between the industry’s ‘natural’ structure and the impact of rating-
based regulation. Such a division is useful in order to clearly understand the basic economic 
mechanisms. Further, it simplifies the analysis of the role of the state. We will see that rating-
based regulation is essentially increasing demand for ratings, while potentially restricting 
supply through official recognition. While the analysis is explicitly directed at rating-based 
regulation, it is in large parts also applicable to private arrangements that use credit ratings 
such as voluntary investment restrictions of investment funds. Admittedly, the frictions of pri-
vate arrangements should be lower, as internal investment procedures can be changed with 
greater ease. There is also no direct regulatory barrier to entry. 
2.3 Industry Structure and its Development 
The credit rating industry is today dominated by two global players: Moody’s Investor Service 
(Moody’s) and Standard and Poor’s Rating (S&P). These two rating agencies hold a near 
duopoly. With Fitch IBCA (Fitch) there is only one more but considerably smaller global play-
er that is owned by a French conglomerate (for a short profile of the three companies see 
Smith and Walter 2002, pp. 298-301, for a more extensive analysis of the wider industry see 
Fight 2001, pp. 13-99). Together with the ‘niche agencies’ Dominion Bond Rating Service 
and AM Best, as of 2007 the three market leaders are the only NRSROs in the USA. From 
2008 on, however, the situation is likely to change dramatically since any rating agency with 
a credible client base can register as NRSRO in the USA under the ‘Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006’ (US Congress 2006b). 
Practically all bonds traded today in the USA are rated by Moody’s and S&P and also a large 
majority of international issues are also rated by them (e.g., Hill 2004, p. 48). In 2005 Fitch 
rated 66 percent of all debt securities worldwide (Fimalac Group 2006, p. 33). This means 
that the absolute market penetration of Moody’s, S&P, and also Fitch is very high. The same 
is true for their relative standing: in 2005 Moody’s and S&P shared about 77 percent of 
                                                
8  Indirectly, credit ratings have been important for all kinds of credit for some time: In a survey of 230 senior 
level financial professionals in 2004 nearly 80 percent stated that their credit providers – including banks – re-
quire them to have a rating from S&P, Moody’s or both (AFP 2004, p. 3). 
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worldwide credit rating revenues while Fitch held another 15 percent9. It is noteworthy that 
these three general purpose rating agencies have always been the market leaders since the 
inception of the industry. Moody’s was founded in 1909, the Poor’s Publishing company and 
the Standard Statistics Company that merged to S&P in 1941 started in 1916 and respective-
ly 1922, and the Fitch Publishing Company began its rating business in 1924 (White 2002, 
pp. 44). 
Fight (2001, pp. 6-11) and Sylla (2002) provide a good outline of the historic development of 
the industry. From its beginning in the early twentieth century, the credit rating market was 
for many decades limited to the USA. The country was predestined for credit ratings because 
of its grand railroad development projects under private auspices, and because of the pre-
dominant bond financing in a large and rapidly expanding economy. The credit rating market 
expanded with increasing speed between 1909 and the 1930s. In the 1940s, 50s, and 60s 
the rating agencies faced weak demand in an environment of low volatility, a healthy econo-
my and few defaults (Partnoy 1999, pp. 647-48). A second period of rapid and increasing 
growth began in the mid 1970s and lasts until today. Both periods of expansion have seen 
high volatility and many defaults in the bond markets, as well as an increase in rating-based 
regulations. Especially the second wave of expansion was significant. S&P, for instance, had 
only 30 professionals working in its industrial group in 1980, a number that rose to 800 by 
1995 (p. 650). The expansion was accompanied by an internationalization and later globali-
zation of the rating market. In the 1960s and 1970s first issues of sovereign states were 
rated by the US agencies. In the 1980s Moody’s and S&P started to rate domestic bonds in 
Europe and Japan. In quick succession both companies opened local offices in Europe, Ja-
pan, and later in many emerging markets. In certain cases they also acquired local rating 
agencies that have mainly been founded during the 1980s and 1990s. 
We can outline five factors which have driven industry growth especially since the 1970s 
(Gras 2003, pp. 11-14). First, there have been structural changes in financial markets. The 
number of participants and anonymity have increased, while investment strategies have be-
come more complex and diversified. Second, disintermediation shifted credit from banks to 
capital markets and new complex credit products have been created through securitization. 
Third, individual countries have increasingly financed themselves through the credit markets. 
Sovereign ratings, in turn, have been the basis for local companies to be scrutinized by rating 
agencies. Fourth, American approaches in capital markets have set the standard worldwide. 
One important aspect of today’s globalized financial markets is credit ratings. Fifth, rating-
based regulation has increased in the USA and since the 1990s in many other developed 
and developing countries. All five factors favor credit rating agencies either by increasing 
complexity and informational asymmetries or by raising the number of available debt securi-
ties and regulatory induced demand respectively. 
                                                
9  The market share data is estimated on the basis of the 2005 Annual Reports of Moody’s Corporation, 
McGraw-Hill Companies (S&P), and Fimalac Group (Fitch), as well as on revenue data of several larger 
second tier rating agencies. An exchange rate of 1.28 US Dollar per Euro and 116 Yen per US Dollar was 
used. Note that the large market share differences between the two leaders and Fitch is influenced by differ-
ences in rating fees. Fitch rates a relatively higher share of world wide debt securities than implied by market 
share; its average fees must consequently be lower. For older estimates from 2001 see Hill (2004, p. 60). De-
spite the enormous industry growth since the late 1990ies, Moody’s and S&P have only slightly lost ground to 
rivals. 
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In the USA at any given time there have never been more than five general purpose rating 
agencies. In virtually all other countries there have been and are even less competitors 
(White 2002, p. 33). As the company histories of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch show, most US 
and many domestic agencies of other countries that managed to build up a strong reputation 
eventually merged or were acquired by one of the market leaders. Altogether there have only 
been few entries to the credit rating market – US nationally and internationally – in which 
most companies maintained a narrow focus on a market niche, such as an individual industry 
or country (BIS 2000, pp. 21-39). No national rating agency has so far managed to reach a 
worldwide standing anywhere near the three market leaders. It is remarkable that the number 
of general purpose agencies has remained at its historical levels, although the world market 
for ratings has grown exponentially since the 1970s. 
The increase in market size has been accompanied by many product innovations. Whereas 
ratings were confined to US domestic industrial bonds for many decades, the market gener-
ated several new rating products since the 1970s. Examples are sovereign ratings, bank loan 
ratings, or issuer and bank financial strength ratings (BIS 2000, pp. 97-99). The most impor-
tant new class of ratings is structured finance products, which make up a major part of the 
rating business today. Moody’s generates over 40% of revenues from structured finance rat-
ings, for Fitch it is the most important business and growth driver (Fimalac Group 2006, pp. 
32-33 and Moody's Corporation 2006, p. 7). There have also been several technical innova-
tions. Most notably, rating scales have been expanded or adapted for newly rated debt-
classes such as commercial paper; watch lists as well as plus and minus additions were in-
troduced. Since the late 1990s the leading agencies have begun to offer consulting services 
as well. In general the rating industry has been quite innovative in recent decades despite 
concerns about excessive conservatism in a low competitive environment (Schwarcz 2001, 
p. 307). The main innovators tend to be smaller agencies such as Fitch, which can use their 
leaner organizational structures to move quickly into new segments of the market (Fight 
2001, pp. 48-49). New rating products have become attractive through their usually high 
complexity, which also makes it easier to command premium prices. 
Credit rating agencies traditionally generated their revenues by selling publications to inves-
tors. In the early 1970s, however, all major agencies changed their business model and 
started to charge issuers for the ratings. One reason cited is the emergence at that time of 
low cost copiers (e.g., Cantor and Packer 1994, p. 3). On closer inspection, however, estab-
lishing intellectual property rights does not seem to be the main problem, as other informa-
tion providers did not change their fee structure at that time. The reason lies much more in a 
structural change in demand, as the growing mutual fund industry required a broad and well 
monitored supply of ratings (Chen 2004, pp. 40-41). The traditional subscription fees could 
not offset the increasing costs while at the same time the direct value in the eyes of the issu-
ers was increasing. It simply makes sense economically to charge the issuers instead of the 
investors. The cost for the rating is proportionally spread to the investors according to the 
fraction they hold by a reduction in the yield of the debt security (Partnoy 1999, p. 654). 
If issuers request a rating, they have to pay a yearly fee that increases with the issue size. 
Larger issues tend to be more complex to analyze and – more importantly – they pose a 
larger risk to the rating agencies’ reputation (Herring and Reeve 1986, p. 68 and Schwarcz 
2001, p. 302). As of November 2002, e.g., Moody’s charges 0.033 percent for the first $500 
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million of par value of corporate debt and an additional 0.02 percent above. The minimum fee 
is $33,000, the maximum $275,000 (Covitz and Harrison 2003, p. 7, citing an official Moody’s 
document; see also Partnoy 2006, p. 69 and AMF 2005, pp. 16-17). Smaller agencies charge 
considerably less (e.g., Jewell and Livingston 2000, p. 71). Some rating agencies assign un-
solicited ratings without using private information, for which issuers are asked but not bound 
to pay (e.g., White 2002, pp. 47-48). 
Rating agencies were not especially profitable until the 1970s. Their financial performance, 
however, has increased enormously since then, both in absolute and in relative terms (Part-
noy 2006, pp. 62-68). Moody’s has traditionally been the most profitable agency. On credit 
rating revenues of $1.590 billion in 2005, Moody’s Investor Service generated operating prof-
its of $935 million, which yields an operating margin of 58 percent (Moody's Corporation 
2006, p. 91). Exact data on S&P is not available, since the rating business is part of a larger 
financial services business. For about similar revenues the operating margin is also likely to 
be above 50 percent (McGraw-Hill Companies 2006, p. 70 and own estimates). Fitch gener-
ated a significantly lower – but in absolute terms still remarkable – operating margin of 31 
percent on revenues of €477 million and operating profits of €149 million in 2005 (Fimalac 
Group 2006, p. 112)10. 
                                                
10  As a comparison, the operating margin of Microsoft in 2005 was 37 percent (Microsoft Corporation 2005, p. 5). 
The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation 21 
3 The Role of Reputation 
“A firm has a good reputation if consumers believe its products to be of high quality” (Shapiro 
1983, p. 659). Reputation is typically relevant in multi period relations with asymmetric infor-
mation in which consumers cannot easily observe the quality of the product or service ex 
ante. Nelson (1970) categorizes these products and services as ‘experience goods’. In con-
trast to ‘search goods’, consumers would have to incur high costs to learn about the true 
qualities of experience goods ex ante. It is the simplest way to consume a unit of the expe-
rience good and make further purchases dependent on the information gained after the first 
transaction. Further, the observations made from experience must not be easily verifiable. 
Otherwise there would be no need for reputation as any deviation from a contract involving 
an experience good could be judged by a court (Kreps 1990, p. 116). Such a scenario ap-
plies to the rating context: investors cannot asses the quality of a given rating ex ante but 
have to rely on ex post information about the quality of past credit ratings. While the average 
quality can be perfectly monitored, there is no way to determine the quality of a single rating 
because of its nature as probability. 
The basic idea behind the reputation mechanism in the rating market is simple: rating agen-
cies can easily be monitored ex post by correlating the rating assessments with actual de-
faults. Agencies with a strong correlation build up reputation with issuers and investors for 
their accurate risk assessments. Because of the good reputation, investors believe in the 
rating quality ex ante and value the agencies analysis highly. The issuers in turn seek ratings 
from agencies with high reputation, because their ratings promise the largest reduction in 
borrowing costs. Thus, reputable rating agencies can demand a high price for their rating 
assessment, generating above market returns compared with a situation without reputation. 
In any period, rating agencies could deceive issuers and investors by an unsound analysis, 
either to save costs or to generate extra fees through favorable ratings11. The rating agency 
would earn an extra profit in the period of deceit, but would lose the rents generated from its 
reputation in the following periods. If this onetime gain cannot offset the reduced profits in the 
future, rating agencies will always produce high quality ratings in order to keep and streng-
then their reputational capital. 
The reputational capital view is nearly universally accepted in the credit rating literature. See, 
for instance, Schwarcz (2002, p. 14), or Mann (1999) for a general discussion of verification 
institutions in financing transactions. While some scholars see only little flaws in the reputa-
tion mechanism (e.g., Brookfield and Ormrod 2000, p. 326, or Smith and Walter 2002, pp. 
314-15) others identify different areas of concern (e.g., Partnoy 1999, pp. 655-83, or Sinclair 
2000, p. 495). 
3.1 The Reputational Mechanism 
Among the early scholars concerned with the build-up of reputation Shapiro (1983) describes 
the reputation mechanism in the most intuitive way. His model analyzes the build-up and 
implications of firm specific reputation in a competitive product market with free entry and 
                                                
11  Some examples of deceit or ‘milking’ can be found in Strausz (2005, p. 46). 
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quality choice by firms (see Shapiro 1983, pp. 659-79 for the whole subchapter)12. The only 
deviation from perfect competition is the incompletely informed group of consumers. In the 
rating context considered here, the firms are the credit rating agencies, the product is the 
rating service, and the consumers are the issuers. The issuers are assumed to pursue a high 
quality signaling service as their only goal concerning their rating. 
Shapiro derives equilibrium from dynamically modeling reputation as an asset. After an initial 
period of investing into reputation, firms earn a premium on this reputation in subsequent 
periods, so they earn zero profits ex ante. In particular his model looks at an unlimited time 
frame divided into discrete periods T. The one period interest rate r is assumed to be con-
stant over time. Reputation is built up in relation to a single quality measure q that covers all 
information imperfections in the market. The quality of an agency’s ratings in a given period 
can only be observed after the lifespan of the underlying debt securities. The length of a pe-
riod T is thus assumed to be equal to the maturity of the rated debt security. Specifically, the 
described world consists of a large number of issuers that all issue revolving debt notes. 
Every period they decide whether or not to seek a rating from one of the rating agencies, the 
actual quality of which can only be observed ex post. 
In the rating context, quality q can most easily be interpreted as the correlation between de-
faults and rating categories. There should be more defaults during a given time period for 
every lower rating category. The higher the correlation, the better the relative ranking of cre-
dit risks and therefore the better the signaling service. For an overview on default studies see 
BIS (2000, pp. 126-31). Default studies are conducted by the rating agencies themselves as 
well as by independent scholars13. A high correlation shows that the ratings were factually 
correct and that there has been no manipulation, e.g., resulting from conflicts of interest. In 
other words, high quality is based on both expertise and independence (Hill 2004, p. 75). 
Most correlation studies include transition matrices displaying shifts of ratings between the 
rating categories. A high quality rating service would imply that there are few drastic rating 
changes. Transition studies are especially important because they capture the rating quality 
of debt securities that do not default. 
There is, of course, more to a rating’s quality than a high correlation with defaults, for the 
correlation does not constitute a causal link. A high quality rating should also bring new in-
formation to the market. As already discussed, the information value of ratings is the object 
of many empirical studies. In principle, the information value can be measured for every rat-
ing right after its issuance through its market impact. Since the absolute information value is 
so small and unstable, however, a complete picture can only be gained ex post through a 
                                                
12  Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994, p. 59) suggest that it is more appropriate in a service context to use a 
framework with incomplete quality information on the intermediary’s side. This idea derived from an invest-
ment banking model, however, does not apply to the rating context. Rating quality purely reflects the quality of 
the fundamental credit analysis which is measured statistically and not on a case by case basis. As the agen-
cies have full information about their analytical quality, Shapiro’s model developed for product markets is ap-
propriate. 
13  This definition of quality is only applicable to a pool of ratings. Concerning a single rating, quality could be 
defined as standard deviation of the given rating from the ‘true rating’. Theoretically, such a concept is illogical, 
however, for the true rating would not be a probability of default, but a certain statement: A debt security either 
defaults in a given time period or it does not. Therefore, the quality of a single rating can only be approximated 
by input factors, notably the level of scrutiny during the fundamental rating analysis. 
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large enough data sample. The market might simply not react to single ratings while the fun-
damental credit analysis is still of a high quality. Throughout this work the proven correlation 
studies shall therefore serve as quality measure14. 
Ex ante the issuers are able to observe if at least a minimum quality q0 is provided. This as-
sumption is unproblematic in the case of most physical products, but needs some further 
thoughts in a service context. There are two principle mechanisms to observe minimum qual-
ity. Under an input oriented argumentation, the provision of a minimum quality level can be 
assumed because of the production technology used. Rating agencies provide a fundamen-
tal credit analysis that necessarily employs knowledgeable employees and specialized data 
sources. There are several points of contact in the regular rating process, where employees 
of the rating agency meet with the management of the issuer, so that input factors (especially 
employees) can be observed (Moody's 1991, pp. 87-100). This complexity of the service 
makes the difference to products and simple services. When buying canned soup, e.g., one 
has no information about input factors and production technology, so minimum quality can 
only be observed from what one sees. When buying ratings, on the other hand, issuers al-
ways learn a certain amount about the production technology used. Thus it is realistic that 
issuers can use input factors as a proxy for minimum quality. International efforts to guaran-
tee high rating standards largely build on this mechanism (IOSCO 2004) 15. 
Especially established agencies can hardly camouflage their production technology. They 
might try to use their observable production factors secretly for different purposes in adjoin-
ing businesses. However, there is already detailed information on the issuers’ side about the 
rating process. Big shifts would be detected. In addition, the three market leaders do not 
have major adjacent businesses where they could easily use these resources (e.g., Fight 
2001, pp. 13-99). In order to comply with the model assumptions, one has to rule out any 
sunk or multi-period fixed costs. This assumption is not unrealistic, either: the production 
technology of credit rating agencies is heavily dependent on knowledge of the different in-
dustries and analytical techniques. This knowledge is not firm specific and should thus trade 
on the market at cost. There are, however, firm specific credit risk models. 
From an output oriented perspective, one can argue that recently issued ratings are proof for 
the minimum quality. The minimum quality can be observed once a rating is issued, e.g., by 
comparing the rating with market prices of the underlying debt instrument or other readily 
available data such as company reports. This is especially true in a world with cheap infor-
mation technology and strict disclosure requirements. Ratings and market data generally 
need to be ‘in line’, as financial markets are very efficient. Being in line with the market, how-
ever, only shows that an agency is not wrong on a broad scale while one cannot say ex ante 
if its analysis is superior. Market prices are not a perfect mirror of credit quality, as factors 
such as taxes or liquidity also play a role (ECB 2004, pp. 10-11). In other words, a compari-
                                                
14  Further quality measures could focus on short-term aspects such as the frequency of rating reviews or the 
timeliness of reactions to unexpected events. However, default studies already cover such aspects to some 
extent. Defaults are recorded for different time periods such as one year or ten years. If the agency is slow, 
one year default rates will reveal this, since too many highly rated issues default. 
15  In case input factors are centrally checked by a regulatory body, there is more (confidential) information avail-
able than observed by the issuers. Therefore, input factors can be used to guarantee a quality above q0, e.g., 
in state licensing. 
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son with market data only allows checking for a minimum quality. As long as it is possible to 
check a large enough number of ratings against market data, the mechanism works to relia-
bly detect a negative deviation from q0. If the rating agency were to decide not to provide at 
least minimum quality, e.g., by arbitrary, sham ratings, all issuers would quickly observe this 
behavior and stop buying further ratings from this agency. In the following it is assumed that 
the input oriented method always works to verify minimum quality. In addition, minimum qual-
ity can be checked against market data, if available. 
In order to focus the analysis on the quality aspect, it is presumed that each agency provides 
a given number of ratings. For simplicity, the quantity is set at unity, so one can abstract from 
fixed costs. As a result the costs of supplying ratings of quality qi can be denoted by 
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. The index i covers all possible quality levels. The 
cost structure is also valid for ratings at q0 and below. It is assumed that all providers have 
access to the same technology. Hence, there are many potential rating agencies operating 
under the same cost function and acting as price takers. In its nature, the cost function is 
unspecific to the level of quality for any > 0iq q , i.e. there are no sunk costs that signal a cer-
tain level of quality. At any given date t, each agency faces perfectly elastic demand which is 
only dependent on its reputation Rt at that date16. Accordingly, the price that can be charged 
is denoted as p(Rt). Reputation can thus be interpreted as quality expected by the issuers. 
Regarding the information structure of the rating business, one can realistically assume that 
the issuers can distribute ex post information about product quality among themselves for 
free, while it is not possible to assess quality ex ante17. As described, correlation and other 
empirical studies are an adequate measure of quality that is readily available at no or little 
cost. Rating agencies that choose a lower than contracted quality will thus be punished 
through a decline in the issuers’ willingness to pay in subsequent periods. The immediate 
and complete diffusion of quality information results in the adjustment equation (see Shapiro 
1983, pp. 664-67 for the equations of the basic model): 
 −= 1t tR q  (3.1) 
The demand side of the market is comprised of a large number of issuers with heterogene-
ous preferences. They differ both in their willingness to pay and in their taste for quality. In 
equilibrium, two conditions must be fulfilled regarding the demand side: (a) every issuer 
knowing =( )i ip q p  chooses his most preferred price-quality combination on a given price-
quality schedule, and (b) the market clears at every quality level. Any price-quality combina-
tion not demanded by the issuers will not be supplied by the rating agencies. 
                                                
16  The assumption of perfectly elastic demand is crucial in that it rules out price competition per se. If the as-
sumption is relaxed there exist cases where a high quality equilibrium will not sustain without central regula-
tion (Kranton 2003, p. 386). The matter will be discussed in section 3.6. 
17  As the number of ratings is fixed to 1, the free distribution of quality information does not provide for a com-
petitive advantage in form of ‘free riding’ on existing reputation. In case a reputable rating agency increases 
output in the basic model, it needs to build up new reputation for these activities. 
The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation 25 
The equilibrium price-quality schedule is derived by two conditions regarding the supply side: 
(c) firms with reputation R must find it optimal to supply ratings of quality =q R  rather than to 
deviate from issuer’s expectations, and (d) no entries occur to the rating industry. Shapiro 
describes a situation fulfilling all conditions (a), (b), (c), and (d) as ‘reputation equilibrium’. 
Considering condition (c) one has to posit a state in which the rating agencies have no incen-
tive to milk their reputation. Milking in the rating context means that a high quality incumbent 
secretly reduces its effort and costs. He could, e.g., cancel subscriptions to data sources, or 
reduce the depth of the analysis in order to save labor costs. The issuers cannot observe this 
behavior as long as a minimum level of input factors is still employed. The contact to the 
agency looks normal and the observable rating quality is unchanged. Only after the lifespan 
of the ratings can the reduced quality be detected. In practice much easier and probably 
more relevant form of milking is not to decrease costs but to increase revenue by issuing 
favorable ratings or pressuring issuers with too low ratings. A manipulated rating from a re-
putable agency might be very valuable while it cannot be rightly identified by other market 
participants. 
In any period an agency with reputation = > 0iR q q  could lower its quality to the minimum 
level yielding a onetime profit of − 0ip c . In the subsequent periods the agency either exits 
the market or generates zero profits producing minimum quality as =0 0p c . Alternatively, the 
agency could maintain its quality forever, generating a constant flow of profits of −( )i ip c  
with a present value of + ⋅ −1 ( )i ir p cr . In order for milking to not be attractive, 
+ ⋅ − ≥ − 01 ( )i i ir p c p cr  must hold
18. I.e. the present value of future reputation premiums 
generated from continuous high quality ratings on the left side of the equation must be larger 
than the onetime profit which could be generated from cheating in any given period on the 
right side of the equation. After transformation one derives the ‘no-milking condition’: 
 ≥ + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c  (3.2) 
Equation (3.2) puts a lower bound on prices at which an equilibrium can be sustained. Con-
versely, ‘the no-entry condition’ (d) puts an upper bound on prices. An entry at the quality 
level > 0iq q  is unattractive if non-positive profits are expected ex ante. As a new rating 
agency has no reputation, it can only sell its service at an introduction price of = 0ep p  for 
minimum quality which is readily observable. In his first period the new competitor will thus 
generate a negative profit of −e ip c  with = =0 0ep p c , whereas he can expect profits of 
−( )i ip c  in all following periods. In order to prevent entries the present value of all expected 
profits must be non-positive: − + ⋅ − ≤1 ( ) 0e i i ip c p cr . After transformation one derives the 
no-entry condition ≤ + ⋅ −( )i i i ep c r c p  which can be written as: 
                                                
18  Remember that quantity is set at a level of 1. The term (pi-ci) of course refers to profits per unit, but it is as-
sumed that a single unit contains all ratings. Therefore, one does not need to explicitly consider quantity x. 
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 ≤ + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c  (3.3) 
The two conditions (3.2) and (3.3) determine the equilibrium price-quality schedule: 
 = + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c  (3.4) 
Figure 3.1 shows the equilibrium price-quality schedule and illustrates a firm that has chosen 
= 1iq q : 
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium price-quality schedule (according to Shapiro 1983, p. 668)19 
All ratings with a quality in excess of the minimum quality sell at a premium of ⋅ 0( - )ir c c . 
This premium can be interpreted as return on a one-time information cost of 0-ic c  in the first 
period or alternatively as return on the asset value of the reputation that has been built up in 
the introduction period at a cost of 0-ic c . One can also understand ⋅ 0( - )ir c c  as an annuity 
paid every period on a loan with unlimited maturity that was raised in = 0t  to build up reputa-
tion. 
                                                
19  For ease of depicting, the graph assumes a very high interest rate r which corresponds to very long periods T 
of several years. 
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A point of critique in this simple framework is the basic assumption (3.1) which stated the 
immediate adjustment of reputation after one period, i.e. −= 1t tR q . Typically, there is no such 
black-white behavior of issuers in real markets. A new rating agency might only be able to 
raise prices slowly and issuers might perceive reputation differently while time lapses. In-
stead of one period of loss followed by constant gains in all following periods, rating agencies 
will likely see several periods of losses. At a certain point the agency breaks even in the 
sense that investments into reputation equal reputation premiums earned. From this point on, 
the earned premiums surpass new investments into reputation. Figure 3.2 illustrates this: 
Figure 3.2: Intertemporal reputation returns (according to Shapiro 1983, p. 669) 
Such a picture corresponds with what one expects from real markets: initially, there is an 
investment period, followed by a siphoning phase. Ex ante, the expected profits from the in-
ter-temporal reputation returns are zero. This is the necessary equilibrium condition for no 
entries. It becomes clear that such a view on the reputation building process does not alter 
the mechanism itself. Rating agencies initially deliver high quality ratings below cost, but can 
raise prices above cost in later stages. The possible gains from cheating are thereby more 
than offset by gains from continuous high quality production. 
In the model, the investment into reputation consists only of the price discount in the first pe-
riod. In reality, important parts of it may also be other factors such as marketing costs. An 
unknown agency might need to approach potential customers individually, while issuers will 
turn to highly reputable agencies on their own. Other costs could accumulate in connection 
with demonstrating high quality. Technically, correlation studies can easily be done, but still 
require substantial effort. Newcomers might need to produce such studies by themselves so 
that quality information can spread among their clients and in the market. Even the well es-
tablished agencies such as Moody’s and S&P regularly issue such reports. Given their com-
pany size, however, the cost should not be substantial to them. Other potential burdens for 
newcomers might come with capacity building. For simplicity, such factors will be abstracted 
from and all information costs are assumed to accrue in the form of the initial price discount 
in the entry period. 
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3.2 Reputation and Market Power 
Shapiro’s analysis challenges several informal notions concerning reputation predominant in 
particular in the rating context. Many authors attribute market power to the leading rating 
agencies simply because of the fact that they feature a high reputation (e.g., Partnoy 1999, 
p. 620). This argumentation, however, is questionable, if reputation is seen as an asset that 
yields no first-mover-advantages. It can be built up through an initial investment which yields 
a stream of profits in future periods. Reputation thus does not carry more or less market 
power than any other asset. From the same line of reasoning one can argue against the 
statement that reputation itself is a barrier to entry (CESR 2004, § 58). A barrier to entry is 
any cost differential between firms already in an industry and firms that are planning to enter 
(Stigler 1968, p. 67)20. As long as it is possible to sell subsidized high quality ratings at an 
introduction price of = 0ep p , any newcomer can enter the market. Reputation in this case is 
merely an investment to entry, but no barrier to entry. Given the availability of a milking strat-
egy, it is also always possible to exit the market without a loss. Consequently, there are no 
sunk costs involved in the basic reputation mechanism. 
In the light of the small number of competitors in the credit rating industry throughout its his-
tory, the profitability, and the importance of reputation, it is obvious that some factors will 
prevent the competitive outcome described in the basic model. The question is how exactly 
the actual industry situation influences the function of the reputation mechanism. Most impor-
tantly, one needs to clarify whether the reliance on reputation could indeed be a barrier to 
entry as well as a source of abnormal profits in the credit rating business. 
3.2.1 The Value of Minimum Quality 
In order to build up reputation, new entrants need to sell ratings in the initial period at a price 
level pe that ensures the issuers will not be cheated. This condition is met by the price p0 for 
minimum quality. Any agency providing ratings below this level would immediately be recog-
nized. On the other hand, an agency providing higher than minimum quality cannot be rec-
ognized ex ante. Even though the average quality of new agencies is likely above q0, no is-
suer would pay more than p0, because at any price > 0ep p  a newcomer could generate a 
riskless profit. However, cheating must not be profitable. New entrants thus can either pro-
vide minimum quality ratings at cost or higher quality ratings below cost with the expectation 
of according profits as return to their reputation in the future. 
The price for minimum quality is a crucial variable in the reputation model as it determines 
the initial investment of a high quality producer. The reputation premium is directly dependent 
on the entry price: ⋅ −( )i er c p . A deviation from the perfect competitive results of the basic 
model will occur when the achievable entry price changes over time. Given the historical in-
dustry development, just such as situation has occurred. Today the value of minimum quality 
                                                
20  Stigler’s definition is one of the clearest but tightest definitions of entry barriers. Capital requirements and 
especially sunk costs are no-entry barriers from his point of view. However, sunk costs are an exit barrier, be-
cause they cannot be recovered. In turn, exit barriers potentially act as entry barriers, as incumbents may use 
the sunk costs to make threats of aggressive post entry behavior more credible (for an overview on barriers to 
entry definitions see McAfee et al. 2004, p. 461-65). 
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is zero because freely available market data provides the same information as cheaply pro-
duced ratings. The argumentation behind this idea is straight forward: if the value of a credit 
rating is mainly informational and the information carried by minimum quality ratings can 
easily be checked against freely available information, the rating does not carry much value. 
Instead of relying on a rating, the investors could directly look at the available market data 
without incurring major costs. Therefore, no issuer will buy a low quality rating, as it brings no 
advantages. This argumentation is particularly plausible today, as the pool of freely available 
information such as bond quotes or mandatory business reports is very large and easily ac-
cessible through the internet. 
The same reasoning did not apply to the infancy of the credit rating industry. In the first half 
of the 19th century freely available information was very limited since modern information 
production and sharing means such as copying machines, computers or the internet were 
not available. In addition, strict disclosure laws, which are common today, were only gradual-
ly introduced since the 1930s (Sylla 2002, p. 25). Therefore, one can conclude that there has 
been demand at q0 because minimum quality credit ratings originally did carry valuable in-
formation. This statement is also supported by the fact that for many decades the investors 
directly paid the agencies for the information value of the ratings which can be seen as a 
proof that ratings – even of newcomers – were valuable (Partnoy 1999, p. 640). 
A low quality rating can of course be produced through a fundamental credit analysis with 
real analytical effort at the cost of c0, but today the information generated is not better than 
what is freely available21. With respect to the model one can speak of a ‘competitor’ offering 
ratings of quality q0 at its marginal cost of 022. In the very low quality segment up to the level 
of q0, rating agencies can never compete with market information. It has been argued above 
that the minimum quality of rating agencies can always be checked against input factors. If a 
rating agency sells a rating, it needs, e.g., analysts with contact to the issuer or a manage-
ment team negotiating the deal. These are costs that cannot be avoided. As a result, a credit 
rating agency offering a fundamental credit analysis always acts on a positive cost curve, 
even if it produces ‘worthless’ information at the minimum quality level. The two key points of 
these ideas are firstly that up to q0 all demand will be satisfied by freely available information, 
while secondly a rating agency producing quality q0 has to always incur the positive cost c0 
nonetheless. 
In reality, it is likely that a new rating agency producing ratings through an observable fun-
damental credit analysis provides a quality higher than minimum quality. Issuers and inves-
tors are therefore likely to assume an average quality above q0 which might be high enough 
to offer them a substantial value compared to the free market information. Hence, issuers 
expecting a higher average quality are willing to pay a positive price even though only mini-
mum quality is verifiable. The Shapiro model says only that rational issuers will not pay more 
than costs in order to prevent hit and run strategies. However, it is plausible that the addition 
                                                
21  This is not necessarily true for structured finance products which are usually not publicly traded. Information 
about them is difficult to generate. In such circumstances the line of thought below does not hold. As a result it 
should be comparably attractive to enter segments such as structured finance, for here it is easiest to gener-
ate revenues as an unknown rating agency. 
22  Of course, there are at least some costs such as the opportunity cost of looking up information. For ease of 
analysis such costs are disregarded here. The results hold for any pe<c0. 
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of free information at the minimum quality level will reduce the valuation for lower quality rat-
ings. Relevant for the following analysis are cases in which issuers are only willing to pay 
entry prices below the cost for minimum quality. For the purpose of simple analysis the ex-
treme case of = 0ep  is assumed. Structurally, the same results hold for any < 0ep c . 
What does a changed willingness to pay for ratings of newcomers mean for the reputation 
equilibrium? If one first looks at the no-milking condition (3.2) for established high quality 
producers, one can see that it remains unchanged at ≥ + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c . An agency still 
has to decide either to offer constantly high quality at a profit −( )i ip c per period or to lower 
its quality to the minimum level yielding a one-time profit of − 0ip c . Crucial is the fact that 
issuers can check minimum quality against the agency’s input factors. An established reput-
able rating agency simply cannot close shop and provide its client with information read in a 
newspaper. Even if the issuer cannot see ex ante if the rating information is indeed better 
than the freely available market information, the cheating profit is still limited to − 0ip c . 
Looking at the no-entry condition (3.3) one arrives at a deviation from reputation equilibrium. 
No issuer will assign a positive value to ratings issued by new entrants which can in turn only 
realize a new introduction price of =ˆ 0ep . This is because of the quality uncertainty. Even if 
a newcomer provides high quality, it can only be checked after a certain time. The issuers 
observe if quality is at least q0, nothing more. As this information is freely available, no one 
will ever be willing to pay a positive price to a newcomer. There is also no possibility to raise 
q0 to a level where it has value, since the mechanisms to evaluate minimum quality have not 
changed. The no-entry-condition ≤ + ⋅ −( )i i i ep c r c p  for high quality newcomers changes in 
turn to ≤ + ⋅ −ˆ ( 0)i i ip c r c , as the introduction price ˆep  would no longer match the minimum 
cost level c0. The new no-entry-condition for quality levels above q0 in the absence of any 
positive demand for ratings at or below minimum quality can be rewritten as: 
 ≤ + ⋅ˆ (1 )i ip r c  (3.5) 
As argued, the no-milking-condition (3.2) does not change. Transformed one can rewrite the 
condition as: 
 ≥ + ⋅ − ⋅ 0(1 )i ip r c r c  (3.6) 
Comparing the two equations one can see that there is no longer a definite equilibrium price. 
The market price can now be anywhere between ip  and ˆip  in a range of ⋅ 0r c . The actual 
price level will develop according to the nature of the competition in the industry. Figure 3.3 
displays the interrelation with reference to a firm that has chosen = 1iq q : 
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Figure 3.3: No demand for minimum quality 
In bold print one can see the new no-entry path. A newcomer needs to receive a market 
price of ˆip  so that a high quality entry strategy at any point above q0 can be profitable in the 
first place. Anywhere below this path the initial investment into reputation would be larger 
than the discounted value of all future premiums. Below ˆip  is the original equilibrium path pi. 
However, it has lost its equilibrium property. It now only constitutes a lower price barrier for 
the incumbents who have been in the industry since before minimum quality lost its value. At 
any price below this path it would be more profitable – as before – to reap one-time cheating 
profits than to continue offering high quality. In the lower left corner one can see the follow-
ing: at any directly observable quality, i.e. at any quality lower or equal to q0, the price is 0 for 
newcomers and incumbents alike because the informational content of such ratings can be 
freely read from available market data. The cost of producing such ratings, however, stays 
on the original cost path because a minimum number of input factors must be sustained by a 
rating agency. Obviously, there will never be a market for ratings on these quality levels, as 
costs are above price. 
One can read two important results off Figure 3.3. Firstly, newcomers to the credit rating 
market today face a barrier to entry. They have to incur costs that the incumbents never had 
to incur. In the entry period they receive nothing for their high but unknown quality ratings, 
while the incumbents received c0 when they entered the industry. In other words, the build-up 
of reputation has become more expensive over time. Although newcomers and incumbents 
only need the same reputational capital in order to make a high quality strategy credible, the 
investment needed to generate this capital has increased. The second result directly follows 
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from the first. The initial market players have acquired an ‘early-mover-advantage’ over time. 
The market price can vary in a range of ⋅ 0r c  above the no-milking path pi. Depending on the 
competition between the incumbents there might well be market prices above pi. At such 
levels incumbents make economic profits exceeding their cost of capital. The argument is the 
same as above: they entered the industry under the old no-entry condition, generating a 
positive price in the entry period. Thus, their investment into reputation was comparably 
smaller than the one needed by newcomers today. Thus, the incumbents already break even 
at a lower price. In an open market, economic profits would attract entry, but today newco-
mers operate under different conditions.  
The analysis is supported by actual market developments. The incumbents have been in the 
market since the early 19th century, while the number of successful newcomers has been 
small. No one has managed to independently reach the reputation of the incumbents. Fur-
ther, the credit rating industry has become very profitable over time. This is a clear indicator 
of entry barriers preventing current and potential competition from influencing the rating in-
dustry. Although the model corresponds to the market development, one has to be careful 
about the results, as several other factors also play a role. Rating-based regulation and offi-
cial recognition, e.g., can have similar effects on the competitive environment. One can con-
clude, however, that there are ‘natural’ factors which have at least some explanatory power 
for today’s credit rating market environment. 
3.2.2 Cost Structure Change 
It has been shown that a shift in the value of minimum quality over time is plausible. A 
second possible parameter change concerns the cost structure. The relative cost of services 
– such as credit ratings – has generally increased over time as productivity gains in physical 
production were larger than in services. Put differently, knowledge has gained more weight 
compared to physical production in many areas, leading to a relative price increase of know-
ledge. With specific regard to the credit rating market one can note that the complexity of 
corporations and especially of financial transactions has risen. Although there are better ana-
lytical tools today than at the inception of the industry, the provision of high quality ratings is 
much more complex. New risks from international competition, from fast changing technolo-
gy, or from complex legal positions need to be considered. Many complex financial regula-
tions exist today that were not present decades ago. In sum, it seems realistic to assume 
higher production costs per rating today than at the inception of the industry. 
For ease of analysis a general rise of the cost curve of a factor α >1 is assumed. I.e. ratings 
of any quality level become proportionally more expensive, reflecting an evenly increase in 
factor costs. Alternatively to such a symmetric rise one could also argue for no or only a little 
cost increase on low quality levels but over proportional increases for higher qualities. This 
would especially reflect the rise in complexity. However, such a modeling would not structu-
rally alter the analysis. 
If the whole cost function ci has shifted up to α′ = ⋅i ic c , the incumbents have to attain, ana-
logous to the original model, a price of ′ ′ ′ ′≥ + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c  in order not to have an incentive 
to milk their reputation. The potential newcomers must face a price of ′ ′ ′ ′≤ + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c  in 
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order not to enter. In equilibrium the market price must therefore be ′ ′ ′ ′= + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c . 
From an equilibrium point of view, there is no difference to the basic model. However, the 
incumbents originally decided to enter the industry on the condition that ≥ + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c , 
with ⋅ − 0( )ir c c  as return on the initial investment in reputation. Given that the incumbents 
keep their reputation constant at level i over time, it follows that for generating zero profits 
today a price of π ′= + ⋅ − 0( )i i ic r c c  is needed. If ′ ′− < −0 0( ) ( )i ic c c c  holds, the price to be 
profitable is below the equilibrium price, i.e. π ′<i ip . Under the assumption of a general rise 
of the cost curve of a factor α >1 the relationship holds as α′ ′− = ⋅ −0 0( ) ( )i ic c c c  and thus 
α− < ⋅ −0 0( ) ( )i ic c c c . Consequently, the incumbents generate a steady profit margin of 
π′ ′ ′− = ⋅ − + − >0 0( ) 0i i i ip r c c c c  per period. 
Figure 3.4: Price margin with rising cost structure 
Figure 3.4 shows the situation discussed, again with reference to a firm that has chosen 
= 1iq q . The ‘old’ cost curve ci has shifted upwards by the factorα >1 to the new level of ′ic  
which is drawn in bold. Also in bold one sees the new equilibrium price path ′ip . On this path 
newcomers just have no incentive to enter, while incumbents just have no incentive to milk 
their reputation. However, incumbents are profitable at the new equilibrium level because 
their investment into reputation was based on the original cost curve ci with an initial loss of 
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− 0( )ic c . The ‘old’ reputation premium of ⋅ − 0( )ir c c  is therefore still enough to make the 
incumbents break even. The profitability price path π i  matches the new cost curve with the 
‘old’ premium. All prices above this path provide for profits. In equilibrium the profit margin is 
π′ −i ip . The ‘old’ premium plus the profit margin equals the new premium ′ ′⋅ − 0( )ir c c  which 
is not drawn in the figure for the benefit of a better overview. 
A cost structure shift as described above can provide an explanation for the incumbent’s 
profitability today. Similar to the ceasing value of minimum quality, a cost structure shift 
translates into a relatively higher investment needed. Incumbents had to pay less for the 
same level of reputation than a newcomer would need to invest today. In other words, the 
value of existing reputation has increased over time. Technically, a cost structure change is a 
structural barrier to entry as newcomers have to defray higher costs than incumbents had to 
when they entered. Practically, however, newcomers are not hindered from entering the in-
dustry, as incumbents will increase prices to the new equilibrium level. Below that, it would 
be more profitable to reap one-time milking profits. Thus, no incumbent could credibly com-
mit himself to lowering prices in order to deter entry; the additional profits might only be used 
in non-price competition. All in all, a potential rise of the cost curve is a logical mechanism 
explaining the incumbents’ profitability, even if it provides no basis for a strategic entry bar-
rier. 
3.3 Transfer of Reputation 
A key question of the reputation mechanism is the possibility of transferring an established 
reputation to new market segments or rating products. General research suggests that a 
transfer is altogether possible as long as no ambiguity towards reputation emerges (Kreps 
1990, p. 130). In other words, a clear corporate culture must endure, otherwise the benefits 
from widening the scope of a reputable firm will quickly be outweighed in the consumers’ 
eyes by a falling overall reputation for high quality. Transferring existing reputation is a two-
sided argument. On the one hand, it can be used to explain how a newcomer can generally 
reduce the investment to enter the credit rating market. On the other hand, it offers an expla-
nation for long-time incumbents having a cost advantage over newcomers if they want to 
quickly enter a new market segment. This second case will be used to explain the model. 
Over time several new rating market segments, such as structured finance products have 
developed. Because new segments usually promise strong growth and profits, they are at-
tractive to incumbent agencies and newcomers alike. In order to succeed, both have to build 
up reputation for the new rating product. In the example of structured finance products, dif-
ferent methodologies and analytical tools are needed compared to classic commercial bond 
ratings. According to the basic Shapiro model, the cost of reaching a reputation level of i in 
the new market segment is solely dependent on the entry price pe. The entry price reflects 
the observable minimum quality, which is the same for everybody. In principal, one thus has 
a level playing field. However, established rating agencies can often leverage their existing 
rating business in order to gain a competitive advantage over newcomers who are not yet 
seen as reliable for any credit ratings: the established agencies transfer their reputation 
(Jendges 1996, pp. 103-08). The key argument goes as follows: an incumbent is able to 
convey to the issuers in the new market segment through his existing reputation that he will 
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provide at least a quality level of >0 0rq q . This idea is shown in Figure 3.5, implemented into 
the basic model: 
Figure 3.5: Transfer of existing reputation (Jendges 1996, p. 107) 
The upper price path pi has here not changed in comparison to the basic case, it simply de-
scribes an unknown newcomer. The lower price path pir is applicable to rating agencies suc-
cessfully transferring reputation from their existing rating business. They are thus able to re-
duce the ex ante quality uncertainty from q0q1 to q0rq1 . Up to a quality of q0r they can sell at 
cost, because issuers believe that the actual quality will never run below this level. Only be-
tween q0r and q1, will the transferring agency need to build up reputation according to the 
basic model. 
Reputation is usually connected to a brand name as a vehicle. Market participants associate 
a certain product class, different quality characteristics and an overall image with it. Relevant 
for transferring reputation, however, are only those quality characteristics that apply to the 
new product as well. One speaks of company or brand reputation. Brand reputation can 
usually make up only a part of the reputation for providing a high quality level. The other part 
of the reputation is very specific to the new product and must be generated by investments in 
a way described above (Aaker 1992, pp. 269-70). This is the reason why issuers still have to 
pay a lasting premium. As a rule of thumb, the assumed minimum quality q0r will be higher, 
the closer the existing rating service characteristics match the ones of the new service and 
the greater the overall image of the entrant is. The usual reputation premium on 0( - )ir c c  is 
reduced to a premium for reputation specific to the rating service 0( - )i rr c c . The remaining 
quality qi 
q0r q1 
c1 
q0 
p1 
pi 
ci 
p1r 
company/brand 
reputation 
⋅ −0 0( )rr c c  
 
service-specific 
reputation 
⋅ − 0( )i rr c c  
pir 
price pi 
costs ci 
=0 0p c
=0 0r rp c
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part of the original premium 0 0( - )rr c c  ceases to exist, generating a competitive advantage 
for firms already reputable in related markets. In Figure 3.5 one sees both cases of a reputa-
ble entrant and an unknown entrant. In equilibrium an unknown entrant would need to sell at 
pi whereas a reputable entrant would sell at pir, well below the other entrant’s price. 
Of course, a competitive advantage without any difference in production technology or de-
mand structure for reputable and unknown newcomers causes problems in the competitive 
equilibrium model. For now, the idea of a competitive advantage resulting from existing repu-
tation will be adopted. The actual structure of the competitive advantage will be modeled in 
the following section. 
How does the mechanism work in detail? Although directly unobservable, the issuers believe 
the new ratings to be of quality q0r because of their prior experience with the agency in other 
market segments. Thus they are willing to pay a price of p0r in the initial stage. Two mechan-
isms help to make the new minimum quality credible. The stronger one is a negative spillover 
on reputation in incumbent market segments. If the agency sells the new ratings at a quality 
level below q0r, the affected issuers will draw negative inferences on the agency’s complete 
business. In fact, all the agency’s clients of the incumbent business are able to observe the 
low quality of the new ratings as well. They, too, are likely to reduce their willingness to pay 
because they fear a generally reduced quality. In case of a milking strategy with a price p1r 
but quality q0r, only the new rating business is affected as merely reputation specific to the 
new rating service is milked, whereas the brand reputation covering also the incumbent rat-
ing activities is untouched. By contrast, in the case of a milking quality q0, quality characteris-
tics applicable to all credit ratings are negatively affected. As a consequence, participants in 
incumbent market segments will expect a decreasing quality of their ratings as well and limit 
the price they are willing to pay for unobservable quality. As this effect is potentially very 
large compared to the new business, this threat is assumed to be binding. Thus a quality 
below q0r will never be produced. 
The second mechanism is based on expertise in production technology. The issuers connect 
certain quality characteristics of existing credit ratings directly to the new kind of ratings. 
They anticipate that characteristics applicable to both will have the same specification in ei-
ther product. This idea is based on the assumption that existing production technologies or 
capacities are also used for ‘old’ and ‘new’ ratings, leading to the same level of quality in the 
respective characteristics. The entrants would need to impose costs in order to deviate from 
a high quality level. This argumentation, however, is problematic in the model settings. It im-
plies a production technology specific to a quality level beyond q0. Since quality level-specific 
production technologies above q0 and sunk costs have been ruled out, the focus will be on 
the mechanism described first. 
Incumbent agencies that successfully transfer reputation are able to offer their new rating 
service at the introduction price of = 0e rp p  in the first period. In turn, they cannot provide 
lower quality than q0r once they are established. Otherwise their incumbent businesses would 
be harmed. For a high quality strategy to be profitable, the one-time cheating profits of 
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−1 0rp p  must be smaller than the present value of all future premiums + ⋅ −1 ( )ir ir p cr . One 
thus arrives at a new no-milking condition: 
 ≥ + ⋅ − 0( )ir i i rp c r c c  (3.7) 
If there are several incumbent rating agencies that could all enter the new segment via a 
reputation transfer, expected profits, i.e. the initial loss plus the discounted premiums, must 
not be above zero for additional competitors: − + ⋅ − ≤1 ( ) 0e i ir ip c p cr . One now arrives at a 
new no-entry-condition: 
 ≤ + ⋅ − 0( )ir i i rp c r c c  (3.8) 
Both conditions are similar to the conditions (3.2) and (3.3) in the basic model, with the only 
difference being that the introduction price and the lowest possible quality in a milking at-
tempt both rise to c0r. By combining the two conditions one arrives at the new equilibrium 
price path pir: 
 = + ⋅ − 0( )ir i i rp c r c c  (3.9) 
The equilibrium (3.9) builds on the assumption that there are several reputable potential en-
trants assuring the new no-entry condition. If there is only a single suitable reputable entrant, 
the original no-entry condition for unknown firms ≤ + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c  is relevant. Unknown 
newcomers will only enter the new market segment if prices above pi look realistic. The mo-
nopolistic entrant thus has a pricing margin of 0 0( - )rr c c  which corresponds to the company 
reputation in Figure 3.5. Without competitive pressure he will hold his price close to the origi-
nal level pi, creating positive economic profits. In any event the successful transfer of reputa-
tion by incumbents is an entry barrier for unknown newcomers as the market price can be 
below their profitability level pi. 
3.3.1 Chances of a Successful Reputation Transfer 
The theoretical basis for the transfer of reputation is rather strong. One now needs to consid-
er if the credit rating industry’s specific conditions make the concept a practically viable strat-
egy. If one looks at the historical evidence it seems to be rather easy for incumbents to trans-
fer reputation to emerging market segments. Over time the rating business has expanded 
from railroad bonds to diverse areas such as foreign debt, commercial paper or structured 
finance. In practically all these segments the original incumbents are still the market leaders 
today – they must have had a competitive advantage over unknown newcomers. From a de-
tailed practical point of view there are four areas of limitation which generally might impede a 
reputation transfer: the transferability of reputation itself, possible conflicts of interest, a li-
mited discrimination between brand and service-specific reputation, and the necessity of an 
innovative element. The key is certainly the transferability itself. 
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The central premise for a successful transfer of reputation is the general acceptance of such 
a transfer. The issuers need to believe in a higher quality q0r than the observable minimum 
quality q0. Is the issuer indeed likely to deliver a superior quality in the new field? Such a be-
lief must be based on similarities between the incumbent rating business and the segment to 
be entered. Issuers must have the justifiable opinion that agencies doing reliable business in 
one segment will also do reliable business in another segment. Such trust can develop when 
the two rating services are very similar and share important key elements. In other words, 
company reputation needs to be of high relevance. It has been explained that the track 
record for high quality is the one decisive element in a rating service. Incumbents exhibit 
such a track record in at least one segment of the rating market. This makes it possible that 
customers accept a transfer of reputation, since the agency has proven its general abilities. 
The rating agencies actively support this impression by using the same rating scales for dif-
ferent rating products. While the new ratings might be analytically quite different to existing 
ones, they suggest similarity by choosing the same scale for the outcome. In sum the gener-
al transferability of reputation is certainly given. 
The second area of potential limitation to a transfer process is conflicts of interest23. Even if 
issuers believe that an agency is technically able to provide high quality, there might be con-
flicts of interest between the two market segments preventing high quality in the new seg-
ment. This is especially true if a dodgy behavior in one segment can create business in the 
other segment. Generally, potential conflicts of interest are imminent to the credit rating busi-
ness (e.g. Smith and Walter 2002, p. 289). It is always possible to argue that there is an in-
centive to award a favorable rating for one debt security in order to gain business for other 
debt securities of the same issuer. This holds true even if there is only a single debt security. 
In this case, the incentive of a favorable rating would then be to gain business in future pe-
riods. Because there are structurally no new conflicts of interest, the issue is not likely to play 
a major role in a reputation transfer in the eyes of the investors. The strategic alignment of 
the transferring agency stays focused. It is easy for the investors to understand that a high 
integrity in the new segment of the rating market is vital for the success of the whole compa-
ny. 
A third problem limiting the prospects of success is the perception of the different parts of 
reputation. In some cases it might not be possible for investors and other market participants 
to judge if a drop to q0r from a higher level qi is relevant to the agency’s other businesses, 
although it should actually not be relevant at all. In extreme circumstances any deviation from 
qi could harm its reputation in other segments, even if the issuers and investors originally 
expected merely a minimum quality of q0r resulting from its existing reputation. Once a high 
quality level i is reached, a drop to a lower level potentially affects all other businesses. 
Therefore, a milking strategy on the q0r-level bears a financial risk. In the worst case scenario 
even small accidental deviations from the implicitly contracted quality i would have severe 
negative effects. Thus the strategy of transferring reputation becomes incalculable. 
The danger of a limited discrimination between brand and service-specific reputation is of a 
strong nature in the case of reputable incumbents. Existing and new rating products are likely 
                                                
23  The issue will be discussed in more detail in subsection 5.2.3.2. 
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to be very close in their characteristics. Issuers might wisely withdraw business in the exist-
ing segments in case of a lower than expected quality of new rating products. If there are 
quality problems in the new segment, investors will question the credibility of the whole rating 
agency, not only the credibility of the specific new rating service. This is a major hazard. 
However, such risks are inherent to the reputation-based business model of the rating agen-
cies. Small deviations from expected quality can lead to a major loss of reputational capital, 
be it in one or in several segments of the rating market. Management is hence used to deal 
with such risks and there are internal institutional checks and balances. Or incumbents might 
cautiously enter new segments under different brands through joint ventures and acquisitions 
(e.g., Smith and Walter 2002, pp. 301-02). In sum, the absolute increase in risk should in 
most cases not be large, as the risk is already present even without a reputation transfer. On 
the other hand, the increased risk of random quality problems can be dealt with by internal 
quality management measures which are already present. 
The last area of practical concern is the need for an innovative element. One has to differen-
tiate between new and existing market segments. The first mover in a new segment is per se 
innovative, so there is no problem. Later entrants, however, do need some kind of innovative 
element to be successful (Kroeber-Riel and Weinberg 1996, pp. 280, 291 and Jendges 1996, 
p. 111). This could be a special product feature, ease of use or an accompanying service. 
Pure me-too products usually have a difficult stand in experience good markets as they can 
only compete on price. Even if they manage to efficiently build up reputation, they need to 
offer the same value at a lower price in order to lure away customers from earlier entrants. In 
the credit rating business, the need for an innovative element might become a bottleneck, if 
the market does not demand many different rating characteristics other than high informa-
tional quality. The first or second player might easily enter, while further entrants have diffi-
culties in differentiating. Incumbents can try to offer a superior service during the rating 
process. This, however, does not help if demand is driven by investors who only care for the 
best possible rating and not for the issuer’s convenience during the rating process. In young 
market segments with only small players, the innovative element provided by a veteran 
agency might be its reputation itself. An incumbent can be the first agency in a rating seg-
ment that has generally proven to be able to offer high quality. 
Altogether, the appraisal of the areas of limitation shows that a transfer of reputation to new 
segments of the rating market is a possible strategy for incumbent agencies. The theoretical 
analysis cannot quantify the strategy’s impact, though. Artus et al. (1993) are some of the 
few authors trying to empirically measure this effect. They analyzed S&P’s market entry into 
France in 1990 through a joint venture with Agence d'Evaluation Financiere, a young but 
leading local credit rating agency. The study finds hardly any impact of S&P’s ratings on in-
terest rate spreads shortly after its entry in 1991. Consequently, the assumed entry quality q0r 
was not much higher than q0 which by definition has no impact on market prices. Although it 
is only a single example, the paper shows that a transfer strategy is likely to bring only limited 
benefits to incumbents. But even if the ability is limited, it might still be a competitive advan-
tage towards outsiders not active in the rating business at all. 
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3.3.2 Market Potential of Reputable Non-Rating Newcomers 
So far the transfer of reputation has been modeled from the perspective of an already reput-
able rating agency moving into new market segments. However, reputable companies from 
non-rating businesses might also use the strategy to enter the rating market. Technically, the 
same mechanism applies. Because of their high company reputation they might persuade 
issuers to believe in an increased minimum quality of q0r. If one again first looks at the histor-
ical evidence, it seems to be difficult for external entrants to transfer reputation to credit rat-
ings. If it were easy, there would have been many attempts of entry as well as constant price 
pressure on existing agencies over time. However, in the credit rating industry’s history, in-
cumbent agencies never have been under significant competitive pressure from outside en-
trants trying to leverage their reputation acquired in non-rating markets. The BIS (2000, p. 
21-22), e.g., lists the owners of 29 mostly global and regional rating agencies. While some 
are from the financial community, no agency is dominated by a single owner who could leve-
rage his brand name. Thus there might be factors at work which make such a competitive 
strategy per se difficult or even impossible. 
Looking at the central question of transferability itself, one can see that only companies that 
offer services with similar characteristics can be seriously considered. The firms most likely 
to be able to transfer a meaningful amount of reputation to the credit rating business are from 
the larger financial community. Banks, auditors or insurance companies are some examples. 
They have sophisticated analytical skills, experience in finance, as well as a high level of 
professionalism and confidentiality; all characteristics that are required to be successful in 
the credit rating business. The key element of a successful rating service, however, is its 
track record. Investors only believe in the quality of ratings after they have seen proof for it 
over a longer period of time, regardless of how qualified the new entrant might be judged by 
the track record in his traditional markets. Put differently, reputation in the rating business is 
strongly connected to output. A good reputation regarding input, on the other hand, is not 
central. Issuers want to see that a company has proven to be generally able to rate before 
they will believe in an unseen increased minimum quality. Therefore, a meaningful transfer of 
reputation to the rating market is likely to be very difficult. 
In addition, there are potentially very strong conflicts of interest for entrants from the financial 
community. They might have an incentive to provide artificially high ratings in order to ac-
quire business from a rated organization in other markets. An insurance company, e.g., 
might rate the bonds of a client favorably in order to secure large insurance contracts with 
the same company. From a theoretical point of view this argumentation is weak, as favorable 
ratings would be detected after the lifespan of the debt securities with potentially strong neg-
ative effects for the agency. Investors would stop valuing the ratings, so no issuer would 
have any incentive to buy them anymore. Furthermore, the incumbent businesses might also 
be harmed. The general company reputation for high quality service is at stake. In this ex-
ample fewer clients would contract with the insurer in its core business. Because of these 
potential dangers, it would be irrational to provide artificially high ratings, as it is irrational for 
incumbent agencies. The sensible strategic options remain either to provide constantly high 
quality or to broadly milk reputation. Conflicts of interest might at most trigger cases of indi-
vidual fraud. Single people or divisions of a company might try to secretly profit from provid-
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ing rigged ratings. However, such risks are inherent to most financial businesses and com-
panies have internal measures to prevent them. 
In sum, conflicts of interest should not be a major issue for reputable entrants, as there is no 
room for deceit in a reputation-based business model. But from a practical perspective the 
mere existence of these potential conflicts of interest can pose a problem since not all inves-
tors can be expected to judge rationally. A finding supporting this thesis is the multitude of 
measures for rating agencies to actively convince investors of their integrity (Covitz and Har-
rison 2003, p. 8). A potential conflict of interest is already a threat to the build-up of reputa-
tion towards the investors. Even if all issuers do not expect any misconduct on the part of the 
new rating agency, they know that some investors will become wary when they buy ratings 
from an entrant who could abuse the ratings to assist its other businesses. For the investors 
who do not trust in the ratings of a new agency, the issuers cannot realize any benefits asso-
ciated with these ratings. Therefore, rational issuers will also take potential conflicts of inter-
est into account. Since such conflicts are stronger for reputable newcomers with adjacent 
businesses, the transfer strategy becomes comparably more difficult than for incumbents. 
The remaining two areas of practical concern require less thought. The danger of a limited 
discrimination between brand and service-specific reputation is also present, but to a lesser 
extent compared with incumbent rating agencies. The new rating service is less similar to the 
existing outside business. Any likely reputable outside entrant should feature a risk man-
agement system preventing large, random quality variations. In regard to the need for an 
innovative element the same argumentation as above applies. A first mover is per se innova-
tive, for later entrants it will be more difficult to innovate. 
If one combines these findings, one can see that external companies have practically little 
chance to successfully transfer reputation to the credit rating business. The key is simply the 
difficulty to convince issuers and investors that the new rating service shares enough charac-
teristics with the existing business so that a higher assumed minimum quality of q0r is justi-
fied. Limitations to a transfer strategy might also arise if some investors have quality con-
cerns because of potential conflicts of interest. If one compares the possibilities for reputable 
rating agencies and companies whose reputation is based on other financial businesses, the 
result is clear: it is only possible for the former to use this strategy. Incumbent rating agen-
cies might be able to offer their new service at a low equilibrium price pir. Even if the differ-
ence to pi is small, outside entrants cannot compete at this price level. They always need to 
build up more product-specific reputation than incumbent rating agencies. In any case, they 
have a cost disadvantage which acts as entry barrier. 
Experimental research from Alpert and Kamins (2004) shows that market leading incumbents 
who are able to successfully assert their status in the eyes of customers have a competitive 
advantage in the transfer of reputation24. Specifically, the advantage lies in the customers’ 
positive perception of the incumbent’s ability to be a successful market leader in an adjoining 
market. In the reputation model, this corresponds to a high q0r assumed by issuers and in-
                                                
24  Although the study uses household panels as the research method, the results are likely to hold for the credit 
rating market. The investors – the ultimate consumers of ratings – include many ‘unsophisticated’ individuals 
and small institutions that can be expected to act similarly to the households. 
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vestors. These experimental findings support the implications for the credit rating market. 
The leading companies – and thus in general the biggest companies – are most likely to 
transfer reputation25. 
Both experimental and empirical research on the credit rating market is supportive. As cited, 
there are no reports on successful examples of outside companies leveraging their reputa-
tion (BIS 2000, pp. 21-22). The three major rating agencies, on the other hand, have all leve-
raged their reputation to expand into emerging foreign markets (Smith and Walter 2002, pp. 
301-02). As discussed above, a very cautious management is needed in this process. Nega-
tive impact onto the existing rating business resulting from quality problems beyond the 
management’s control in new market segments must be prevented. This explains why the 
leading rating agencies are expanding into more risky emerging international credit rating 
markets through local partners. Only after several years can these partners become an au-
thorized local branch operating under the incumbent’s name. 
3.4 Frictions Explaining the Transfer Process 
In the reputation transfer process it has so far been argued that the new minimum quality q0r 
is binding because of negative spillover effects on existing markets. This is plausible from a 
practical perspective. From a theoretical point of view, however, the transfer of reputation 
cannot be explained within the perfectly competitive world of the model. Equation (3.1) above 
posited the diffusion of information within a market only after one period, i.e. −= 1t tR q . It de-
scribes a time lag which also applies to information diffusion between different market seg-
ments. Clients in the incumbent segment will only learn about the actual quality in the new 
segment after one period. Consequently, they can consider a milking strategy in the new 
market segment in their buying decisions on the incumbent market only after one period as 
well. In other words, negative spillover effects are delayed by one period. Therefore, there 
will always be a profitable cheating strategy: a reputable rating agency could offer its servic-
es in a new market segment at the observable minimum quality q0 but charge a price of p0r 
reflecting the minimum quality q0r assumed by the issuers. This would yield a positive one-
time profit of −0 0rp c . If the company were at the same time to pursue a milking strategy in 
all its other segments, there would be a strictly positive profit overall. By definition, in equili-
brium the milking strategy merely produces zero profits on the other segments. This was 
precisely the calculation used to arrive at equilibrium. Given this profitable strategy, the threat 
of a negative spillover cannot be binding, i.e. issuers would not believe in the higher mini-
mum quality in the new segment. 
This result conflicts with many real examples for the successful transfer of reputation. Appar-
ently, there are practical factors preventing a profitable milking strategy in the transfer 
process. Theoretically only frictions surrounding the reputation mechanism can explain this 
phenomenon. The real rating market does not feature a distinct equilibrium price, but a range 
of possible market prices exist. 
                                                
25  This is also consistent with the concept of cheating costs to be introduced in section 3.4. Market leaders have 
the largest cheating costs which they can pledge against the issuers trust. 
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3.4.1 Market Prices Above Equilibrium 
The simplest friction which can explain a successful transfer of reputation is market prices 
above equilibrium or respectively above the no-milking price. If incumbent agencies produce 
long-term economic profits, they have a strong incentive to stay in business, because a milk-
ing strategy can only produce zero profits. When the profits are substantial, they override any 
inducement to cheat in a new rating market segment. The basis for market prices above 
equilibrium are deviations from perfect competition. In particular there must be a protection 
from outside competition in the form of entry barriers. Only if incumbent agencies do not 
have to fear new entries to their industry, do they in principal have the leeway for durable 
price increases. As analyzed above, one entry barrier results from a changing value of mini-
mum quality. Generally relevant for entry barriers is the fact that potential entrants must bear 
costs the incumbents never had to bear. 
Let us assume a fixed cost γ  in the first period for new entrants. The cost curve for providing 
ratings remains unchanged from gamma at ci because γ  is only the cost to enter which is 
unconnected to actually producing ratings. The no-milking condition ≥ + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c  
does not change either, for it only regards current and future profits of a reputable incumbent 
and not the entry cost. The no-entry condition, on the other hand, is affected. The investment 
into reputation is increased by γ  to γ− +i ec p  (with = 0ep c ) compared to what the incum-
bents had to pay. As above, entry is unprofitable if the discounted premiums are smaller than 
the initial investment, i.e. γ⋅ − ≤ − +01 ( )i i ip c c cr . After conversion one arrives at a new no-
entry condition: 
 γ≤ + ⋅ − + ⋅0ˆ ( )i i ip c r c c r  (3.10) 
Similar to Figure 3.3 one arrives at a state where the no-entry price is above the no-milking 
price by a margin of γ⋅r . Figure 3.6 depicts the situation with reference to an agency that 
has chosen the quality level q1. One can see the familiar cost curve ci which is determinative 
for the no-milking price path pi. In the basic model pi is the equilibrium price level. Here, how-
ever, there is a possible price range of γ⋅r  between pi and ˆip . The reason is the entry cost 
of γ , which is displayed in the form of the broken line. All new entrants must bear this cost. 
As a result, they must generate higher reputation premiums than incumbents in order to cov-
er their increased investment. At the price level of ˆip , potential entrants would break even. 
The entry cost does not depend on quality. Therefore, ˆip  can simply be derived by moving pi 
upwards about γ⋅r . 
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Figure 3.6: Entry barriers 
If a rating market segment is indeed protected from new entrants, it is possible that the in-
cumbents generate lasting profits. Let us assume that an established rating agency is active 
in j segments, producing regular profits of γ j  in each. The sum of these profits must be 
weighed against the potential gain from a milking strategy in the context of a reputation trans-
fer. While the agency can successfully dupe issuers in the new segment, it will risk all of its 
future profits in its existing businesses. Only if this potential loss is a substantial pledge, will 
issuers initially accept a transfer of reputation. Specifically a successful transfer requires that 
the sum of the profits is larger than the one-time cheating profit −0 0rp c  in the new market 
segment: 
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The strategy to cheat in all market segments simultaneously is not only viable in the period of 
transfer, but in any period because there is never an immediate way to control the higher 
minimum quality q0r in the new segment. This means a reputable company can only expand 
via the transfer of reputation on a fixed and limited scale because profits from incumbent 
segments must be permanently pledged. 
However, if it is possible to increase the price in the new segment from a level of pir to pi, the 
pledge of economic profits from other market segments is no longer necessary. At pi the 
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highest possible milking profits with a milking quality of c0 are by definition offset by the gains 
of continuous high quality production. A price increase to pi is in principle possible, because 
after the reputation for high quality has been established in period t, issuers know about it 
from period +1t  on. If the competition allows for it (e.g., if there is only one agency in the 
market able to enter via a reputation transfer strategy) the price in period +1t  can be in-
creased to the level pi. In this case, the new market segment turns its structure into an in-
cumbent segment with reputation described in the basic model, with the exception that posi-
tive economic profits are generated, as there has been no full initial investment into reputa-
tion. The originally pledged profits from incumbent segments can then again serve as insur-
ance for further reputation transfers. Note that the profits generated in the new segment at a 
price of pi cannot be used as a pledge for a reputation transfer to other segments. These 
profits arise because of the reduced investment into reputation, not because the market price 
rises above the no-milking price. At pi a rating agency is indifferent between milking and con-
tinuously providing high quality; the discounted profits are the same for either option. 
One can conclude that rating agencies creating economic profits can credibly transfer their 
reputation to new rating market segments. Admittedly, the size of profits sets a limit to the 
speed of expansion. The profits can only be pledged once and are bound until the price in 
the new segment rises at least to a level equivalent to a ‘normal’ reputation equilibrium. The 
result is a sequential expansion of the credit rating business, because issuers and investors 
will only accept unproven minimum quality on a limited scale at any given time. If the new 
market segment is very large compared to the existing business, even the biggest incum-
bents are likely to be unable to prevent substantial new investments into reputation. Howev-
er, the bigger the company the larger is the potential scope for reputation transfers. 
3.4.2 Cheating Costs  
So far the possibility of a credible reputation transfer has been ascribed to entry barriers 
which open up the way for sustained profits. On the other hand, frictions in the reputation 
mechanism can also be modeled as exit barriers. Specifically sunk exit costs in the form of 
cheating costs hi (h for hiding) are relevant. Cheating costs also break with the original per-
fectly competitive assumption. However, they fit well into the picture one expects from an 
actual industry. Cheating costs mean that an established agency cannot abruptly lower its 
quality to q0 without being detected. It needs to incur costs to disguise its action, keeping the 
quality drop hidden from the issuers until they discover this after the end of the period. The 
assumptions of quality uncertainty beyond q0 and a production technology not specific to a 
quality level beyond q0 are still valid. Cheating costs simply accommodate the fact that sur-
rounding factors other than the actual informational quality may hint at a milking strategy. 
In the rating process there are several points of contact between the agency and the issuers. 
It has been argued that these contacts work as a guarantee for minimum quality as the issu-
ers learn about some of the available input factors (e.g., personnel). However, issuers cannot 
learn more than this from what they see. Hence, a milking strategy cannot be detected. While 
the personnel externally representing the agency stay the same, the internal analytical 
process might be altered in order to save effort. I.e. employees could be shifted to other 
projects. Such a strategy seems practical in a single case, but on a broad scale there are 
obvious problems. In order to significantly save costs, an agency must eliminate personnel or 
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shift them to different businesses or markets. As a result, it is not possible to sustain the 
agency’s known standards in client relations. If there are significant changes, at least some 
issuers will detect this and spread the information. While it is not possible to detect an actual 
quality reduction, broad scale changes in external relations clearly suggest a big shift behind 
the scenes. This can only mean a reduction in quality as an upward shift would be gradual 
and be inclined to involve additional personnel. All taken together one can conclude that high 
quality incumbents need to keep more personnel for milking as would be needed to just pro-
duce minimum quality. This is equivalent to an extra cost accruing in milking. (Newcomers in 
their entry period, on the other hand, face no such restrictions as they could plan with minim-
al input factors from the outset.) 
Considerable cheating cost can also be expected in the process of preventing a leakage of 
internal information concerning the quality reduction. If the issuers learn from a credible 
source such as a discontent senior employee about the milking strategy, they will immediate-
ly stop buying ratings. A rating agency pursuing the milking strategy must internally set in-
centives to prevent such a conduct. However, there is of course no absolute safety for the 
agency. In this respect cheating costs can be modeled as a probability of leakage, with the 
interesting feature that the expected loss increases over-proportionally with size. This is be-
cause a single point of leakage affects the whole company. If a few issuers learn about the 
milking attempt, the information will spread quickly. This conforms to the basic assumption 
−= 1t tR q  in equation (3.1) which precludes that quality information quickly spreads among 
clients once available. Further, the higher the drop in quality, the likelier a leakage is as its 
‘value’ rises. This explains why cheating costs are best modeled against quality. As a result 
one can conclude that cheating costs rise with the complexity of the business. Large, reputa-
ble rating agencies have an absolute and also relative higher amount of cheating costs. 
If a reputable company chooses to cheat its customers in period t, a cost of hi for hiding its 
action dependent on the quality offered in −1t  is assumed. As a result, the no-milking condi-
tion (3.2) changes. The possible cheating profit is reduced to − −0i ip c h  while the dis-
counted benefit of high quality production is unchanged at + ⋅ −1 ( )i ir p cr . For stable high 
quality production, cheating profits must be smaller than the honorable alternative. Therefore, 
one arrives at a new no-milking condition for cheating costs: 
 ≥ + ⋅ − − ⋅0( )hi i i ip c r c c r h  (3.12) 
The no-entry condition (3.3) remains unchanged at ≤ + ⋅ − 0( )i i ip c r c c 26. Thus for an agen-
cy that has chosen the quality =1i  one ends up with a pricing power margin of ⋅ ir h , which 
is displayed in Figure 3.7: 
                                                
26  At this point it is assumed that entrants consider a high quality strategy at the equilibrium price as the stable 
market outcome. 
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Figure 3.7: Cheating costs 
The figure shows the familiar cost curve ci and the equilibrium price level pi. In the lower part 
one sees the broken cheating cost curve hi. As argued, cheating costs only accrue with milk-
ing and must be deducted from the milking profit of − 0ip c . This is why it becomes less prof-
itable to cheat. The price path hip  describes at which price a reputable agency is indifferent 
between high quality production and milking. This path must not be mistaken as equilibrium – 
the zero profit equilibrium is still described by pi. What one sees, however, is that reputable 
agencies will be less likely to milk their reputation when cheating costs are included. Down to 
a market price of − ⋅i ip r h  high quality production is superior to milking. 
If the market price stays at ip , there is room for transferring reputation
27. In order to cheat, 
the incumbent has cheating cost ⋅ ir h  per market segment j he is active in. As long as the 
sum of all cheating costs is higher than the value of the transferred company reputation 
0 0-rp c  in the new segment, it is unprofitable to choose the milking strategy: 
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j
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27  Such a market outcome is likely, as any price below pi would mean a loss on the capital investment into repu-
tation. For a detailed appraisal see section 4.3. 
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Again, the strategy to cheat on all segments simultaneously is viable in any period. The 
pledge of cheating costs therefore needs to be permanent. Only if the market price in the 
new rating segment rises from pir to pi, can issuers safely expect no-milking attempts. Similar 
to the case of economic profits, incumbent agencies can only expand via the transfer of repu-
tation on a fixed and limited scale. The analysis of cheating costs also bears another interest-
ing result: the higher the current quality and the bigger the rating agency, the higher are the 
costs for hiding a milking strategy. Therefore, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch are able to transfer 
much more reputation than small competitors, thus strengthening their competitive position. 
Cheating costs have just been identified as the source of a competitive advantage of incum-
bents, because they make possible the credible commitment not to cheat when transferring 
reputation. Laterally reversed, each competitive advantage of an incumbent is a disadvan-
tage for potential entrants. Cheating costs can therefore also be described in the framework 
of entry barriers. 
Thus far Stigler’s definition of entry barriers as cost differentials has been used. If one neg-
lects the time dimension, the introduction of cheating costs hi in this sense does not consti-
tute a barrier to entry. Any company could follow an incumbents’ development path: entering 
the original rating market, building up reputation, and then using this reputation to enter other 
rating markets on competitive terms. But in a shorter time horizon the picture looks different. 
If an incumbent transfers reputation to a new rating market, a newcomer could not follow 
easily. The incumbents moving to a new market need a price level of pir to be profitable, whe-
reas a newcomer would need to charge >i irp p . In other words, there exists a cost differ-
ence between unknown newcomers and reputable incumbents, for the short-term investment 
into reputation is larger for the newcomers. Thus, cheating costs can be the basis for short-
term entry barriers to innovative rating market segments. Specifically, ‘short-term’ means at 
least the length of one period T that is needed to build up reputation in the original segment 
which can then be transferred in the next period. With long-term commercial bond ratings, 
e.g., a single period might comprise several years to verify informational quality. In the actual 
market this is a substantial amount of time which might well exceed the planning horizon of 
most businesses. In other words, the ‘short-term’ is already so long that the entry barrier is 
absolute. Because of the long planning horizon companies will not take the risk. 
It has just been shown that cheating profits and the resulting advantage in transferring repu-
tation are a relevant barrier to entry under the strict definition of entry barriers as cost diffe-
rentials (Stigler). In a wider context, there is a second very important dimension to the issue if 
one looks at entry barriers as “a rent derived from incumbency” (Gilbert 1989, p. 478). Cheat-
ing costs can be interpreted as rents which are lost in comparison to a continuous high quali-
ty strategy. This reflects their nature as sunk costs. Consequently one can argue that cheat-
ing costs hi allow strategic pricing to deter new entries (McAfee et al. 2004, p. 463). If a new-
comer seems likely to enter an established market segment, incumbents could lower their 
price to a level of hip . Because a part of the investment in reputation has effectively become 
a sunk cost that cannot be recovered upon exiting the industry, issuers will not suspect a 
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milking attempt by such a price move28. At hip  entrants face expected losses ex ante, so they 
would not enter in the first place. One can therefore claim that cheating costs are much more 
than a barrier to entry for unknown firms in innovative market segments. They are potentially 
the basis for a general entry barrier into any established market segment if incumbents can 
indeed credibly commit themselves to a post entry price below pi (the likelihood of such be-
havior will be analyzed in section 4.3). 
3.5 Reputation and Growth 
Shapiro’s model and its various expansions have thus far completely eliminated the aspects 
of quantity and growth. It was assumed that every agency produces the optimal quantity 1 
which does not change in later periods. However, the credit rating market has multiplied its 
size over time. A lot of this growth came from new rating products, but the classic industrial 
bond ratings also increased substantially (e.g., Fight 2001, p. 7). Within the basic model such 
a quantity expansion is only possible if reputation is developed for every new unit of produc-
tion capacity. From a practical point of view this assumption is unrealistic: Moody’s and 
S&P’s reputation for high quality is widely known. Every new issuer who seeks a rating in 
one of the established market segments will rely on this information. There is no need for an 
initial discount for the large incumbents to overcome an informational asymmetry. Only lesser 
known competitors, who are not generally accepted in the market as high quality producers, 
will need to build up reputation in the eyes of each new customer. 
There are two principal categories of growth. Either industry growth is expected in = 0t  or it 
comes as a surprise in later periods. If there is constant growth expected ex ante, the model 
changes only slightly. The no-milking-condition (3.2) has been derived by equating the dis-
counted future premiums + ⋅ −1 ( )i ir p cr  with one-time milking profits − 0( )ip c . With antic-
ipated constant growth, there are additional contributions to profit whose present value ∏  
has to be added to the discounted future premiums ex ante. Since growth is assumed to be 
constant, ∏ is the same in any given period. As a result, the quality assuring price path pi will 
move downwards to ≥ + ⋅ − − ∏0( )i i ip c r c c . Similarly, the no-entry price falls to the same 
level, since entrants can expect higher profits and are willing to enter at lower market prices. 
Thus the quality assuring price in a scenario with anticipated constant growth is 
= + ⋅ − − ∏0( )i i ip c r c c . There are no changes to any of the model mechanics which have 
been explained in this chapter. 
Analytically more difficult is the case of unexpected and inconstant growth. It is a realistic 
assumption that rating agencies and issuers did not anticipate the industry’s massive expan-
sion over time. Growth came at least in part as a surprise and it has been erratic. Within the 
equilibrium reputation framework it is difficult to integrate an unstable environment ex ante, 
because incumbents and newcomers take different development paths. The key problem lies 
                                                
28  This of course implies that no cheating costs are ‘pledged’ in some new market segment as part of a transfer 
strategy. Otherwise it would be profitable to exit the threatened existing market with no disadvantage com-
pared to continuous production, but reaping milking profits in the new market. 
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in the inflexibility of the price path pi which cannot fall easily. The no-milking price has the 
informational asymmetry − 0( )ip c  as input which does not change with the quantity of rat-
ings supplied. Clearly, if the number of ratings grows, the sum of milking profits rises propor-
tionally. As a consequence, the sum of reputation premiums must also rise proportionally. 
This is exactly the case when the premium per rating is constant, reflecting the unchanged 
informational asymmetry. In other words, the no-milking price and therefore the whole price 
path pi cannot fall. Contrary to the case of constant growth there is no assurance that future 
premiums will rise so that today’s no-milking price falls. 
Since unexpected growth is a reality, the question arises as to what happens with the addi-
tional profit contributions? The answer ultimately is dependent on market power and issuer 
rationality. There are two possible cases: either the issuers acquire the benefits from a 
spreading reputation, or the rating agencies do. If new issuers take the high quality of an 
agency for granted in an existing market segment, they do not hesitate to pay a price pi. At 
this price, the agency generates profits because there has been no investment into reputa-
tion. A rational issuer knows this fact. Although there is no quality uncertainty, he will demand 
a price discount in the first period. In a competitive market new issuers will in fact be granted 
the price discount since profit seeking rating agencies will underbid each other as long as 
profits can be generated. Although there is no longer a quality uncertainty in this scenario, 
the price mechanism of the reputation framework stays intact as discussed. Instead of an 
initial discount reflecting the quality uncertainty rating agencies grant a discount to gain new 
clients29. 
The picture looks differently in a world of frictions and market power. If there is little competi-
tive pressure between the incumbents, issuers who seek a high quality rating might have no 
other choice than to directly pay pi. The credit rating market today seems to resemble such a 
situation. Price discounts of Moody’s or S&P for new issuers are at least not known to the 
author. 
The described scenario can be built into the reputation framework by applying reasoning sim-
ilar to the transfer model above. In contrast to new market segments, there is no ‘remaining’ 
quality uncertainty in existing market segments when buying from one of the long-term in-
cumbents. New issuers will directly believe in the high quality of the big market leading agen-
cies, i.e. they believe =0 1rq q . The complete reputation premium is covered by compa-
ny/brand reputation. Technically, the experience good resembles in these settings a search 
good. Contrary to the transfer model, the equilibrium price path will not change because the 
minimum quality is still assumed to be q0. The incumbents can reap the full milking profits by 
lowering their quality from q1 to q0. Thus they must earn at least a market price of p1 per rat-
ing in order to have an incentive to constantly provide high quality. At this price, however, 
incumbents realize positive profits. Figure 3.8 shows this situation in a simple two stage 
model: 
                                                
29  Such a mechanism makes only sense if clients are locked-in to the rating agency after their discounted pur-
chase. The issue will be analyzed in section 4.2.2. 
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Figure 3.8: Profitability in incumbent rating market segments 
One sees a high quality credit rating agency providing a rating service at q1 realizing an equi-
librium price of p1 while always having costs of c1. The market price is the same in all stages 
because at any point below p1 milking would be profitable. As analyzed, this is because the 
detectable minimum quality does not change. In the first stage from period 0 to X, the rating 
agency has no general market reputation. That means its clients believe in the high quality 
only after they have tested it. For every new issuer the agency has to build up reputation. No 
economic profits are generated. In period X the agency succeeds in building up a wide-
spread reputation for high quality ratings in the market. Everybody believes that the agency 
always provides q1. In period X a certain number of new issuers sign up. For these issuers 
no initial price discount is necessary. Therefore, the premiums generated from these new 
ratings are direct profits. Overall, the rating agency would only need to generate a price level 
of π1 to compensate for its initial investments. Consequently, at p1 a constant profit margin of 
π−1 1p  is generated. Again, the price will not fall below p1 because it would be more profita-
ble to cheat at such a level30. In the example the market is saturated after period X, so stage 
2 describes the final state of the industry. 
This phenomenon is in its essence a fixed cost degression. The initial loss of −0 1p c  for de-
veloping reputation can be spread to more units over time. Since growth is not constant and 
                                                
30  The no-milking price was developed only by looking at future returns, not at the actual investment into reputa-
tion. 
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unsure in its nature, it is not calculated in ex ante. Instead, a rational issuer would demand a 
onetime discount in =t X  equaling the agencies discounted profits. This does not happen 
for the reasons described. In a competitive environment, such profits should in the long run 
attract other companies to the credit rating industry. In principal, every new entrant could 
follow the incumbents’ development path. This, however, is unrealistic in the credit rating 
market. As argued already, newcomers to existing market segments necessarily start under 
different conditions. As latecomers, they hardly have a chance to establish themselves as 
well known market leaders that could profit in the mid to long-term from their reputation being 
spread for free. It takes several years until period X is reached. In saturated or even declining 
segments this might not be possible at all. That means newcomers might never reach gener-
al market acceptance to leverage their reputation towards new customers in a way the in-
cumbents do. Only in new market segments might the expectation of a spreading reputation 
and high profits play a role. But because of the long time horizon – it took the incumbents 
several decades to reach their position – and the general uncertainty about market develop-
ments, it seems unlikely that entrants to a new market segment can expect such effects. 
Since reputation-based growth has been modeled as a special case of the transfer model, 
one again needs to think about obstacles to such a strategy. The four areas scrutinized 
above change in the case of internal expansion in an established market segment. Structu-
rally, no new conflicts of interest will arise, and there is no danger of a limited discrimination 
between brand and service-specific reputation as all reputation refers to the established mar-
ket segment. An innovative element is not necessary because the issuers are seeking not a 
new but an established and well known service. That leaves the transferability of reputation 
as the only restriction. An agency must have a market-wide reputation for high quality rat-
ings. Every new issuer has to trust the incumbent to an extent that he clearly believes he is 
receiving the quality contracted for. In such a case internal growth is possible without further 
substantial investments into reputation – bar competitive pressure. 
3.6 Critical Review 
The analysis has thus far shown that the reputation mechanism within the credit rating indus-
try is effective: It makes high quality offerings possible despite the experience good characte-
ristics of ratings. An undesirable outcome of the reputation mechanism might be barriers to 
entry and abnormal profits. However, this does not limit the quality assurance function of 
reputation which is pivotal to the business model of credit rating agencies. Regulatory author-
ities rely on it, too. Therefore, it is fundamental to check for possible failures of the reputation 
mechanism which might have been overlooked in the model thus far. The reputation me-
chanism may fail especially in extreme circumstances. 
First of all, there is a general critique on the model’s assumptions. In reality there are never 
perfectly competitive situations. However, the different variations of the basic Shapiro frame-
work above all deal with deviations from a competitive situation. Market prices are indeed 
unlikely to match equilibrium prices, but in every case analyzed the reputation mechanism 
remains intact. Changes in ‘untouched’ parameters such as the interest r or the length of a 
period T do not alter the mechanism either. Regarding different values for T an agency must 
build up reputation for ratings of all different maturities. The analysis has largely eliminated 
quantity, because of the argument that reputation needs to be built up for every unit, i.e. is-
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suer. The more realistic scenario that rating agencies grow and reputation freely spreads to 
new issuers has also been dealt with. In all these cases reputation allows for a sustained 
supply of high quality ratings. 
Probably the most critical point in the reputation model is consumer rationality (Shapiro 1983, 
pp. 663, 667). Issuers are assumed to price ratings strictly on their quality over the past pe-
riod which is why agencies have no control over price. In particular it is argued that issuers 
do not buy from agencies demanding a price below equilibrium, because at such a price pro-
ducing high quality is not profitable in the long run. Demand is perfectly elastic. This view, 
however, excludes the possibility of setting prices dynamically in a strategic firm interaction. 
Kranton (2003) contemplates the possibility of firms temporarily lowering prices in order to 
increase market share. The consumers buying decision is ultimately driven by the expecta-
tion of future quality which can be assured if losses in the current period are offset by gains 
through an increased quantity in the future. 
If the decrease in current period profits from a lower price is offset by an increase in current 
and future market share and the dispersion of market share decreases, issuers should ra-
tionally be willing to buy ratings below the quality assuring price (Kranton 2003, p. 392). The 
argument can be explained with the help of Figure 3.8: an established agency (in stage 1) 
might temporarily lower its price below pi in order to attract a higher market share. In all fol-
lowing periods it again charges pi. If one assumes for simplicity’s sake that there is no loss of 
the additional market share, the agency will generate a profit margin, for the additional pre-
miums are generated without additional investments into reputation. However, there have 
been costs in the form of lost premiums in the period of reduced prices. If these costs are 
smaller than the additional discounted profits, the strategy is profitable. Rational issuers will 
therefore not suspect a milking attempt and rely on the high quality-low price combination. 
Given this possibility of strategic pricing, it becomes obvious that equilibrium cannot persist 
under the assumptions made by Kranton. A rating agency has the incentive to temporarily 
reduce prices, especially if competitors have acquired a large market share. The lower prices 
would draw away issuers from competing rating agencies. Once prices are returned to the 
normal level, additional profits are generated from the new issuers. However, this strategy 
would be attractive for any reputable rating agency. The market would hence see constant 
price pressure and attempts to undercut each other; a return to high prices would be imposs-
ible. Therefore, high quality could only be guaranteed under central (price) regulation, e.g., of 
an industry association (Kranton 2003, pp. 399-400). In general, the possibility of profitable 
strategic pricing is indeed an obstacle to consumer enforced high quality standards. The key 
question is whether the assumptions that allow such behavior hold for the credit rating mar-
ket. On a practical level the question can be easily answered with no, as there are several 
high quality producers in the market. 
To answer the question analytically, consumer behavior needs to be analyzed in detail. Are 
issuers readily willing to move from one rating agency to another because of price? Once 
prices return to a high level, will they remain with the new agency or return to the old one? 
These issues will be scrutinized in the analysis of demand and supply in chapter 4. One will 
see that issuers are price insensitive. They have incentives to stay with their traditional agen-
cy in order to offer continuity to the investors. An agency would need to offer a very low price 
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to attract additional issuers, while it cannot be certain to hold them if they have a long-
standing rating history with another agency. In other words, the investment to acquire new 
issuers is high, against which the return is unsure. The credit rating industry’s market struc-
ture generally makes strategic cooperation attractive. In sum, strategic pricing is no threat to 
the reputation mechanism in the credit rating industry, while it might well be in other indus-
tries. 
To date there have been no major rating agencies deliberately milking their reputation, espe-
cially no long-established players at the top end of the market. Could this suggest flaws in 
the concept of the reputation mechanism? Real markets should at least produce some com-
panies milking their reputation. For several reasons the question can be answered with no. 
First of all, if milking is indeed profitable for a reputable company, it would not wait but direct-
ly milk and exit the market. Therefore, young companies are more likely to milk than old 
companies. Long established players have obviously never found the milking strategy to be 
attractive which suggests structural factors that make milking unattractive. For the big rating 
agencies, e.g., it has proven to be profitable to take the honorable, high-road strategy for 
nearly a century. 
The most obvious structural issue making milking unattractive is cheating costs, which were 
introduced above in the context of reputation transfers. For practical reasons it is not possible 
to simply choose the milking strategy. Especially for big and long established players cheat-
ing costs are likely to be substantial. Even if reputation premiums did not cover the calcula-
tive cost per period, reputable companies would not exit via milking – their investment into 
reputation has become partly sunk. The other important structural issue is profits. If entry 
barriers are present, market prices tend to be higher than equilibrium prices. Even if market 
prices fluctuate they likely do this at a level where the quality strategy is clearly superior to 
milking. Also, the profitability of the milking strategy is highly dependent on assumptions 
about future prices. In real business life there is of course no certainty. A manager might eas-
ily make a mistake if he decides to exit the market by milking. Only if prospects are very bad, 
can milking be a viable strategic option. Furthermore, if prospects are indeed very bad, some 
issuers and investors will also be aware of this fact. It will consequently become more difficult 
to hide a cheating strategy. 
If one drops the assumption of perfect ex post monitoring, models will suggest a failure of the 
reputation mechanism only if there is a monopolistic rating agency (Hörner 2002, pp. 644-
45). Once the monopolistic agency has established a reputation for high quality, issuers will 
assign single instances of low quality to ‘bad luck’ and continue to buy ratings from the agen-
cy. In turn the agency will have the incentive to reduce quality in order to profit from these 
wrong expectations. Given such model assumptions, a high quality equilibrium can only pers-
ist under competition that provides the issuers with an outside option: in the case of low qual-
ity they will play it safe and choose another high quality producer. While the failure of the 
reputation mechanism is analytically clear, the respective assumptions do not hold for the 
credit rating market. Big rating agencies with a large number of ratings every period can be 
monitored at virtual perfection. If there are hundreds or thousands of ratings in a correlation 
study, systematical quality deviations in a given period will surely be identified. For smaller 
agencies, single instances of ‘bad luck’ might distort correlation studies. However, a small 
rating agency is unlikely to be a monopolist. 
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Kuhner (2001) shows that the reputation mechanism might also fail in situations of financial 
crisis. He defines a financial crisis by the inability of investors to distinguish between ‘healthy’ 
and ‘unhealthy’ issuers and the fact that investors withdraw their funds cumulatively. Neither 
healthy nor unhealthy issuers can survive an investors’ exit. Under such circumstances rat-
ings can hardly provide useful information to investors. Rating agencies in turn focus not on 
giving the best possible fundamental analysis but rather on not losing their reputation. They 
will provide arbitrarily low ratings because they assume that even healthy issuers will fail. 
Further, all agencies act in the same manner in order not to be exposed as the only agency 
that had wrong predictions. However, it must be clear that the failure of the reputation me-
chanism in such a scenario is not the reason for the financial crisis. The model simply sug-
gests that credit rating agencies are unlikely to prevent or attenuate a financial crisis. The 
results are empirically supported: McNamara and Vaaler (2004) find that the three leading 
credit rating agencies were undifferentiated and overly pessimistic in the Asian Crisis of the 
late 1990s. 
While the model critique presented is valid in some respects, it offers no starting point to 
question the principles of the reputation mechanism. The conclusion holds that reputation will 
always provide for a high quality in the credit rating market. A broader critique of the reputa-
tion mechanism would include factors overriding it, i.e. other things than rating quality deter-
mine reputation. The matter will be analyzed in section 5.2.3.1 where it becomes relevant. 
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4 Market Forces in the Credit Rating Industry 
4.1 Demand in the Credit Rating Industry 
Credit ratings are ubiquitous in financial markets. Issuers attach great value to them – de-
mand is high. In a 2005/2006 survey, two thirds of issuers stated that they receive good or 
very good value for the rating fees they pay, despite of the seemingly high prices reflected in 
the profitability of the big rating agencies (TBMA 2006, p. 20). From a microeconomic point of 
view the influence of demand on the industry structure is of special interest. We first need to 
analyze what kind of rating is valued by investors and issuers. A second important question 
is the impact of rating-based regulation. Further points of interest are network effects and the 
two ratings norm. 
As above, the analysis will concentrate on an abstract evaluation of the underlying economic 
factors. The area also offers rich opportunities for empirical research, though. Previous stu-
dies are at variance about the impact of the different value drivers. Usually, researchers do 
not explicitly try to combine several value drivers into one model. The common approach of 
examining bond spreads tries to explain the information value of ratings31. If a rating makes 
investors feel more confident about the credit risk of an issue, they demand a lower risk pre-
mium. Given the fees of only about three basis points per rating, the potential value attached 
to them is very high since bonds can easily have spreads of several hundred basis points. If 
the interest paid on an issue were reduced through a rating from, for example, 6.5 percent to 
6.4 percent, the savings in interest payments would outweigh common rating fees by a factor 
of three. A small market impact of the credit risk information carried by ratings – which is 
demonstrated by most studies – easily makes issuers willing to pay today’s seemingly high 
rating fees. One focus of this section is therefore to find out about the structure of demand 
rather than its absolute value. 
There is virtually no empirical research on the exact value of the regulatory recognition of 
credit rating agencies. Several studies focus on the impact of rating changes around the in-
vestment grade boundary (e.g., Johnson 2004). In principal they are concerned with the li-
cense value, as many rating-based regulations refer to it. However, the step of actively diffe-
rentiating between the informational and regulatory effect has yet to be taken. Such studies 
are also complicated by private rules such as rating triggers which have similar effects on 
rating-based regulation. A promising approach is to study differences in CDS, bond, and 
stock price adjustments after rating events. Some regulatory benefits such as lower reporting 
costs for the issuer or an increased financial flexibility when issuing bonds have no direct 
effect on credit risk. They should therefore only be measurable in equity prices and not in 
bond and CDS prices. 
                                                
31  Interest spreads can, however, also reflect a change in the regulatory status especially if a debt issue passes 
the investment grade boundary. 
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4.1.1 Valuation of Quality 
Thus far the specifics of demand have been largely eliminated in the formal reputation mod-
el. In Shapiro’s framework all rating agencies are assumed to produce the optimal quantity of 
1. At any given quality level there are a certain number of agencies meeting stable market 
demand. There might also be no demand at all on certain quality levels. Demand is assumed 
to be fully elastic in the sense that no issuer would pay more than pi because with free entry 
there will always be an agency offering this price. On the other hand, issuers would not pay 
prices where milking is obviously the best solution. These assumptions helped to simplify the 
explanation of the reputation mechanism. Now a more realistic approach shall be taken. One 
needs to clarify in how far demand depends on quality. Which quality levels are desired by 
issuers? A second aspect is price. There is not a single equilibrium price but a range of poss-
ible prices. Which price are issuers willing to pay? It has already been argued that some kind 
of lower price boundary based on issuers’ rationality is indeed a plausible assumption in the 
credit rating context. Specifically, a realistic no milking-price hip  takes cheating (hiding) costs 
into account. Entry barriers, on the other hand, create room for prices above equilibrium. An 
upper price boundary ˆip takes this into consideration. 
Only if issuers are willing to pay a price between hip  and ˆip  (the equilibrium price in the ba-
sic model) for a given quality i, do rating agencies have the chance to establish themselves 
on this level in the first place. The graphical analysis below will build on the basic model for 
convenience. Issuers will base their decision to buy ratings on price and quality, i.e. there 
exists a classic demand curve32. Here, quality solely refers to the informational quality. As 
indicated by the suffix i for quality, there is a demand curve for every quality level. In a first 
step one needs to clarify which quality levels are most important to issuers. Particularly the 
willingness to pay for quality qi, i.e. the valuation vi, will be looked at. In a second step one 
also needs to analyze any possible interdependencies between different quality levels. 
Would issuers change a high quality rating for a lower quality rating at a lower price? For 
simplicity, the analysis initially concentrates on the valuation of an exemplary issuer. 
It has been argued that today a minimum quality level can be observed by comparing ratings 
with market data and mandatory company reports. All investors will therefore not value q0 
ratings. There is obviously no demand for ratings below q0, either, since ratings are even less 
informative than what investors already know. A positive valuation can only be expected for 
> 0iq q . At quality levels slightly above q0 investors only have small benefits over what is 
freely available. Consequently, there will be little willingness to pay. On the other hand, credit 
rating agencies must invest real and substantial effort to come up with ratings even slightly 
above minimum quality. It has been argued that they cannot simply take freely available in-
formation, but need to generate ratings through a fundamental credit analysis – the usual 
cost curve ci applies to any quality level. As a result, there will be a range of qualities above 
minimum quality, at which issuers are not willing to pay enough to even cover costs. The 
                                                
32  Note that issuers need to incur costs to provide the rating agency with the information it needs for the analysis 
(Herring and Reeve 1986, p. 68). This is a third decision variable. For simplicity, it is abstracted from in this 
analysis. 
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quality level where the valuation matches costs is xq . Similarly, there is a point yq  further up 
the quality spectrum, where a given issuer is willing to pay exactly the equilibrium price. Fig-
ure 4.1 illustrates the context: 
Figure 4.1: Individual valuation of ratings 
One sees the familiar cost curve ci and the respective reputation equilibrium price path pi. 
The valuation path vi is indicated in bold. It characterizes the willingness to pay by an exem-
plary investor depending on quality qi offered by a rating agency. The valuation for q0 is zero 
and at qy it matches the equilibrium price. There is a second quality level qz, where valuation 
matches the equilibrium price. This is because the costs to improve quality rise dispropor-
tionately at high quality levels, while the willingness to pay levels off at the same time, for 
additional informational quality does not have big benefits for the investors at this level. An 
actual rating market can only exist for qualities between qy and qz since only in this quality 
range is the valuation equal to or higher than price. The shaded area covers all possible 
market prices given that pi is the no-milking price. At q1 the difference between the valuation 
and the equilibrium price is maximal: 
 − = −1 1 max i iiv p v p  (4.1) 
Under strong rating agency competition, it would therefore be the quality level of choice of 
the depicted issuer because its rents will be maximized at p1. In an anticompetitive market, a 
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monopolistic agency would also choose the quality level, maximizing its monopoly profits at a 
price of v1. 
The valuation of ratings by an arbitrary issuer has just been described. The important ques-
tion now is if such a valuation is applicable to all investors. In order to come up with a predic-
tion of market demand one needs to look in more detail at the factors driving the issuers’ and 
investors’ valuation of ratings. The general assumption of a low willingness to pay for ratings 
slightly above q0 seems unproblematic since ratings at this quality level do not offer substan-
tial advantages over freely available information. At extremely high quality levels it is also 
plausible that costs rise over proportionately compared to the issuers’ valuation because sta-
tistically measurable quality increases become marginal. One can therefore retain the gen-
eral idea of an ‘s-shaped’ individual valuation curve as depicted in Figure 4.1 for every is-
suer. 
The motivation of issuers to buy ratings is driven by their desire to convey credit information 
about themselves. They also want to profit from the general reputation to be scrutinized by a 
rating agency, even if they have a bad credit risk. Basically, a rating works as a signal to out-
side parties, especially to investors. By its very nature the value of this signal in the investors’ 
eyes is driven by informational quality. They want to be provided with the best possible in-
formation. The individual investor does not care about the rating costs when researching: he 
can choose from a wide array of possible investments and is likely to consider mostly those 
with a rating of high quality. As a result, there will be little willingness of issuers to buy low or 
medium ranged ratings, for many investors concentrate on securities rated by highly reputa-
ble agencies. 
Another argument takes a similar line from the issuer’s perspective. No issuer wants to buy 
ratings from a bad or even the ‘worst’ rating agency. As a signal, the rating needs to act posi-
tively on market participants. In its external presentation, no issuer can afford to be rated by 
a mediocre or even the worst agency, even if this agency offers decent quality on an abso-
lute scale. Hence, issuers will try to avoid the agencies of the relatively lowest quality33. On 
the other hand, it is an advantage in external communication to be scrutinized by the best 
and most reputable rating agency. Since every issuer wants to buy ratings from the best and 
not the worst agency, the demand for ratings will be channelled to high quality levels. Only if 
the quality of all agencies in the market is high and close enough so that statistically signifi-
cant statements about an agency’s relative ranking are not possible, an issuer can be sure 
not to buy ratings from the relatively worst agency. 
Both arguments support the idea of an s-shaped valuation curve. Investors want an abso-
lutely high rating quality which directly translates into demand for high quality ratings by the 
issuers. Additionally, issuers care for a relatively good rating, what makes buying ratings of 
intermediate qualities even more unattractive. As soon as an issuer regards the rating quality 
as high, the willingness to pay will increase sharply, accounting for the steep part of the 
valuation curve depicted in Figure 4.1. A direct result from the course of the valuation curve 
                                                
33  In normal (product) markets for personal use there is no such behavior. In fact, many customers often look for 
the best price, not the highest quality. 
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is a low cross elasticity of demand between different quality levels i and j (where x is the 
quantity or number of ratings sold): 
 η ∂= ⋅∂,i j
ji
x p
j i
px
p x
 (4.2) 
Especially in their decision to buy high quality ratings, issuers pay not much attention to the 
price of low or midrange quality. Such ratings are bad substitutes for high quality ratings. As 
argued, demand concentrates on comparably high quality ratings such as q1, no matter how 
lower quality ratings such as q0 might be priced – the cross elasticity between these two 
quality levels is zero: 
 η ∂= ⋅ =∂1 0
01
,
0 1
0x p
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 (4.3) 
The argument helps us to narrow down the range of possible rating qualities to the high qual-
ity levels. To come up with an actual demand curve for high quality ratings one now needs to 
clarify the direct price elasticity of demand, i.e. the quantity change which can be expected 
when the price changes. A key question is how different issuers value a rating of a given 
quality. 
For relatively unknown issuers trying to reach many investors – which is the largest group in 
a worldwide debt market – the valuation of ratings will be similar. Exactly because ratings are 
directed at many investors, there exists a common mechanism of valuation. Each issuer es-
sentially caters to the same pool of investors which have been dubbed as ‘financial markets’. 
A debt security rated by a high quality agency bears lower interest rates than a comparable 
unrated debt security. This interest rate spread is identical for comparable issuers. Of course, 
an issuer’s absolute benefit of a rating varies with the volume of the debt security. A large 
issue benefits more from a rating than a small one. From a per unit perspective, however, a 
rating has an identical value for every issuer. The drafted valuation vi can be interpreted as 
common valuation structure for a rating referring to a standardized debt security. 
Differences in individual valuations might arise in connection with the reputation value of rat-
ings. A part of the interest rate spread is derived from the general value to be scrutinized by 
a high quality agency. A household name issuer with a reputation for sound financials might 
be able to generate high demand for its debt securities without a rating. This might especially 
be true for small issues in ‘home markets’. A good example is the sports car producer Por-
sche AG which successfully issued several unrated bonds in the past. However, such a 
strong position is an exemption in international financial markets and should only affect few 
issuers. Anyway, such issuers can often profit from ratings as a marketing instrument to dis-
tinguish themselves from other issuers – or to not fall behind (Fight 2001, p. 5). One can 
conclude that the individual valuation vi of a given rating fluctuates in dependence of the rep-
utation value for the issuer, although these fluctuations should be limited for a large majority 
of them. Issuers also value ratings as an instrument to release private information to the 
market without directly disclosing it. It is difficult to empirically quantify such an effect. How-
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ever, it should cause no major disparity in rating valuations, as all issuers can be expected to 
have some private information which benefits investors if released ‘securely’. 
Another source of value for credit ratings is standardization (Kerwer 2002a, pp. 297-99). 
Credit ratings define the process of issuing debt. This is most important for institutional inves-
tors with guidelines and practices for day to day investment decisions which premise ratings 
of certain high quality agencies (Hill 2004, p. 61). Ratings that comply with such investment 
processes enjoy an increased value. Investors have to incur higher transaction costs when 
buying bonds either unrated or rated by ‘not accepted’ agencies. Therefore, they are less 
likely to invest in such bonds if there are many appropriately rated alternatives. The effect is 
independent from issuers, as the cost differential occurs on the investors’ site. Naturally, 
such a standardization value is limited to a few high quality rating agencies that have compa-
rable rating methods. While this is no argument for valuation differentials between the differ-
ent issuers, it once more reinforces the s-shape of the valuation curve independent of quality. 
Ratings of agencies with little reputation cause higher transaction costs for investors than 
ratings of high quality agencies34. Independent from the information value, issuers will con-
centrate on high quality ratings fulfilling (or setting) the standard. 
The direct alternative to buying ratings is not buying ratings. Therefore, the valuation path vi 
can at a maximum reflect the interest rate spread of rated versus non-rated debt securities. 
However, the valuation might also be limited by alternatives to debt securities. In all devel-
oped financial markets issuers have access to standard bank lending. If it is cheaper to raise 
a bank credit than to issue an unrated bond, these financing costs determine vi. Within a na-
tional market, the bank credit conditions are comparable for all issuers. Therefore, the influ-
ence on the valuation should be similar for everyone. Difference can only be explained be-
tween national markets. If there is no strong national bank credit market, issuers often have 
little chance other than international debt issues to access substantial capital. This is true for 
many developing markets without a grown financial system. In countries where banks tradi-
tionally hold a large portion of assets compared to other institutional investors such as mutual 
funds, bank lending often is more attractive compared to rated bond issues. Baliga and Polak 
(2004) analyze the case of Germany which traditionally has a strong lending business. An 
important reason is that credit and investment standards are more aligned to bank lending in 
such countries, especially because of historically developed monitoring structures. For issu-
ers seeking manageable debt, transaction costs with banks can be so low that they assign 
but small value even to high quality ratings. In this case the spread achieved in the credit 
market for a rated bond is higher than the interest demanded by a bank. 
Taken together, the absolute valuation of ratings by different issuers is very similar, because 
ratings are used in frictionless international debt markets. Ratings on comparable debt secu-
rities result in the same interest rate spread. A part of the value is derived from common 
standards in international financial markets. Large valuation differentials might exist in na-
tional markets where bank lending is the standard. If one looks at credit ratings as a global 
market, however, one can safely conclude that there is a common valuation curve vi applying 
                                                
34  There can of course also be high quality/highly reputable smaller agencies which do not comply with invest-
ment standards and thus do not enjoy a transaction cost advantage. 
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to most issuers. Therefore, the market for high quality ratings has a low direct elasticity of 
demand in the relevant range where x is the quantity or number of ratings sold: 
 η ∂= ⋅∂,x p
x p
p x
 (4.4) 
If the valuation of ratings is similar for all issuers, they will react to prices in the same way. 
For all market prices below the common valuation vi most issuers will buy a rating, for all 
prices above only few will buy a rating35. As long as vi is above pi or respectively the range of 
possible market prices ˆhi ip p , the quantity sold will (virtually) be the same for any price, i.e. 
the direct elasticity of demand is zero: 
 η ∂= ⋅ = >∂, 0    for  vi i
i i
x p i i
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 (4.5) 
The analysis has been simplified by concentrating on a standardized debt security of a given 
size. The conclusion was that the valuation of ratings is comparable per unit of debt issued. 
As a direct result, issuers will have a higher willingness to pay for large debt securities. The 
demand function becomes elastic under fixed prices per rating. At a high price only big is-
sues are profitable, while at a low price ratings for small issues also make sense. The effect 
gets attenuated because rating costs increase in tendency with size: the complexity of the 
analysis grows and also ‘risk costs’ rise (Herring and Reeve 1986, p. 68 and Schwarcz 2001, 
p. 302). Therefore, the equilibrium price schedule also rises with issue size. The actual pric-
ing policy seen in the market corresponds to the guideline: yearly rating fees are dependent 
on issue size within a range, e.g., $33,000 to $50,000 as the minimum fee and up to 
$300,000 as the maximum fee for corporate debt ratings (Partnoy 2006, p. 69)36. Because of 
the degression of the fixed minimum fee, ratings for large debt securities are always rela-
tively cheaper than for small issues, though. Rating fees for very large issues (roughly above 
$1 billion for Moody’s, e.g.) are constant. In sum, differences in issue size will therefore in-
crease the demand function’s elasticity at least to a certain extent. 
One can conclude that demand in the credit rating industry will focus on high quality levels 
and that the issuer’s valuation of ratings is similar, i.e. the direct demand elasticity is low. 
These results have been confirmed empirically: nearly all international debt securities today 
feature a credit rating. This striking market penetration corresponds to a low elasticity of de-
mand. However, it might also be a result of rating-based regulation, which will be discussed 
below. Moody’s, S&P and Fitch have all been historically active in the very high quality seg-
ment. There are either no or only negligible players at lower quality levels. In general, the 
nature of demand poses an entry barrier to the credit rating industry. As all issuers concen-
trate on established companies, they are unlikely to look at newcomers with a low reputation. 
                                                
35  Graphically, the demand curve is steep over a certain price range (i.e. the quantity does not change much with 
a rising/falling price), but has a break at a certain price where it becomes very flat (i.e. the quantity quickly 
goes towards zero with only slightly rising prices). 
36  It is difficult to empirically analyze if the rising price schedule purely reflects costs. Under limited competition 
rating agencies are able to reap extra profits from issuers with a high willingness to pay for large issues. 
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The oldest incumbents have an inherent advantage (Hill 2004, p. 45)37. Even if newcomers 
offer a high quality service over several years – which is the basis for a high reputation – is-
suers might simply not be aware of this development because they focus on agencies which 
already have a high status (Podolny 1993, p. 832). 
4.1.2 The Impact of Rating-based Regulation on Demand 
The demand for ratings has been modeled so that it will be driven by the issuers’ desire to 
convey information about their creditworthiness to investors. A second major driver of de-
mand is rating-based regulation. This is most obvious in the case of disclosure requirements 
where an appropriate credit rating may lower legislative requirements. Issuers have an incen-
tive to buy a rating simply to reduce reporting costs, completely independent of the informa-
tion value for investors. Rules concerning investment restrictions and capital requirements 
have a similar effect. They help to lower financing costs and increase financial flexibility, as 
issuers can reach a larger pool of potential investors with an appropriate rating. In a nutshell, 
ratings receive an additional value other than informational: they provide a ‘license’ for ac-
cessing certain areas of the financial markets, or to avoid regulatory burdens (Partnoy 1999, 
p. 683). 
The license value of ratings is generally accepted. Open to question, however, is its impor-
tance. The regular or ‘reputational capital’ view regards the license value as an addition to 
the information and reputation value (e.g., Hill 2004, pp. 66-68). Overall, the information val-
ue is still decisive in the willingness to pay for ratings. Some authors see the relationship the 
other way around (especially Partnoy 1999, p. 683; see also Kerwer 2002a, p. 306). From 
this perspective the license value is the main or even the only driver in buying a credit rating 
today. One can speak here of the ‘regulatory license’ view. The information value has deteri-
orated over time because of more readily available risk measures. There is no detailed em-
pirical research on the question, while the general hypothesis that the market impact of rat-
ings is primarily driven by rating-based regulation has existed for quite some time (e.g., West 
1973, p. 168). Only anecdotal evidence is cited for the actual importance of the license value 
compared to the information value (Hill 2004, p. 72). There are, however, examples of large 
bond price movements induced by a change in the regulatory status (e.g., Gerke and Mager 
2005, p. 204). Since the reputational capital view is the standard view of most researchers it 
will be dealt with first. The structural differences to the regulatory license view will be ana-
lyzed in a second step. 
4.1.2.1 Information Value as Major Demand Driver 
To understand the structural impact of rating-based regulation one first needs to clarify its 
relation to quality. Does the license value fluctuate with informational quality or does it remain 
constant? From an ex post perspective the picture is clear: a given rating invariably features 
the same license value independent of the analytical quality behind it. An AAA rating, e.g., 
always has the same regulatory benefits attached to it, no matter which agency issued it. 
From an ex ante perspective, however, the valuation might to some extent depend on the 
                                                
37  A long time series of ratings is not only the basis for a high reputation, it may also feature direct additional 
advantages. Historical data may give hints about the absolute credit risk, for instance. 
The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation 64 
informational quality. If one assumes that an issuer has perfect knowledge about his fair rat-
ing, a lower rating quality can be interpreted as a higher fluctuation margin of the actual rat-
ing received compared to the fair rating. This is important in cases where a small rating dif-
ference has a significant impact on the license value, e.g., in cases where the actual credit-
worthiness is slightly above or below investment grade38. An issuer with a fair rating below 
investment grade profits from a high fluctuation margin because his chance of receiving a 
(wrong) investment grade rating increases. The respective benefits more than compensate 
for the similarly increased chance of getting a too low rating, because there is not much dif-
ference between being rated one or two notches below investment grade. Issuers with a fair 
rating slightly above investment grade prefer high quality ratings for the same reason in the 
reverse situation. Consequently, both assign different license values to the same quality rat-
ings. 
In the analysis here, such differences in the license value vL are neutralized, because there 
are only few points on the rating scale where one will see such big differences in regulatory 
benefits as at the investment grade boundary. For most issuers regulatory benefits are simi-
lar for any likely rating from a reliable agency, i.e. the fluctuation margin of i does not matter 
at all: ∂ =∂ 0
Lv
i
. A rating of minimum quality has exactly the same license value as a high 
quality rating. By contrast, the value of the signaling service is solely derived from its informa-
tional quality, i.e. the accuracy in describing the financial soundness of the rated debt securi-
ty and issuer: ∂ >∂ 0
iv
i
. The unobservable analytical quality i is reflected by an agency’s repu-
tation. This is the reason why thus far only demand for high quality ratings of reputable agen-
cies has been identified. This situation changes when one considers rating-based regulation. 
The individual valuation for recognized ratings rises for all quality levels. In Figure 4.2 the 
constant license value is assumed to be vL for a given debt security and all rating agencies 
are recognized by the state. 
The figure shows the familiar cost curve ci and equilibrium price path pi. The broken line in 
the lower part represents the license value vL which is constant for all quality levels. The bro-
ken s-shaped curve is the original valuation curve vi. The bold curve +i Lv v  is the sum of the 
two broken valuation curves. It represents the issuer’s willingness to pay for an officially rec-
ognized rating of quality qi. In the depicted case the increase in the valuation through vL is so 
large that at any quality below qz the valuation curve is above the equilibrium price path pi. 
The shaded area indicates all possible price quality combinations at which a market for rat-
ings could emerge. Contrary to the analysis without rating-based regulation, one now sees 
demand for low qualities as well, since the willingness to pay is larger than costs. The area 
left of q0 (shaded in light gray) indicates strategies where rating agencies arbitrarily make up 
artificially high ratings without inducing any corresponding costs. 
                                                
38  The investment grade boundary has a considerable impact, as many rules refer to it (ECB 2004, p.12). 
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Figure 4.2: License value of ratings 
The low quality area is of particular importance. Below q0, reputation is no longer involved. It 
is evident that ratings are artificial, i.e. they bear no information value and are only useful in 
the light of regulatory restrictions. An AAA rating for a high risk bond is an example. Rating 
agencies operating in the very low quality area will choose whatever rating is most profitable 
for them, because they do not have a reputation to lose. Such sham ratings might be attrac-
tive for issuers with a bad effective creditworthiness. Neglecting any impact on the issuer’s 
own image, some will request artificially high ratings which secure them rating related bene-
fits of ,L shamv . A sham rating does not reflect the issuers’ credit-worthiness, but is exclusively 
aimed at maximized benefits in connection with rating-based regulation. Consequently, the 
license value ,L shamv  is above the ‘honorable‘ license value vL. It increases with the differ-
ence between the honorable rating and the sham rating. In essence, an AAA sham rating 
takes all regulatory restrictions attached to a debt security. 
Clearly, sham ratings are not in the interest of the state because all rating-based regulation is 
explicitly or implicitly directed at influencing the behavior of financial market participants. If it 
is possible to shop for arbitrary ratings at very low cost, there is no longer any incentive for 
the respective issuers to actually change their manner of doing business. Investors, too, 
could circumvent rules directed at them. This dilemma poses the question if the market will 
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prevent the pure avoidance of regulatory burdens or if a direct intervention into the credit 
rating market is necessary39. 
Certain issuers have an incentive to avoid very low quality ratings despite of their apparent 
benefits. They have to fear large reputation costs concerning their own reputation. Investors, 
customers and partners might get alienated by evident attempts to avoid regulation by ‘shop-
ping for ratings’. For such issuers the broken valuation curve vi becomes negative below q0 
(not depicted). An artificially high rating does no good and is harmful to the issuer in that it 
has a negative impact on its business. Potentially, borrowing costs might even increase be-
cause investors become unsure about which information on the issuer is right. Possible gains 
from the license value ,L shamv  are easily offset by these negative effects. In sum, issuers with 
such an incentive structure are unlikely to buy ratings of very low quality. They still enjoy the 
highest rents at q1. Even if sham ratings offer a positive net value, high quality ratings offer a 
far higher value. 
Issuers with few investors, customers and partners or little market contact in general might 
not have such an incentive structure. This is especially relevant for ratings of debt securities 
directed at a few acquainted investors, such as many structured finance issues. There might 
be only little or even no informational asymmetries between the involved parties. The valua-
tion curve vi would be flat at zero and all parties would prefer to contract without regulatory 
restrictions. In a world without rating-based regulation there would never be demand for rat-
ings from such issuers, which is why they haven’t been included in the previous analysis. 
Under rating-based regulation, however, some structured debt securities might need a 
(good) rating in order to become viable. The constant license value vL applies as described 
for any rating quality level. At the very low quality level, however, artificially high ratings even 
provide for an especially high license value ,L shamv . Naturally, the respective issuers will go 
for the cheapest and most favorable ratings, as they have little to lose in terms of reputation 
but a lot to gain through avoidance of regulatory burdens. 
One can summarize the main impact on the rating quality demanded as follows. Issuers who 
are interested in the informational and reputation value of ratings will stick to high quality rat-
ings. Potential benefits of sham ratings are offset by their own reputation losses. Among the 
honorable alternatives their preference for quality q1 remains untouched, as the valuation 
curve vi moves upwards at about the same amount vL for all qualities. For the very low quality 
level, however, there will be additional issuers merely interested in avoiding regulative costs 
by buying artificially high ratings. 
This is problematic in the eyes of the state. Issuers who buy high quality ratings because 
they are interested in their own reputation for prudence, are most likely to act cautiously as 
well in compliance with governmental expectations. By contrast, restrictions on debt securi-
ties shifting risks between a small number of parties might be of a key interest to the state. 
Financial institutions might accumulate too much risk through issues with sham ratings and 
                                                
39  For private rules in risk management the answer is clear: No one would use clearly identifiable sham ratings, 
because they rather distort things than give valuable information. Even if issuers buy sham ratings, they will be 
(at best) ignored by investors. 
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endanger financial market stability. It is precisely those parties that the state wants to influ-
ence most who are likely to avoid the regulation. The market offers no mechanism to prevent 
this. Therefore, it is easy to understand that virtually all researchers see the need for regula-
tory control of the rating market in connection with rating-based regulation. The most plausi-
ble way is to restrict the ratings that are open to a certain group of recognized high quality 
rating agencies, which is the traditional approach taken by the SEC with its NRSRO designa-
tion and the Basle II guidelines. The impact on demand created by rating-based regulation is 
answered with rules restricting supply. 
Figure 4.3: Official recognition based on quality 
In Figure 4.3 one sees the impact of a regime that only recognizes agencies that have a 
proven track record in delivering at least a quality level of qs (s for state). Below qs demand is 
not affected by benefits derived from rating-based regulation and a market cannot evolve as 
the valuation vi is at every point below the equilibrium price pi. Under such a regime the de-
scribed problems are not present, as very low quality ratings do not offer any benefits to is-
suers. However, the possible scope of the market has broadened from the quality range qyqz 
from Figure 4.1 to qsqz now. The two previous Figures 4.1 and 4.2 allow for a comparison 
between a situation without rating-based regulation and with such regulation, but with univer-
sal recognition of all agencies. In all three cases one can see that an honorable issuer max-
imizes his rents at high qualities, notably q1. The discussed group of issuers – exclusively 
concerned with the license value of ratings – will strive for the cheapest available recognized 
rating (as vs is below ps in the depicted case, no such market would evolve, however). Empir-
ically there is some evidence for such behavior: Fitch, which ranks lowest among the three 
quality qi 
q1 q0 
ci  
qz 
pi  price pi; costs ci; valuation vi; license value vL 
vL 
vi  
+i Lv v
qs 
The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation 68 
big recognized agencies and has the lowest prices, has a significantly higher proportion of 
structured finance ratings than Moody’s (Fisch 2004, footnote 23). This might reflect the 
higher proportion of debt securities with few involved parties and little informational asymme-
tries among structured finance ratings compared to regular bond ratings. Here, price possibly 
counts for more relatively than reputation. 
One has seen that rating-based regulation creates a constant license value. But an important 
question remains unanswered: Do different issuers assign the same (constant) license value 
to a given rating for a comparable issue? If rating-based regulation eases disclosure re-
quirements, the savings in reporting costs will be similar for everybody. All issuers can in this 
way reduce certain administrative tasks. But with capital requirements based on ratings, the 
benefits for investors are also very similar. A certain rating reduces the capital costs of hold-
ing a debt security by a fixed amount. Investors are therefore willing to accept a lower inter-
est rate on the rated security. From the issuers’ point of view, a lower interest rate directly 
translates into a higher willingness to pay for a rating. If one assumes that all issuers have 
the same structure of investors, the license value derived from capital requirements is iden-
tical. Such an assumption is not unrealistic in an open financial market, as a regulated debt 
security will always be held by investors who have the highest relative advantage in holding 
the respective security. A similar reasoning applies to rating-based investment restrictions. If 
a certain rating enables a debt security to be bought by additional investors, the interest rate 
will tend to fall. In sum, the question if all issuers assign the same license value to a compa-
rable rating can be answered in the affirmative. 
The analysis has so far concentrated on a rating for a given debt security, independent of its 
size. Taking this additional factor into account one finds that some parts of the license value 
depend on issue size while others do not. Most importantly, a (good) recognized rating low-
ers interest rates compared to a non-recognized rating, because more investors are allowed 
to hold a security and liquidity is high. Of course, the interest rate reduction applies to every 
unit issued, i.e. this part of a rating’s license value is proportional to issue size. By contrast, 
benefits for reduced reporting needs accruing to the issuer are largely fixed. A small debt 
issue profits more on a per unit base than does a large issue. This is the first time one finds a 
value driver for ratings that is independent of issue size. The policy of split prices (base min-
imum fee plus fee depending on issue size) of the major officially recognized rating agencies 
corresponds in this respect to the actual valuation of ratings dependent on size. 
It is not easy to empirically quantify the different value drivers, but the actual price structure 
might be well aligned with the willingness to pay for different issue sizes. While in a competi-
tive market the split price structure can only be explained as reflection of costs, in a protected 
market price discrimination could also be an explanation. I.e. the prices do not reflect costs 
but rather the individual willingness to pay in order to maximize the agencies’ profits. Note, 
however, that these theoretical considerations would require thorough empirical analysis to 
either verify or refute them. Important here is the fact that one can largely neutralize the size 
of debt securities in the valuation analysis because it is in fact neutralized by the actual pric-
ing policy. 
Overall, the license value of a recognized rating is very similar for all issuers. This is impor-
tant for demand elasticity. Thus far it has been concluded that demand is very inelastic over 
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a large part of the price range. This result does not change qualitatively with rating-based 
regulation. The whole demand function for a given rating quality moves upwards, while the 
elasticity remains largely unchanged. In addition, the cross elasticity between different rating 
qualities is not affected as the s-shape of all individual valuation curves remains similar. Even 
if low quality ratings now acquire a certain value, they are still a poor substitute for high quali-
ty ratings since the difference in value remains unchanged. 
4.1.2.2 License Value as Major Demand Driver 
Thus far, the license value vL has been considered to be limited compared to the information 
and reputation value vi. The only substantial problem of rating-based regulation was arbitrari-
ly high sham ratings which undermine its purpose. However, official recognition based on 
quality is an effective solution to the problem. Empirically, however, the proportion between 
the two different value drivers has not proven. That is why one also needs to look at the 
second possible, significant case put forward by Partnoy (1999, p. 683). The information-
al/reputation value vi might have suffered substantial deterioration over time. In this case, the 
license value vL is decisive for the issuers’ overall willingness to pay for ratings. Specifically, 
a situation is assumed where vi is in fact so insignificant that there would be no market for 
ratings without rating-based regulation. Figure 4.4 illustrates the scenario: 
Figure 4.4: License value dominates overall value 
As always, one sees the familiar cost curve ci and the equilibrium price path pi indicating the 
supply side of the market. Only at or above pi can a market for ratings evolve. However, in 
this scenario issuers assign only a limited informational and reputation value to ratings. The 
broken valuation curve vi is well below the equilibrium price path. In the absence of rating-
quality qi 
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based regulation there would be no credit rating market at all. The benefits derived from rat-
ing-based regulation, however, are substantial, as represented by the broken line vL. The 
overall willingness to pay for ratings dependent on quality is represented by +i Lv v . 
In the absence of official recognition, a market might evolve at any price-quality combination 
in the shaded area, because the willingness to pay is higher than the quality assuring price. 
In the very low quality area to left of q0 there might again be the possibility of sham ratings at 
no costs providing an extra high value ,L shamv . Along the lines of the argumentation above, 
in this scenario there is also a need for official recognition based on quality. In this figure only 
agencies with an informational quality higher than qs are recognized. As a result, the valua-
tion to the left of the threshold is exclusively driven by the information value, while to the right 
of qs the license value also applies. The two lines in bold represent the overall willingness to 
pay under the respective regulatory regime depending on quality. 
One can see that in the recognized regime the area of possible price-quality combinations 
becomes limited to the darker shaded area between qs and qz. The highest difference be-
tween the equilibrium price and the valuation stands at qs: 
 + − = + −maxs L s i L iiv v p v v p  (4.6) 
One no longer sees a maximum at q1 somewhere within the range of possible qualities, but 
the minimum quality needed for recognition directly sets the most desired quality. This is be-
cause the gap between the valuation of the informational quality and the price for the respec-
tive ratings widens with rising quality40. Issuers aim to minimize this ‘loss’. They no longer 
care about quality but only about the value of the license. In a competitive market they 
choose the cheapest recognized rating. A monopolistic agency would go for the same quality 
level as it can extract the highest rent at qs.  
From an economic perspective this result is interesting in that it creates antithetic conclu-
sions. On the one hand, rating agencies need to offer a stable high quality in order to secure 
state recognition. The license is comparable to an asset which can be withdrawn by the state 
in the case of violations (Shapiro 1986, note 6). A recognized agency faces risk costs of los-
ing its license =( )i ir q r  which increase with falling quality. This risk should prompt the agen-
cy to act responsibly by offering high quality. Without recognition it would immediately lose all 
its business. On the other hand, credit rating agencies strive to keep production costs as low 
as possible, which corresponds to a low quality. The lower the costs, the better is an agen-
cy’s competitive position. Profits per rating of a monopolistic agency − +i i Lv p v  are max-
imized at =i s . The market will not ‘care’ about a relatively low informational quality as long 
as an agency is officially recognized. 
If one compares the situation to the reputational capital scenario where the informational 
quality is the main value driver, one finds a crucial difference. While the motive to provide 
high quality in order to stay in business remains in principal intact, the profit incentive is con-
                                                
40  Mathematically, pi is at any point steeper than vi. 
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trary. A lower quality is more profitable than a higher quality. A rating agency does not strive 
to be better than other agencies, but a lower informational quality gives a competitive advan-
tage. As analyzed, rating agencies would choose the extreme outcome =i s  in a frictionless 
environment, i.e. the lowest possible quality which enables state recognition. However, the 
real recognition process carries certain risks. Assuming the recognition will immediately be 
lost below qs; rating agencies will therefore adjust their quality to a level ≥*i s  where the 
marginal risk costs ri of losing state recognition equals the marginal gain from further lower-
ing quality: 
 
π = − + − →
−⇒ =
( ) max
( ) ( )
i i i L i i
i i i
v p v r
d v p d r
di di
 (4.7) 
The optimal quality level i* depends on the specifics of the recognition regime. It will be the 
lower, the more exact (little risk of recognition loss by unintentional events) and the less strict 
(e.g., no loss of recognition even slightly below qs) the regime is. In any event, as long as 
there is a notable quality difference between q1 and qs, one will see a quality deterioration in 
the credit rating market compared to the reputational capital scenario. Again, all agencies will 
settle for a similar quality level. First, the optimal level according to (4.7) is equal for every 
agency. Secondly, if one considers interdependencies of the risk costs ri between different 
agencies in a game theory framework, no recognized agency would want to have the lowest 
reputation in a quality region where state recognition is not guaranteed. It is safest for the 
individual agency if all agencies operate on the same quality level, as the state would not 
withdraw recognition from all at once. 
The main result of the analysis is simple: the rating quality of recognized agencies will be 
lower if demand is driven purely by the license value compared to the regular scenario where 
informational quality is decisive. The reputation mechanism does not provide for a high quali-
ty (Partnoy 1999, pp. 655-56). In fact it no longer plays a role at all for market participants. 
The demand for information/reputation provision by ratings is not sufficient to provide for the 
existence of a market. In this respect, the ‘failure’ of the reputation mechanism is no problem 
for private market participants, as there is not sufficient informational asymmetry to justify the 
information costs induced by it. For private market participants ratings are merely an instru-
ment to free themselves from restrictions. However, the failure of the reputation mechanism 
is certainly relevant for the regulator. The goal of rating-based regulation is to increase the 
informational quality in the market and thereby to reduce systematic risk. Whereas private 
actors have better tools – e.g., ratings from smaller non-recognized agencies – for their own 
risk management, the state relies on a mediocre tool. Hence, regulation is not as effective as 
possible – it might even have a negative influence on markets through inaccurate gover-
nance. In addition, the state creates an anticompetitive environment through official recogni-
tion, which is a concern voiced by Partnoy (Partnoy 1999, p. 655). A small group of compa-
nies is granted market power and high profits. 
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4.1.2.3 Discussion – Which Scenario is Right? 
The impact of the above scenario on the reputation mechanism and therefore on the whole 
credit rating industry is substantial. But the question remains as to how important these 
thoughts are in reality. Is the license value the major demand driver? In a world of many so-
phisticated institutional investors with their own in-house research, this might be true. Credit 
risk information is generated by internal research, while credit ratings are only a burden limit-
ing their flexibility. Anecdotal evidence from one survey (TBMA 2006, p. 4) conflicts with this 
consideration, as over 80% of surveyed institutional investors indicate that ratings are rele-
vant in their internal risk management efforts. Jewell and Livingston (1999 and 2000) show 
that third and fourth ratings of NRSROs are valued by the market even in the non-investment 
grade area where no regulatory benefits accrue. Hill (2004, p. 65-72) actively disputes the 
regulatory license view. If reputation did not matter, all issuers would buy the cheapest avail-
able ratings from Fitch or one of the smaller recognized agencies. The major price differenc-
es between the NRSROs cannot be explained by Partnoy’s view. As certain regulations only 
require a single rating, at least some issuers should have an incentive not to buy two, which 
is the norm for big debt securities. 
If Partnoy is right, Moody’s and S&P should not be able to sell ratings to issuers in jurisdic-
tions without rating-based regulation. A finding from the EU, where rating-based regulation 
has been traditionally less important than in the USA, is that Moody’s and S&P are nonethe-
less the dominant players (CESR 2005, § 246). This suggests a general competitive advan-
tage of the market leaders’ unrelated to rating-based regulation. However, the small absolute 
size of the European rating market can be interpreted in support of Partnoy, i.e. even the 
leading agencies have no chance to gain a strong hold in the market. There is a similar 
anecdotal finding for Middle Eastern banks, many of which refinance themselves domestical-
ly (Poon and Firth 2005, p. 1746). Although there are certainly at least some informational 
asymmetries involved, such banks seldom choose to become rated. 
Indications of the importance of rating-based regulation might be derived from reactions of 
rating agencies’ stock prices to important changes in the regulatory framework. The Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act in the USA, which was introduced and discussed in mid to late 
2005, is such an event (U.S. House 2005a and 2005b). Since it permits many additional rat-
ing agencies to quickly receive official recognition, it clearly weakens Moody’s and S&P’s 
position from the perspective of rating-based regulation. However, Moody’s stock price out-
performed the market and appreciated significantly in mid/late 2005 and early 2006. A de-
tailed analysis of Moody’s falling stock price in mid/late 2006 when the Act was finally passed 
might provide more insights into this question. 
One problematic point in this analysis is the fact that ratings and especially rating down-
grades become information by themselves under rating-based regulation (Hill 2004, p. 69). 
This is a reason why market participants pay attention to recognized ratings even if they con-
tain no other information. Available empirical studies do not actively differentiate between a 
self-induced and a ‘real’ information value. The information value attested to ratings today 
might purely reflect the regulatory status. Another point in favor of Partnoy’s argumentation is 
the standardization of investment processes. Private market participants might stick to their 
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grown investment processes geared towards Moody’s and S&P ratings, even if the informa-
tion value has deteriorated over time. 
Such a transaction costs argument, on the other hand, is inconsistent with the use of ratings 
in non standardized private contracts. If there are better measures of credit risk, they might 
be preferable, for instance, to classic rating triggers. In sum, the pure regulatory license view 
is clearly too drastic. Given the evidence cited, the information and reputation value plays an 
important if not decisive role in the valuation of ratings. Regulators relying on rating-based 
regulations should nonetheless watch the issue closely. There is clearly a sizable regulatory 
value attached to ratings today and conditions might shift over time with a gradually falling 
quality q1. For researchers, too, the area is one of the most promising fields for future empiri-
cal research. 
Regulators should also care for a different reason. Even if the regulatory value is not deci-
sive, it might easily run above ps. This means that the benefits of the license alone justify 
rating costs. While ‘normal’ issuers still buy high quality because of the added benefits of 
reputation, the group of issuers interested in sham ratings will opt for the cheapest ratings. 
Although outright sham ratings are not possible, it might still be a benefit for certain issuers to 
buy ratings which are not of the highest quality. 
4.1.3 Network Effects 
The demand for ratings is also influenced by direct network effects or, in general terms, de-
mand side economies of scale41. Credit ratings do not focus on specifying a certain absolute 
risk of default but provide investors with a comparative risk evaluation. Thus, risky financial 
instruments from diverse areas such as structured finance products or sovereign debt can be 
compared, whereas the absolute risk of the rating categories changes over time (e.g., BIS 
2000, 126-127). The leading agencies actively seek to minimize differences in default proba-
bilities of similar ratings between different segments of the credit rating market (Ammer and 
Packer 2000, pp. 11-12). This is why an important aspect of a rating’s information value can 
only be derived in the context of other ratings. All of these ratings must be based on the 
same methodology and displayed on an identical scale. Only if each rating category includes 
securities of identical credit risk does a comparison makes sense. In a 1998 survey, 90 per-
cent of institutional investors cite ‘rating consistency’ as the most important factor for deter-
mining their impression of rating accuracy (Baker and Mansi 2002, p. 1387). 
The utility of every single investor rises with each additional rating. From a technical point of 
view, the market features direct positive external economies in consumption. Given that there 
are n ratings, investors can make ⋅ −( 1)n n  direct comparisons. If an additional issuer de-
cides to buy a rating, + ⋅( 1)n n  direct comparisons are possible. Thus a single new rating 
creates 2n new feasibilities (Economides 1996, p. 679). As the information value of every 
possible comparison is zero or larger, investors do always profit from an increase in the ab-
solute number of ratings. The stronger this network effect is, the higher will be the demand 
                                                
41  Network effects are often explicitly considered by firms in their strategy and can therefore also be described as 
a supply side factor. However, network effects are no factor in the production function. They only realize with 
the decision of issuers to buy ratings. Therefore they are considered as demand side effect. 
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for an agency’s ratings. Thus, network effects provide for important demand side economies 
of scale. Because investors prefer ratings from larger agencies, issuers are most likely to buy 
from the leading agencies. Network effects can be a driver of industry concentration. 
The three major rating agencies Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch all feature very similar rating sym-
bols and scales (e.g., Johnson 2004, p. 27). The economic reason behind this striking simi-
larity is simple. If investors recognize two agencies’ ratings as being based on compatible 
scales and methodologies, they can compare the ratings of both companies. The network 
size rises and therefore the investors’ valuation of the ratings increases. Network markets 
tend to standardize. In the credit rating market the standard was set by the original incum-
bents who have used the same rating symbols since the inception of the industry early in the 
20th century. The rating scales were expanded over time, but not substantially altered. 
Given the possibility of compatibility and standardization, the argument of network effects as 
a driver of high concentration weakens. If every agency can effectively join the network of 
existing ratings by using standardized methods and scales, there is no advantage in featur-
ing a large rating base by itself. Further, if a small agency joins a large rating network, its 
customers profit much more than the users of the existing network from the increased overall 
size. Thus, compatibility is a strategy which especially benefits small agencies such as indus-
try newcomers. 
However, there are two important obstacles to compatibility and standardization for newco-
mers. First, it is questionable if newcomers can offer exactly the same quality as the incum-
bents. This is decisive for comparing ratings. It is also questionable if investors will imme-
diately accept a newcomer’s ratings as fully compatible, even if the informational quality is 
proven to be high after the first period in the market. Such a performance extends the time 
needed to fully catch up with the incumbents in terms of reputation. Second, newcomers will 
have difficulties in generating demand for non-innovative ratings. In order to ensure compati-
bility, rating scales and rating methods must be similar. Under these conditions a newco-
mer’s ratings would offer no more value than the ratings of incumbents. On the contrary, be-
cause of the short track record the value is likely to be lower. Hence, the demand will con-
centrate on the established agencies. In a nutshell, newcomers face a tradeoff between 
compatibility and innovation while full compatibility is hard to achieve anyway. 
4.1.4 Two-Rating Norm 
In the market for big international debt securities a ‘two-rating norm’ has developed over 
time, i.e. a majority of big bond issues is simultaneously rated by Moody’s and S&P (Hill 
2004, p. 61). The two-rating norm is a major factor determining demand and can be attri-
buted to several factors. Two questions must be asked: Why do issuers buy two ratings, and 
why are these invariably the ratings of Moody’s and S&P? 
The simplest reason for investors to want more than one rating is additional information. If 
two ratings convey more information than one, investors prefer debt securities featuring two 
ratings, just as they use many research opinions in equity investment decisions. Empirically, 
studies have indeed documented an additional information value of a second rating (e.g., 
Hsueh and Kidwell 1998, p. 52). While the additional value is not necessarily very high, in-
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vestors still prefer it because they do not directly carry the rating costs. As their perceived 
risk is lower when investing in a bond with two ratings, they are willing to accept a lower in-
terest rate. If issuers expect the decrease in interest rates to be sufficient, they will incur the 
costs for a second rating only for the reason of increased information. Overall, the increased 
information value is unlikely to be the only reason for buying two ratings because the bulk of 
information comes from the first rating. It is no surprise that most other factors leading to the 
two-rating norm build on the certification dimension rather than the information function of 
ratings. 
One of the most obvious arguments for the two-rating norm is rating-based regulation. Cer-
tain rules require at least two ratings (e.g., Partnoy 1999, pp. 692-706). Mutual funds, e.g., 
may only purchase commercial paper with at least two (good) NRSRO ratings. Issuers in turn 
need to buy two ratings in order to reach their core investors. Given the large number of rat-
ing-based regulations, it is plausible that practically all issues benefit to a certain extent from 
a second rating, even if the phenomenon itself cannot be fully explained. Rating-based regu-
lation also provides a partial answer to the second question of why it is invariably the ratings 
of Moody’s and S&P: investors often have the regulators’ obligation to use ratings consistent-
ly. Banks using external credit ratings for risk assessments, for instance, are required by § 94 
of the Basle II framework to use the same agencies’ ratings for each kind of claim without 
‘cherry-picking’ (BIS 2004, p. 24). They will hence try to concentrate on a few agencies with 
broad coverage. For big international issues, Moody’s and S&P are the two apparent players. 
A more subtle argument is the signaling or reputation value of a second rating (Hill 2004, p. 
63). Some issuers tended to use a second rating only to expose themselves to double scruti-
ny. Even if the actual additional information for investors is limited, an issuer shows that there 
is nothing to hide. A second identical rating, e.g., can dispel an investor’s fear of exertion of 
influence on the rating agency, which is far more difficult to duplicate. Once a critical mass of 
issues had been rated with two ratings – for whatever reason – investors began to demand 
double scrutiny from all issuers. As many are willing to expose themselves to double scruti-
ny, issuers with only a single rating might arouse the market’s suspicion for their deviating 
behavior. The two-rating norm is in this respect self-enforcing. Issuers must either comply or 
explain. But explaining why they are not willing to expose themselves to double scrutiny is 
difficult. The argument of lower costs hardly stands against any suspicion of wrongdoings. In 
doubt, investors will only look at issues with two ratings. 
Hill (2004, p. 60-62) discusses further reasons for the two-rating norm, explaining especially 
its endurance once established. Many investors have investment guidelines and practices 
tailored to bonds rated by both Moody’s and S&P. Investment managers do not have an in-
centive to deviate from the standard in day-to-day business, as it would mean extra effort for 
them. They are locked in to doing business the way it has been traditionally done; transaction 
costs are lowest by sticking to bonds rated by Moody’s and S&P. Such investment guidelines 
can explain both questions (why two ratings and why those from Moody’s and S&P). In many 
cases the guidelines are in fact strict rules, i.e. deviating from the two-rating norm can com-
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pletely lock out issuers from a significant number of investors42. Internal investment rules are 
another argument explaining why the two market leaders are chosen. Ratings from Moody’s 
and S&P are commonly accepted as an important measure in an investor’s due diligence 
process. In the event of litigation they can point to their precautionary use of ratings. Another 
argument is the use of Moody’s and S&P ratings in investment benchmarks. Many quantita-
tively oriented investors emulate their benchmark index, which means buying debt securities 
rated by the two agencies. 
Further factors discussed above contribute to the two-rating norm. Ratings by Moody’s and 
S&P are regarded as equivalent and therefore compatible in the sense of network effects. 
Investors have a low preference for ‘incompatible’ ratings, which might be based on different 
standards. It is natural for issuers to pick the two leading and comparable agencies. Moody’s 
and S&P also feature the highest absolute reputation in the market. Since investors prefer 
ratings of the most reputable agencies, issuers stick to the top players in the market. A sur-
vey of 205 institutional investors supports these findings: Moody’s and S&P are perceived as 
equal in terms of quality and they are significantly ahead in market reputation compared to all 
other agencies. Investors and issuers alike clearly see Moody’s and S&P as the top two 
agencies (Ellis 1998, p. 41). Figure 4.5 summarizes the reasons for the two-rating norm: 
Figure 4.5: Two-rating norm 
In many respects the two-rating norm is a culmination of the different demand drivers. On the 
one hand, it guarantees Moody’s and S&P a comfortable business, as everybody buys their 
ratings. On the other hand, it provides protection from smaller agencies since it is inherently 
difficult for them to break into the main business. When additional agencies are used it is 
usually as tie-breakers in the event of a split rating from the two market leaders (e.g., Jewell 
and Livingston 1999, p. 1). In general, however, Jewell and Livingston see a ‘trend’ towards 
third ratings, although the reasons to buy additional ratings are not clear (p. 4-5). Cantor and 
Packer (1996), e.g., find a significantly higher rate of third ratings only for big issues for which 
they are relatively cheap. ‘Rating shopping’, i.e. the hope of getting better additional ratings 
to comply with regulations where only the best rating counts, seems to play no role. Whatev-
er the reasons for additional ratings are, a broad trend could ease the restraints on competi-
                                                
42  In a study published in 1998, e.g., among the 205 institutional investors questioned 23 percent have internal 
guidelines strictly demanding 2 ratings. 80 percent of these investors say the ratings must be from Moody’s 
and S&P (Ellis 1998, p. 39-40). In a broader study of 387 US mutual funds, 43 percent of respondents strictly 
demand two ratings (Baker and et al. 2002, p. 1377-1378). 
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tion set by the two-rating norm. In the ‘worst case’, a new three-rating norm with Fitch as the 
third agency would develop. In a more competitive scenario, various smaller agencies might 
establish reputations for reliable third ratings and eventually make inroads into Moody’s and 
S&P’s primary ratings business. 
4.2 Supply in the Credit Rating Industry 
Thus far the market environment for credit rating agencies has been analyzed with a focus 
on the reputation mechanism and the drivers of demand. To acquire the complete picture 
one needs to look more closely at the economics on the supply side (e.g., Dodd and Setty 
2003, p. 7). Which factors determine the organizational structure of rating agencies and of 
the industry structure as a whole? Is it purely the frictions in the reputation mechanism and 
the concentration of demand on the high quality level, or are there other variables to be con-
sidered? At the center of these questions lies the high industry concentration. The focus is on 
special industry features that might naturally lead to a high concentration, even if the entry 
barriers discussed above and demand side effects are absent. 
4.2.1 First Mover Advantage 
Being first to market is an advantage in the credit rating industry; and all the more so in the 
early days of the industry when the agencies and their rating quality were not generally 
known. Today it still plays a role in innovative new market segments. The mechanism will be 
explored via a model from Schmalensee (1982). 
A new and innovative credit rating market segment is considered. Two identical rating agen-
cies subsequently enter the market in periods = 0t  and =1t . As simplifying assumption the 
first agency does not react once the second agency enters43. Both offer the same high quality 
q1. The issuers, however, are not able to ascertain the quality ex ante, for ratings are an ex-
perience good. Both rating agencies therefore need to offer each new issuer an initial dis-
count in order to compensate his risk as to the true quality. In = 0t  the first agency (‘the in-
novator’) only faces uninformed issuers as no one has yet had the chance to acquire expe-
rience with the innovator. In =1t  the innovator faces two groups of issuers. Issuers who 
have already bought ratings in = 0t  are now informed about the true quality q1 whereas eve-
rybody else is still uninformed. Also in =1t  the second rating agency (‘the follower’) enters 
the market. The true quality of the follower is unknown to all issuers. In = 2t  and all later 
periods both rating agencies face two groups of issuers, one informed and the other one un-
informed about their quality. 
Figure 4.6 shows the price-consumption curve the innovator faces. Since his true rating qual-
ity is unknown, he needs to grant a risk-premium as a discount. For uninformed issuers the 
demand curve EG applies. At an introduction price of 0H the innovator can sell OC ratings in 
= 0t . In =1t  the primal clients are aware of the high quality and no longer demand a risk 
premium – for them the demand curve DA applies. The quantity OC can now be sold at a 
                                                
43  This is unproblematic for the model results, as such a behavior is to the advantage of the second agency. The 
second agency will nevertheless have a competitive disadvantage. 
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price of 0F. Additional issuers, however, still need to be persuaded of the high quality 
through a price discount, i.e. the demand curve BG applies. The complete price-consumption 
curve for the innovator from =1t  on is DABG. 
Figure 4.6: Price-consumption curve of the innovator (according to Schmalensee 1982, p. 
343) 
In =1t  the follower enters the market with an identical rating service of quality q1. However, 
none of the issuers is aware of the high quality. As assumed above, the innovator does not 
react to the entry. The follower faces two groups of issuers. One group – with a generally 
high willingness to pay – is aware of the innovator’s but not of the follower’s high quality. The 
second group is aware of neither agency’s quality. Consequently, the demand curve of the 
uninformed group is BG, the same as for the innovator. The innovators clients, in contrast, 
will only switch to the follower if they are compensated for the substitution risk of changing 
brands. For the marginal issuer the follower must offer a price of 0H to make him switch. The 
discount AB equals the opportunity cost of the marginal issuer to switch to an agency of un-
known quality which must be subtracted from the innovator’s price 0F. In general, the oppor-
tunity cost of switching is the difference between DA and EB. The follower must underbid the 
innovator’s fixed price 0F by this amount to make issuers switch. The issuers who were most 
likely in = 0t  to buy a rating from the innovator are now least likely to switch because they 
have the highest opportunity costs. 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the situation of the follower, given a price of 0F of the innovator. The 
curve ABK indirectly illustrates how many of the issuers (which are already informed about 
the innovators quality) would change to the follower. KB can be interpreted as follows: a cus-
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tomer will only switch if the price of the follower compensates for his individual opportunity 
cost. At a price of 0H only the marginal issuer switches. At a price of 0M, CN issuers will be-
gin to switch. The switching cost of the marginal issuer at this price is VU or respectively QL 
representing the price discount the follower needs to offer. At a price of 0K all issuers C0 
would switch, as even the highest opportunity cost of DE is covered by the discount FK. At 
any price below 0H the follower will also attract issuers unaware of the innovators’ quality; 
the demand curve BG applies. At 0M, e.g., the follower will not only attract CN issuers from 
the innovator, but also other CP issuers will buy their first time rating from the follower. Both 
effects are combined in the HZG curve, which is the price-consumption curve of the follower 
in =1t . 
Figure 4.7: Price-consumption curve of the follower (according to Wendorf 1994, p. 101) 
How does the situation look in ≥ 2t  with prices in =1t  of 0F for the innovator and 0M for the 
follower? The follower has attracted CN issuers away from the innovator. After assuring 
themselves of the commensurately high quality, these issuers are now willing to pay a price 
up to 0F. A higher price is not possible, as all issuers would change to the then cheaper in-
novator offering his ratings per assumption always at 0F. The first time buyers of ratings CP 
are now also aware of the higher quality, and their willingness to pay rises from BS to AR. 
Consequently, the price-consumption curve of the follower is QARSG; the partition QAR re-
fers to the informed and the partition SG refers to the uninformed issuers. Note that at prices 
between 0K and 0M further issuers will switch from the innovator to the follower according to 
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curve KL. For graphical clarity, this aspect is not included in the price-consumption curve 
QARSG44. 
This short graphical analysis indicates that a lack of knowledge on rating quality leads to dif-
ferent results in the entry periods of the innovating and the following rating agency45. Both 
agencies have to overcome the same informational asymmetry – there is no difference here. 
The crucial point is that the issuers buying from the innovator face higher opportunity costs in 
=1t  than in = 0t . Graphically spoken, the innovator has the competitive advantage to de-
duct the risk premium from the demand curve of aware clients DG. The follower has the 
competitive disadvantage that he must deduct the risk premium from the market price of the 
innovator. The innovator can gain 0C clients with a price of 0H, while the follower must offer 
a price of 0K to acquire the same amount of clients. KH is therefore a measure of the com-
petitive advantage of the innovating rating agency against the following rating agency. The 
innovator is more efficient in overcoming the informational asymmetry. In the Shapiro frame-
work the higher investments of the follower translate into a higher equilibrium price compared 
to the innovator – a competitive disadvantage for the follower. 
The first mover advantage plays a significant role in today’s credit rating markets. Moody’s 
and S&P enjoy a market wide reputation for high quality. An unknown newcomer must pro-
vide good reasons to make issuers leave their traditional agency. Because informational 
quality cannot be proven, price is the main variable to compete on. If one considers these 
results in the reputation framework, one can see that entry becomes more difficult for new-
comers. They not only need to provide the discount −i ec p  to overcome the informational 
asymmetry, they also need to compensate for the additional risk in leaving a proven high 
quality rating agency. The first mover advantage acts as a classic entry barrier to the rating 
market, as described in Figure 3.6. The sum of all additional risk compensations is γ ; the 
investment to enter the market increases to γ− +i ec p . With a strategy comparable to reput-
able incumbents, newcomers have to incur costs which the original players never had to pay 
for, i.e. they cannot follow the incumbents’ development path. Empirical evidence from the 
bank credit market, e.g., suggests that more than a quarter of a customer’s added value for a 
bank is derived from opportunity costs of switching to an unknown competitor (Kim et al. 
2003, p. 25). Of course, the informational asymmetries between banking and credit rating are 
very different. The example shows, however, which magnitude a first mover advantage can 
achieve. 
4.2.2 Lock-In Effects 
The first mover advantage is based on the opportunity cost when switching from a known to 
an unknown credit rating agency. After the entry period all informational asymmetries are 
overcome. Issuers who have contracted with both agencies can freely change between the 
two based on the cheapest price. This means that the competitive disadvantage of newco-
mers is confined to a single period. From a broader perspective, however, similar effects are 
always present. Issuers are in some cases locked-in to their rating agency permanently, not-
                                                
44  This aspect is included in Wendorf (1994, p. 101). 
45  For a similar mathematical analysis see Schmalensee (1982). 
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ably in connection with the reputation value of ratings. Lock-in describes “the cost of switch-
ing to a different service” (Shy 2001, p. 4)46. The term originates from the discussion on tech-
nology adoption and is used as an explanation for cases where an inferior technology estab-
lishes itself in the market. Here, lock-in simply describes the case in which an issuer has a 
disadvantage when changing to a different established rating agency, independent of its 
knowledge on the other agency’s quality. Lock-in can therefore be seen as a dilation of the 
first-mover advantage. 
Looking at two rating agencies of the same size with similar reputation for equally high quali-
ty, there is prima facie no difference in the objective value of the ratings from each agency. 
However, from the issuers’ point of view there is a difference, because a part of a rating’s 
value is derived from the general reputation of the issuing agency. With a rating, an issuer 
devotes himself to the high professional standards of the agency, which are generally ac-
cepted in the market. The lock-in happens at this point. Investors will ask why an issuer 
switches away from a highly reputable agency known for its analysis. An equally reputable 
agency would bring in the same level of analysis and would therefore not offer a better ser-
vice. Investors are only able to observe the agencies past quality, but they are not able to 
observe the specific contacts and relations between the issuers and the agencies. As there is 
no observable reason for a change they might fear an unobservable reason. One obvious 
motive for changing agencies is the attempt to receive a better rating, i.e. rating shopping 
(Cantor and Packer 1996, p. 2). Even if the issuer has purely honest motives, it is impossible 
to prevent such reasoning by investors. Switching comparable agencies might thus lower the 
trust in the issuer, likely resulting in increased borrowing costs. 
If all players in the market behave entirely rational, the argument above of course fails. Every 
investor knows that a reputable rating agency would not involve itself in rating shopping, be-
cause it would lose its high reputation over time. The fear of fraud is therefore unjustified. 
However, real markets are not frictionless. The functioning of the reputation mechanism 
might be marginally impaired. Even if it functions flawlessly, some investors might simply 
suspect it of not working properly. The critical literature on credit rating agencies is a good 
indicator that this is actually the case. If an issuer changes its long established agency for no 
obvious reason, at least some investors will suspect that there is a hidden reason (Hill 2003, 
p. 1153). Naturally, such suspicion is not to the advantage of the issuer. 
Generally, the lock-in is most important at the top-end of the market, especially for Moody’s 
and S&P. The two agencies are reputable for the highest quality and have no competitors 
that could exceed them. Any issuer switching away from Moody’s or S&P arouses suspicion 
of rating shopping, as he can at most receive a service of comparable scrutiny. The effect is 
strongest towards less proven newcomers. Changing to an agency of lesser reputation 
(which is derived from informational quality) the suspicion of rating shopping is especially 
strong. But also a change from Moody’s to S&P and vice versa should be seen as a certain 
lock-in effect, as already argued above. 
                                                
46  In case issuers actively consider future switching costs as a variable in their buying decision, it can also be 
described as a demand side effect. However, lock-in is a variable which can directly be influenced by rating 
agencies in their production function. It is realized with every single issuer and therefore considered as a 
supply side effect. 
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Going down the quality spectrum to a medium quality agency, the lock-in mechanism is in 
part canceled. A switch to an equally or less reputable agency will still arouse suspicion. 
However, if an issuer changes to a rating agency with considerably higher reputation, such a 
reaction will not take place. In contrast, investors will appreciate the move to a higher quality 
provider, and the reputation of the issuer will increase accordingly. No one will suspect an 
issuer of shopping for a better rating when he changes from a relatively little know agency to 
Moody’s or S&P. Lock-in is therefore only a protection against competition from lower quality 
rating agencies, but it does not help in competing against more reputable players. Thus, the 
phenomenon only benefits the largest and oldest, high quality incumbents. Formally, switch-
ing costs can be denoted as wij. The index i stands for the reputation of the current agency 
and the index j for the reputation of the new agency. One can summarize the analysis of wij 
as follows: 
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= <
0    for  
0    for  
ij
ij
w i j
w i j  (4.8) 
In order to make an issuer switch his rating agency, he must be offered a price that compen-
sates for the switching cost. Contrary to the analysis on the first mover advantage, this is 
independent of the available information on the different agencies. Even an issuer with a sin-
gle rating from S&P or Moody’s who has been rated by the other agency in the past, faces 
switching costs. In general, switching costs establish market power. There are two ways that 
switching costs can affect competition: rating agencies might lower prices to attract further 
issuers or they might increase prices to extract additional rents from existing customers 
(Klemperer 1995, p. 515). 
A simple example of two agencies with identical reputation =i j , identical prices = =i jp p p  
and identical switching costs = =ij jiw w w  will clarify the matter. To attract issuers from the 
competitor, both agencies would need to offer a discounted price of −p w  to compensate for 
the switching cost if the other agency’s price stays constant. On the other hand, both agen-
cies could raise their price above the equilibrium level of p to +p w  given a constant price of 
the competitor. At such a price level it would of course be more difficult to attract new issuers 
who as yet have no rating and therefore face no switching costs. In a saturated market seg-
ment, on the other hand, this disadvantage is negligible. Hence, switching costs are a good 
argument to explain the high price level one sees in large saturated market segments, such 
as in industrial bonds. While prices would need to be reduced by the full amount w to attract 
issuers from the competitor, prices can be raised incrementally without losing any customers. 
This is a favorable strategic situation for increasing rather than lowering prices. 
There are other factors leading possibly to lock-in which are independent of the relative repu-
tation of agencies. Issuers with many short-term notes who also have outstanding long-term 
debt might be afraid of receiving a worse service in their remaining long-term ratings if they 
change their agency. But the argument is difficult, since any ‘punishment’ would be reflected 
negatively in rating quality (see section 5.2.1). Transaction costs also play a role for the lock-
in. Issuers become used to their rating agency and establish process standards to handle the 
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relationship optimally. However, these factors should have little impact compared to the repu-
tation-based lock-in and are not unique to the credit rating industry. 
4.2.3 Economies of Scale 
The analysis of demand has shown that issuers favor big, high quality rating agencies. The 
opposite approach is to ask if big rating agencies are more efficient than small ones. Tradi-
tionally, this question has concentrated on production technology. In industries with constant-
ly high concentration the cost structure is often the major driver behind this phenomenon. In 
extreme cases the cost function takes the form of a natural monopoly. A sufficient condition 
for natural monopoly is the subadditivity of costs c in the relevant range of market demand 
(Train 1991, p. 12). A single company must be able to produce the market demand x more 
cost-efficient than two or more companies: 
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x x . The out-
put x can be interpreted as the number of ratings provided by the market. Although the econ-
omies of scale model builds on identical output units, it does not seem problematic to treat 
the rating process behind the different ratings as equal. Thus the focus is on the number of 
ratings produced by a company47. 
Thus far no fixed costs in the production process of ratings have been assumed48. The fun-
damental credit analysis is heavily based on human capital, exhibiting general analytical 
skills and industry knowledge (e.g., Moody's 1991 pp. 87-100). In principle, these inputs are 
not specific to a single firm and can be bought on the market for separate periods. The ab-
sence of (major) fixed costs is already atypical for a natural monopoly. Decisive, however, is 
the impact of the output’s size on average cost. The rating process usually involves only few 
individuals. Indeed many of these individuals are specialized in certain segments, such as 
countries, industries or financial products, but this does not constitute a major problem for 
small rating agencies. As long as their ratings remain focused on narrow areas, they have no 
substantial cost disadvantage over bigger companies. 
Economies of scale may arise, on the other hand, from production factors such as access to 
databases, for instance. Usually, it is on average cheaper if more people within an institution 
use the same database. However, given the importance of human capital the overall impact 
on production costs from these factors should be limited,. One can conclude that the produc-
tion function of credit rating agencies does not exhibit major economies of scale. On the con-
trary, it seems quite easy for small companies to compete with bigger ones on costs. The 
production technology features constant returns to scale (Strausz 2005, p. 55). However, 
size matters in reputation building and risk diversification. 
                                                
47  Focusing on a single rating as an information product, it is obvious that it does not make sense to produce 
exactly the same information twice. In the more realistic case of small differences in ratings on the same un-
derlying object, consumer preferences would need to get actively modeled in order to identify the optimal 
number of agencies rating the same debt issue. 
48  The provision of an individual rating does have a fixed cost component which is reflected by the mixed rating 
price consisting of a base fee and fees depending on issue size. Physically setting up a rating agency, howev-
er, bears little fixed costs as described. 
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4.2.3.1 Reputation Building 
The ideas above cover the informational quality of ratings. One also needs to look at the 
second part of value derived from ratings, i.e. the reputation value. An unproven newcomer 
must generate trust among the issuers along the lines of the Shapiro framework. There 
needs to be an initial investment with later returns on reputation. In principal, a growing repu-
tation requires new investments for every unit of output. Hence, there is no room for econo-
mies of scale in reputation building in the equilibrium model. In reality, the picture looks dif-
ferent. While the actual production of ratings does not feature scale economies, the devel-
opment of reputation certainly does. 
The advantages of old, big agencies over young small ones become most apparent in mod-
els where quality information explicitly spreads to non-customers (e.g., Fishman and Rob 
2002, pp. 1-19). There is still a detection lag −= 1t tR q , but contrary to Shapiro the informa-
tion about past quality diffuses gradually in the complete market – reputation building here is 
a dynamic process. The longer a rating agency is in the market with a high quality, the larger 
its potential customer base will grow. Thus it can generate higher profits than smaller rivals. 
This in turn is an incentive for high investments to protect the superior reputation recognized 
by the issuers. Being long established and big, therefore, becomes a quality signal by itself. 
Starting from the familiar Shapiro model similar results have been drawn in developing the 
ideas on growth within the reputation framework and the transfer of reputation. Once a cru-
cial reputation base is established relative to a specific market segment, new clients can be 
attracted without further investments in reputation. The high price becomes a quality assuring 
signal. This idea is the basis for many examinations of brand names and reputation (e.g., 
Nelson 1970). It has been explained in the reputation framework in section 3.5. Issuers are 
certain about the agencies abilities to deliver high quality, so they are willing to pay a high 
price. The price is in fact so high that milking is not attractive for the agencies. 
In a frictionless world, issuers would nonetheless expect an initial price discount because 
they know that a high price means profits for the rating agency even in the first period. Any 
profits would be dissipated by competition. However, such a phenomenon is not seen in the 
credit rating industry. Because competition and issuers rationality is limited, the established 
rating agencies can spread their reputation to new clients without major costs. New issuers 
pay a quality assuring price based on the experience others have had with the agency. In 
economic terms the process is very simple. The reputation for a specific market can be de-
picted as a fixed investment which can be spread to more and more units from a certain point 
on. There is no direct cost for rating agencies to cast many reputational bonds at the same 
time (Mann 1999, p. 27). Many authors see a major driver of concentration in this effect (e.g., 
Dodd and Setty 2003, p. 7). 
Strausz (2005) derives similar results in his model of ‘the threat of capture in certification 
markets’. Although the certification process itself features constant returns to scale, “honest” 
(high quality) certification in his model exhibits increasing returns to scale. As reasoned 
above, Strausz allows (in contrast to Shapiro) for different output-sizes per company. Crucial 
is the amount of future rents a certifier can generate. The higher these rents are, the lesser is 
the threat of capture (milking). Thus, a large company can set its price in equilibrium lower 
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than a small company – in fact, a monopolistic producer will be the optimal outcome49. The 
model results are based on the assumption that consumers communicate a certifier’s reputa-
tion among themselves. Any certifier needs to incur the same cost to establish its reputation, 
but the total amount of future rents depends on firm size. Thus, quite intuitively, the most 
efficient outcome is to have only one company incurring the costs to establish a reputation. 
It seems hardly possible to empirically test the critical reputation base. Rating agencies 
which are only active in a very specific segment need a comparably small investment in ab-
solute terms. In contrast, big ‘full service’ rating agencies such as the three market leaders 
today require much higher investments. Given a fixed market size, the bigger company al-
ways has an advantage. This is derived from the idea that all agencies need to incur the 
same investments to reach the critical reputation base. 
Whereas it is obvious that reputation building within a market segment features economies of 
scale, the analysis of reputation transfer has also shown scale economies in developing rep-
utation in different adjoining market segments. Because of the frictions in the form of cheat-
ing costs hi per market j, a competitive advantage arises for already proven firms. If equation 
(3.13) 
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r h r p c  holds, i.e. if the costs of cheating are higher than the value of 
the reputation transferred, it is possible for a rating agency to transfer its reputation to new 
rating products. The larger a rating agency is, the more reputation can be transferred. Se-
minal new rating segments such as structured finance products may be so capacious that 
only very large agencies can use a transfer strategy. 
One can see that the build-up of reputation is heavily based on size not only within existing 
market segments but also when entering new segments. Larger rating agencies can enter 
more quickly and on a broader scale than smaller companies or newcomers. This naturally 
favors the big players in the market. Especially important is the case when an agency can 
increase its price from pir to pi over time. In comparison to a competitor unable to use the 
transfer strategy, the agency in question reaches the same level of reputation with a smaller 
investment. This advantage is directly based on the agency’s size. As above, the result does 
not hold in a competitive market. A fully rational issuer would expect a one-time price reduc-
tion in order to acquire the profits resulting from a price increase from pir to pi. Under real 
market conditions with limited competition and rationality, however, the result is plausible. 
4.2.3.2 Diversification 
Reputation is the rating agencies’ main asset, which must be carefully protected. Company 
size helps the rating agencies to dissipate risks to the reputation base. In principal, reputation 
can be negatively impacted in two ways. On the one hand, correct ratings might be wrongly 
perceived. Accidental events can lead to unexpected defaults distorting short-term and even 
long-term correlation statistics. On the other hand, an agency might indeed provide some low 
quality ratings because of internal quality problems. This could most notably be employees 
trying to benefit privately from bringing in low effort. While the business strategy aims to de-
                                                
49  In his analysis Strausz blinds out the possibility of cheating. Thus a real price competition is possible. 
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liver high quality, the implementation is imperfect in some cases. This is harmful for the 
agency’s good reputation. 
Models without a perfect ex post measurement of quality (contrary to Shapiro’s framework) 
incorporate the risk that investors wrongly perceive a high quality as low50. If the incorrect 
perception is substantial, this might easily endanger the entire reputation base and therefore 
the business. If it is not substantial the wrong perception might lower the agency’s income 
but not force it out of the market. In the case of risk averse agencies or individual analysts 
who prefer a stable income, it might be concluded that especially small competitors want to 
grow or merge in order to diversify risk. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), for instance, sup-
port this view in a general model on financial information intermediaries. For a small rating 
agency with only a low absolute number of ratings even one badly perceived rating might 
threaten the whole business because the statistical impact of a single rating is significant. 
The statistical impact of single ratings for large rating agencies is negligible. Further, unusual 
events are likely to cancel each other out. In other words, the average quality of small agen-
cies might be substantially influenced by chance, whereas the average quality of large com-
panies would remain unaffected by such unsystematic risk. Overall, the risk-costs of a wrong 
perception of quality fall with agency size, but this effect is declining. At a certain size, further 
growth will probably have no effects on risk diversification. This is a promising area for empir-
ical research. 
The risk diversification effect in the credit rating industry is more pronounced than in other 
experience good markets because of the special nature of ratings and their quality mea-
surement. From an output oriented position the quality of a single rating is not defined. A 
debt security either defaults in a given period or it does not, and its rating merely states a 
probability for this. Even if a top rated issue defaults, one gets no information about whether 
the scrutinized rating class was right. In other words, default is not a bad thing as a certain 
number of defaults in every rating class is needed to guarantee a high quality risk classifica-
tion51. Only in the context of other ratings, can quality be measured. If there are ten issues 
rated BBB and ten issues rated BB, more issues from the second group should default than 
from the first. Clearly, a few ‘unexpected’ defaults, which could not have been foreseen even 
by the most prudent analysis, would heavily impact the sample of ten ratings. In a sample of 
say 1,000 ratings, however, chance should have no impact. If correlation studies are flawed, 
it suggests a bad rating quality. This thought leads to the second factor which might have a 
negative impact on reputation: sporadic low quality ratings by single rating analysts. 
In the presence of perfect internal monitoring (as in the Shapiro model) this is of course not a 
concern. Moral hazard is effectively prevented as no individual within the rating agency has 
the chance to privately benefit by investing only low effort but realizing a high average re-
turn52. The low effort would immediately be detected. Thus, exclusively high quality will be 
produced. Without internal monitoring, on the other hand, some ratings are inevitably of poor 
                                                
50  This idea was already discussed as part of reputation transfers risks in section 3.3. 
51  The difference becomes clear if one takes, e.g., an investment bank underwriting IPOs: The investment bank 
calculates a capital value and future profits. If the actual values depart from the projected, the quality was low. 
Further, the projections can be directly compared with those of competing equity analysts. For a rating, this is 
not possible: If an issue does not default, one cannot say ex post which of several different ratings was best. 
52  The possibility of outright fraud is ruled out here. 
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quality. This has two effects. First, the average quality measured against long-term correla-
tion statistics will suffer, dragging down the reputation premium. Second, a random accumu-
lation of low quality ratings in a certain time period or rating category might lead to notable 
distortions in correlation studies. If distortions are significant and interpreted by investors as a 
milking attempt, the whole reputation base is in danger. One can see that agency size helps 
to diversify this second risk in the same manner as the risk of a wrong quality perception. 
A lapsing average quality must be taken care of by internal risk management efforts. The 
structure of the prevalent rating process suggests a very strong internal monitoring: analysis 
and rating decisions are separated and split between different persons in committees (e.g., 
Moody's 1991, p. 88). Also the fact that thus far no major rating agency has ever been 
brought down over a scandal speaks for the prudence of rating agencies. Although the inter-
nal monitoring is strong on an absolute scale, it is certainly not perfect. But even without per-
fect internal monitoring there are mechanisms to mitigate moral hazard through diversifica-
tion53. It is possible to assign an individual analyst to several different rating teams. If the full 
effort of every individual is needed to produce high quality, there exists an indirect measure 
to monitor effort by statistically correlating the outcome of the individual’s rating projects with 
quality. If an analyst can be assigned to enough different projects, it might also be the case 
that his actual utility is negatively influenced as the benefits of low effort are more than offset 
by the decrease in compensation (Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, pp. 424-25). From these 
considerations one might conclude that internal monitoring becomes easier/cheaper with 
agency size. The bigger an agency, the easier it is to assign analysts to several projects. In 
addition, fixed costs of risk management systems can be offset. 
4.2.4 Diseconomies of Scale 
Whereas it is obvious to point to economies of scale in the credit rating market, there are 
also diseconomies of scale. At the heart of this argumentation lies the possibility of serious 
criminal negligence or fraud. The best illustration is the failure of the auditor Arthur Andersen 
in 2001 over an accounting scandal at the energy company Enron (e.g., US Senate 2002, 
pp. 24-29). As Enron’s accountant, Arthur Andersen was shown to have published a dodgy 
analysis of the company’s financials, in many cases not disclosing the illegal behavior but 
helping to cover it over. In 2002 Andersen was convicted of criminal charges for the shred-
ding of documents, although this verdict was dropped in 2005 (e.g., Lane 2005). Further, 
Andersen’s independence was questioned by market participants because of its high con-
sulting revenues from Enron. The Enron case was such a major challenge to Andersen’s 
integrity that all major clients and the public abruptly lost faith in the company. Expressed in 
the reputation framework, the onetime delivery of minimum quality to a single client was 
enough to destroy the company’s entire reputational capital54. There was no time for a sys-
tematic milking strategy to create extraordinary profits on a broad scale. There are also ex-
                                                
53  Under quite general assumptions moral hazard can also be prevented by costly direct internal monitoring 
creating a positive net result (Diamond 1984, p. 395-402). The diversification argument is not needed under 
this line of argumentation. 
54  One can speak of minimum quality, as the service quality was obviously high enough not to be directly identi-
fied as dodgy by market participants. 
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amples from the investment banking industry, where cases of fraud by single employees 
have lead to a severe loss of reputation of the whole company (Podolny 1993, p. 861). 
This risk applies to any reputation-based business model, not least to credit rating agencies. 
A major scandal can prove fatal (Smith and Walter 2002, p. 293). Very importantly, clients 
may in many cases not differentiate between the reputation in different market segments 
once an agency is firmly settled in a new field. If a rating agency delivers low quality in one 
segment, not only clients in this sector but also clients across the board will become wary. 
The potential loss of reputation through an individual transaction is far greater than the value 
of the transaction itself (Mann 1999, p. 27). The advantage of large companies using existing 
reputation to move into new market segments can easily backfire if reputation suffers. Arthur 
Andersen, for instance, was active not only in auditing big international firms, but also in tax 
services, in consulting, and in auditing midsized and large firms in many national markets. 
Except for the consulting activities, which were already formally separated from Arthur An-
dersen, all these businesses failed in the wake of the Enron scandal, either going out of 
business or being bought and re-branded by competitors. 
It has already been argued that a deliberate milking strategy becomes dangerous if only car-
ried out in a single market segment. Milking one segment can destroy the whole business, as 
in the Andersen case. However, management has control over such a strategy and will not 
pursue it if in doubt. If the ex post quality measure is not perfect, management cannot do 
much about it. But it has been shown that average quality levels out with size, so perceived, 
unintended deviations from high quality pose no threat to big honorable companies55. And 
moral hazard in the form of substandard effort can be prevented by an agency’s internal 
structure, given a certain company size. Furthermore, substandard effort will most likely not 
lead to major quality reductions. 
Fraud or serious criminal negligence, on the other hand, is a different and more dramatic 
event which cannot be completely prevented by internal monitoring. Fraudulent employees 
are usually not guilty of slack, on the contrary, they exert themselves to generate individual 
gains for themselves or a small group, while at the same time disguising their behavior. Giv-
en that the likelihood of fraud leading to the complete loss of reputation is significant and the 
same for all employees, it is obvious that the overall costs of fraud rises over proportionally 
with size. Imagine rating agency A has x employees and reputation y, agency B has the size 
2x and the reputation 2y, and both agencies face a possibility of fraud of f per employee each 
period. The calculative risk cost of A per period is = ⋅ ⋅a f x y , the calculative risk cost of B is 
= ⋅ ⋅ =2 2 4b f x y a . Double the size of A, rating agency B faces four times the risk costs in 
the event of fraud or serious criminal negligence. 
The high expected costs of fraud or serious criminal negligence, especially for large compa-
nies, are based on the assumption that one incident in an arbitrary market leads to the com-
plete loss of reputation in all markets. Empirically the Arthur Andersen/Enron case is proof for 
                                                
55  Some reputation models with noisy quality signals, i.e. a low quality perception by pure chance, allow in equi-
librium for high quality firms leaving involuntarily the market which constitutes a complete loss of all invest-
ments in reputation (e.g., Hörner 2002). This result however seems far too strict in the case of real markets. 
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that assumption, at least in the accounting business56. Credit rating is in many cases similar 
to accounting, especially because of the criticality of reputation for high quality and integrity. 
In principal, fraud in one market segment should not systematically impact quality in other 
segments as the provision of ratings itself is not altered by the criminal negligence of unre-
lated employees. A reaction such as in the Enron case is therefore irrational from a purely 
informational quality perspective. However, a rating from a reputable agency also conveys 
the agency’s reputation itself onto the issuer. Being rated by Moody’s or S&P is a quality sig-
nal in itself regardless of the actual rating. If this general reputation of a rating agency is 
damaged through a case of fraud or serious criminal negligence, it is very likely to alienate 
the issuers. Being rated by a fraudulent agency will link an issuer to all ‘negative talk’ in the 
media and the financial community about the fraudulent rating agency. The actual informa-
tion value of a rating becomes secondary As soon as some issuers decide against the estab-
lished agency the ‘negative talk’ will increase. Investors will ask why an issuer is staying with 
a troubled agency when others have left. 
4.2.5 Market Segmentation 
In the credit rating market, three areas of segmentation are theoretically relevant: quality, 
geography and product class. Furthermore, the market can be split from the supply side into 
officially recognized and non-recognized agencies. Figure 4.8 displays the different areas. 
The subsequent analysis will now look closely at the question of whether a rating agency’s 
practical possibilities to differentiate are as plentiful as indicated. 
 
Figure 4.8: Theoretical scope for credit rating market segmentation 
Most product and service markets feature distinct quality segments. A single brand or pro-
ducer is usually only active on one quality level. As a result the number of competitors tends 
to be higher in markets with many quality segments. In the analysis of demand for credit rat-
ings it has been concluded that issuers concentrate on agencies which offer ratings of high 
informational quality. From this perspective, there is only one possible quality segment. 
However, rating agencies not only face a quality choice regarding their analytical process but 
also regarding the issues they rate. This is inherent to the business model of all intermedia-
                                                
56  Like all big accountants at that time Arthur Andersen had seen several accounting scandals (US Senate 2002, 
p. 27). However, the weight of the Enron case made the public tip. Andersen would probably have failed even 
without its other ‘smaller’ scandals. 
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ries, which in principal have to choose the quality of their service and the quality of their 
products or clients. A retailer, e.g., has to choose the range of products he offers and the 
quality of his sales service. 
For credit rating agencies, this translates into the choice of analytical quality and credit risks. 
Agencies could conceivably focus on low or high credit risks. Such a specialization is ob-
viously not plausible. Ratings are especially valuable as they make the comparison between 
low and high credit risks possible. Ex ante it is not always clear in which category an issue 
broadly falls; ex post default risks change and ratings are updated. Therefore, a specializa-
tion on certain risks is neither possible nor would it make sense. As unspectacular as this 
result may be, its implications are important. The argument becomes clear when the credit 
rating industry is compared with investment banking. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) show 
in their model that the greater the reputation of an investment bank, the lower the riskiness of 
the issues it underwrites. They also cite empirical proof (p. 75). In investment banking, the 
underwriting of an issue is already a signal of its quality. Highly reputable investment banks 
will only accept highly reputable and secure clients. As a result, there is a distinct hierarchy 
between a relatively large number of investment banks (Podolny 1993, p. 857). Competition 
between the different players is limited to within the individual status levels. 
The difference between credit rating agencies and investment banks lies in their business 
models. Investment banks are usually compensated on the basis of the actual offering price 
of an issue. If they achieve a higher price, they receive higher fees. The investment banks 
with the highest reputation generate the highest valuations, but also have the greatest risk of 
endangering their reputation if a valuation turns out to be too high ex post. Therefore, they 
choose financially sound clients that pose little risk (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994, pp. 57-
60). One or more investment banks – presumably all of a high analytical quality – compete in 
the different risk brackets. In the credit rating industry the strategic situation is different: the 
proceeds of rating agencies are independent of the actual rating, as they are calculated ac-
cording to the face value of an issue. Rating agencies gain nothing when assigning a higher 
rating. Even the most reputable rating agencies can rate bad credit risks, as long as they 
issue a low rating. As a result, there is only a single segment for all risks within any given 
market segment, which leaves no room for a hierarchical market structure (Kerwer 2002b, p. 
44). 
Without the possibility of differentiating in terms of quality, rating agencies lack a key compet-
itive variable available in other industries. While retailing, e.g., offers many possible combina-
tions of quality sold and levels of service/choice of channel, all rating agencies are similar in 
these two dimensions. For newcomers it is hard to establish themselves in such a situation 
because it is difficult to differentiate from the incumbents. The same is true for the incum-
bents themselves, who have little leeway to differentiate from each other. 
A classic variable to segment markets is geography. One can often clearly distinguish be-
tween local, regional, national and international markets. For credit ratings national and in-
ternational markets are especially relevant because of potential differences in national finan-
cial regulations and standards. However, geographical differentiation faces a fundamental 
limitation: credit ratings assert their claim on the global comparability of risks. The information 
a rating conveys is the same everywhere. Laterally reversed, issuers are interested in a 
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global reach. They want to have the largest possible basis of investors in order to attain the 
lowest possible interest rate. In other words, credit rating agencies cater to the needs of a 
largely global financial market. Once again, there is not much room to distinguish oneself – at 
least for issuers seeking global attention. 
The picture looks different for issuers which are satisfied with placing their issues in certain 
national markets. These issuers should principally be willing to buy ratings from regional 
players who have no global reputation. The reach of a debt security is therefore a variable 
that allows market segmentation. It is possible to concentrate on issues in a certain country. 
The inherent problem of this competitive strategy is that an expansion is difficult. Because 
the reputation has a limited geographical reach, neither regional issues aiming at internation-
al markets nor international issuers can be attracted. A different national strategy aims to 
bring credit risk information to a certain group of outside investors. Fitch IBCA, e.g., originally 
concentrated on providing American investors with information on European bonds (Fight 
2001, p. 49). 
While the aspirations of the big rating agencies is international, the reality looks a bit differ-
ent. During the rating process there is substantive personnel interaction between the issuer 
and the rating agency. In this respect, credit ratings are localized. Issuers require a contact 
person who is geographically and perhaps also culturally close. To acquire substantial busi-
ness in a region, even an internationally reputable agency needs a local representation. The 
numerous national dependencies of Moody’s and S&P show that it is most profitable to be 
present in all important regions (e.g., Smith and Walter 2002, pp. 301-02). Such a regional 
presence in principal also opens up the market for regional issues. Even if issuers do not aim 
for diversified international investors, they do not lose by having an internationally reputable 
rating. The very way international rating agencies are organized therefore poses a direct 
competitive threat to national players. They might try to compete on superior regional know-
ledge based on their regional roots and on better adaptation to local investor needs – a strat-
egy used, e.g., by the Japan Credit Rating Agency Ltd (e.g., Fight 2001, pp. 84-90). Howev-
er, competing on better analysis is in principal difficult because the international players are 
obviously highly competitive in this. Otherwise they would risk their international reputation. 
Lacking the scope for a superior credit analysis, regional niche players will often have the 
best chance by competing on price and not on quality. Adapting to local investor needs might 
be the only plausible way of real product differentiation, as global agencies cannot change 
their worldwide standards. This ‘protection’, on the other hand, is also a limitation since other 
regions are more difficult to enter with a rating system specifically designed for a local mar-
ket. 
The third area of possible differentiation is in rated debt securities. An agency can concen-
trate on certain industries, financial products or areas such as sovereign ratings. The key to 
the strategy is to build up a reputation for superior credit analysis in a specialized field. 
Thomson Financial Bankwatch is an example for a successful specialized agency which only 
rated banks and their debt securities worldwide until it was acquired and absorbed by Fitch in 
2000 (Fight 2001, pp. 60-71 and Hill 2004, p. 47). The strategy of concentrating on a certain 
industry suffers from the same problems as geographical specialization. General purpose 
rating agencies all work on a similar very high level of fundamental credit analysis. By the 
very nature of demand they must be as good as anybody else in the market. Therefore, spe-
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cialized players will have a difficult time positioning themselves in terms of superior credit 
analysis. Further, general purpose agencies always have the advantage of a broader basis 
of ratings for comparison of debt products. 
A fourth area of market segmentation not found in other industries is official recognition. An 
agency’s ratings are either recognized or not recognized for compliance with rating-based 
regulations. Unlike quality, geography, and product class, recognition is usually not a strateg-
ic variable for firms, since it cannot be influenced directly. Only under registration systems 
such as in the USA from 2008 onwards, will official recognition be a real choice for rating 
agencies. As already indicated, recognized agencies have an advantage over unrecognized 
ones in the form of the license value their ratings carry. Unrecognized agencies therefore 
have a disadvantage per se. Their virtues, on the other hand, are higher flexibility and less 
market impact. Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, e.g., are suspected of not having downgraded 
Enron in 2001, in part because of the devastating consequences a downgrade would have 
had through rating triggers and the impact of rating-based regulations (Hill 2004, pp. 69-71). 
Smaller agencies do not have to consider such outcomes and can focus entirely on providing 
the best possible credit analysis. Off Wall Street Consulting Group, e.g., correctly classified 
Enron as bad debt six months before the NRSRO agencies did (US Senate 2002, p. 119). 
Compared to most other industries the possibility for differentiation by means of market seg-
mentation is limited. There is only demand for the highest analytical quality from agencies 
which rate all levels of credit risk and the market is in principal global. In sum, it is often cor-
rect to speak of a single market for credit ratings which is only divided by official recognition. 
It is difficult to use special regional or industry knowledge for differentiation since successful 
general purpose rating agencies must also possess the respective skills. Nonetheless, a 
niche strategy seems to be the most promising for entrants. The large majority of smaller 
rating agencies focuses on a certain country and/or industry (BIS 2000, pp. 21-22). The mar-
ket leaders, too, vary in strength in some segments, a fact that often results from first mover 
advantages. Moody’s, e.g., is traditionally stronger in Asia compared to S&P, which leads in 
Latin America (e.g., BIS 2000, pp. 2, 33). 
4.3 Strategic Interaction 
Following the analysis of the reputation mechanism against actual industry background it has 
become clear that reputation equilibrium is primarily a theoretical construct which helps to 
understand the operation of the credit rating market. The result of a distinct price, a distinct 
output and a distinct number of competitors is not borne out in reality. There is no large num-
ber of equal rating agencies producing the same quality and quantity (which was set at 1 in 
Shapiro’s model), rather, the market is highly concentrated. The historical shift in quality de-
manded and other frictions such as the general presence of cheating costs or lock-in create 
a range of possible market prices. In addition, the market for credit ratings is cornered by 
several demand and supply side factors that lead to a high concentration. Figure 4.9 pro-
vides an overview of the major elements that have been scrutinized in the course of chapters 
3 and 4: 
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Figure 4.9: Major elements influencing credit rating agency competition 
Incumbent agencies have first mover advantages, while new players face entry barriers. Big 
agencies have an advantage over small ones in reputation building and risk costs, and inves-
tors generally prefer the market leaders. These underlying economic factors apply every-
where, be it in national markets or specialized branches. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
virtually all segments of the credit rating market have a high concentration with only a few 
sizable players (BIS 2000, pp. 21-32). Moody’s, S&P and to a certain extent Fitch dominate 
the market for big international debt securities. 
In economic terms, the analyzed structural factors provide for a duopoly or close oligopoly 
situation. The actual price and quality in the credit rating market is not determined by the 
rules of perfect competition but by strategic interaction between the agencies57. Therefore, 
one needs to analyze how exactly rating agencies interact. The focus now will be a theoreti-
cal analysis of the strategic incentives resulting from the industry structure. Several ideas 
already discussed will be linked here. Details of the agencies’ business models – although a 
very interesting field of research – will be largely overlooked. Instead, the results of standard 
industrial economics will be applied. Two key areas will be analyzed. On the one hand, one 
needs to ask what happens between the incumbents. Will competition ever succeed in driv-
ing down prices? On the other hand, the question of entrants is important. If newcomers do 
succeed in entering the market, how can they best compete against incumbents and how will 
the incumbents themselves react? 
4.3.1 Incumbent Rating Agencies 
Incumbents can set their price between an upper boundary ˆip  influenced by factors such as 
lock-in and a lower boundary hip  determined by costs for hiding a cheating strategy. The 
equilibrium price pi of the basic model is just one possibility within this price range. As dis-
                                                
57  Strategic interaction describes situations where one market participant explicitly considers the actions of other 
market participants (e.g., Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998, p.172). 
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cussed in section 3.6, issuers would expect cheating at prices below hip  and not buy rat-
ings58. Above ˆip  new rating agencies are likely to enter. 
The price for a given rating can fluctuate within the defined range. An agency has to consider 
the immediate effect on quantity sold and its competitors’ reactions. The issue has been ana-
lyzed in section 4.1. Because the direct price elasticity of demand is low in the credit rating 
market, lower prices barely increase the absolute size of the market. All issuers interested in 
ratings have a similar valuation, because it is derived from their use in an anonymous finan-
cial market. If one issuer buys a rating at the market price, most other issuers are willing to 
pay the same. The market penetration of established credit rating products is therefore by 
definition high. This picture is supported by empirical evidence: S&P, e.g., rated 99.2 percent 
of publicly traded debt in the USA in 2003 (U.S. House 2003, p. 219). Even if prices were to 
generally fall, only comparably few new ratings could be sold, for most issues are already 
rated. 
In non-growing segments of the rating market additional business can only come from issu-
ers changing their rating agency, i.e. from increasing market share on the competitors’ cost. 
As ratings of low or mid-range quality are bad substitutes for high quality ratings, high quality 
incumbents will act irrespective of other quality segments – the cross-price elasticity of de-
mand will be low. Empirically, studies find the two leading firms acting on the same quality 
level, while Fitch, too, is only marginally different when corrected for selection bias (e.g., Je-
well and Livingston 1999, p. 42). Therefore, price competition among incumbent agencies is 
in principal possible. Specifically, the prospects of price competition are nonetheless bad: 
lock-in effects may prevent many issuers from changing agencies even in the case of a noti-
ceable price difference. For Moody’s and S&P the strategy is entirely impractical in many 
segments, because of their high market penetration. Both rate, e.g., nearly all publicly traded 
US industrial bonds. A share of 100 percent of clients cannot be increased. Only in certain 
market segments, such as in Asia or South America are there differences in market share 
that could be exploited (e.g., BIS 2000, p. 2). Fitch or smaller recognized agencies could try 
to lure away issuers from the two bigger rivals with lower prices. Apart from general lock-in, 
however, they face the two-rating norm. Strong demand side forces push business towards 
Moody’s and S&P. Even Fitch, which is widely regarded as a reputable full service agency, is 
hardly ever used as single rating without parallel ratings from one or both of the market lead-
ers. 
Overall it is extremely difficult for incumbents to acquire business through price reduction. 
Even if Moody’s or S&P could lower the price enough to lure away issuers from their rival in a 
not fully penetrated segment, they would face direct sanctions: the other agency would also 
lower its price to prevent an exodus of its customers. The result would generally be lower 
prices with unchanged market shares. Profits would be lower for both agencies; especially 
the ‘aggressive’ agency that lowered prices first would suffer. From a strategic perspective it 
                                                
58  The only possibility to safely reduce the effective price below the no-milking threshold is through non-price 
competition. Klein and Leffler (1981), e.g., build their reputation model not on initial investments into reputation 
but on non-price competition such as advertising and other company specific investments to dissipate profits 
at high quality-sustaining prices. Rating agencies might also offer free ancillary services which can only be of-
fered by incurring additional costs. 
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is virtually impossible for the leading incumbents to profit from reducing prices. On the con-
trary, increasing prices is a promising option. In the same way that switching costs prevent 
issuers from changing their agency when prices fall, issuers will not switch when prices rise 
moderately. If the second agency follows all price increases, profits for both will rise. Prices 
can be increased as long as there is no other choice for issuers in the high quality sector. 
Fitch’s price and other recognized agencies represent such an outside option. Although Fitch 
charges much lower fees than Moody’s and S&P, the agency is not able to substantially lure 
away business from its rivals. This demonstrates just how protected the position of Moody’s 
and S&P is. 
In factual, Moody’s and S&P operate in many segments of the rating market as a duopoly. 
On closer inspection the duopoly can even be interpreted as a monopoly in that there is no 
real competition between the two because of the two-rating norm. They both hold nearly 40 
percent of the market and maximize their joint and individual profits by setting the highest 
possible price. Specifically, the upper price barrier ˆip  is set by the price where issuers would 
switch away to Fitch or a new competitor. The economic incentive for Moody’s and S&P is to 
increase prices to this level59. 
Standard industrial organization models support the analysis above (e.g., Tirole 1998, pp. 
239-43). Companies only engage in price wars if detection lags and cost asymmetries allow 
for significant short run profits. In the credit rating industry such factors are admittedly not 
present. Since the industry is concentrated competitors will quickly learn about price moves 
by other agencies. Furthermore, the big rating agencies are in contact in all market seg-
ments. Price reductions in one segment could well trigger broader reactions of competitors. A 
crucial assumption of the competitive models of strategic interaction is an infinite cross-
elasticity of demand, i.e. the products are perfect substitutes. For an unrated issuer choosing 
between one of the market’s leading incumbents this is true. But existing clients are locked-in 
to their agency, which reduces the effectiveness of price incentives from competing firms. 
The cross elasticity between different quality levels is also very low. All in all, structural fac-
tors do not lend themselves to price reductions. Basic industrial economics therefore predict 
tactic collusion between the incumbents, leading to a high price equilibrium. 
In a collusive oligopoly, all rating agencies sell at the monopoly price in order to maximize 
profits (e.g., Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998, pp. 172-74 for the whole paragraph). The mar-
ket will be divided with a fixed share for each agency. The classic obstacles to a collusive 
oligopoly are cheating, outside competition and regulation. The state will usually fight a mar-
ket outcome similar to a monopolistic market. If one looks at the two internal threats to collu-
sive oligopolies, one finds little relevance for the credit rating market: cheating on prices and 
quantities is virtually impossible. As ratings are easily observable, any deviation from ‘busi-
ness as usual’ will be detected. Prices are certainly no secret between the players and shifts 
in market shares quickly become visible. Outside competition usually refers to foreign com-
petitors. Today’s credit rating market, however, is in its very nature global – parallel to the 
reach of financial markets. From this perspective there is no threat of already established 
rating agencies from other countries. Only Fitch or smaller agencies could be a threat to 
                                                
59  Towards Fitch such a pricing behavior can be interpreted as limit pricing (e.g., Tirole 1998, p. 368). 
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Moody’s and S&P. Their power, however, is limited. The outcome of tactic collusion is high 
prices, even if business-sustaining prices could be lower. This is exactly what can be seen in 
the credit rating market. 
4.3.2 Market Entrants 
In a strict sense, entrants are companies that have recently entered the rating market. The 
incumbents are the long established raters Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. In a wider sense, how-
ever, Fitch acts in some market segments like an entrant, in that it has to cope with signifi-
cantly larger and stronger rivals. It has already been made clear that the credit rating market 
is very difficult to enter. Because of historic shifts, the incumbents enjoy a real cost advan-
tage over newcomers, who must pay more to reach the same level of reputation. In addition, 
the structure of demand is unfavorable to newcomers: issuers stick with the proven agencies 
and it is hard to offer them an innovative product. Entrants face the trade-off between ratings 
compatible to the market leaders and a differentiated product. Entering the rating market 
head on against Moody’s and S&P is all but impossible: reputation needs to be built up over 
many years and it is cheapest to transfer reputation to new segments/issuers over even 
longer periods of time. Further, state recognition can usually only be achieved after being 
established on the rating market for some years. 
Realistically, entrants can only follow a niche strategy, initially concentrating on a special 
country, product class, or both. The Japan Credit Rating Agency, for instance, successfully 
entered the rating business by concentrating on the Japanese market and Thomson Finan-
cial Bankwatch built up a high reputation for its bank ratings (Fight 2001, pp. 60-61, 84). 
Such a strategy needs less capital than rating thousands of different issues from the outset. 
The entrant can concentrate his resources on building up reputation in a narrow filed. If he is 
catering to a limited and closely defined group of investors and issuers, it is much easier to 
generate attention than trying to cater to a worldwide clientele. A promising strategy is to fo-
cus on evolving innovative segments of the rating market. Smaller rating agencies are likely 
to move more quickly into new rating niches because of their leaner organizational structures 
(pp. 48-49). This is one of the few competitive advantages of small, young rating agencies. 
Fitch, e.g., early concentrated on structured finance products which might explain why the 
agency still has a comparably high market share in this segment. 
If a small agency is successful in establishing a good reputation in a specialized niche, it can 
use its position as a basis for expansion. Thomson Financial Bankwatch is an example. Its 
market recognition for ratings of financial institutions was so high that it was awarded limited 
NRSRO status for its special field in 1992. In 1999 it was upgraded to a fully recognized 
NRSRO for all ratings (White 2002, p. 46 and endnote 23). The example shows how an 
agency can overcome the ‘catch 22’ situation in gaining official recognition by entering the 
market on a limited scale. Shortly after full recognition, however, Thomson Financial Bank-
watch was acquired by Fitch. The case of Fitch itself shows the other possibility to gain rec-
ognition. IBCA, a London based rating agency, gained full NRSRO status by buying the rec-
ognized US agencies Fitch, Duff & Phelps, and Thomson Financial Bankwatch (e.g., Fight 
2001, pp. 45-47). The strength of the conglomerate – which operated under the most promi-
nent brand name Fitch – results from the combination of the different reputations in special 
segments. 
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One can conclude that there is some scope for newcomers despite the high entry barriers. 
This necessarily poses the strategic question for incumbents of how to react to entrants. 
Most obviously, Moody’s and S&P could lower their price to a certain extent to discourage 
entry from the outset. However, as prices in the credit rating industry have only a low com-
mitment value (only a part of reputation is economically a sunk cost), the credibility of such 
threats is questionable. Price reductions might only be interpreted as attempts of incumbents 
to manipulate the information available about them (e.g., Tirole 1998, pp. 361-88). Indeed, a 
reputation of aggressively reacting to newcomers in any segment may well pay off despite 
short run losses in the form of a long-term reduction in entries (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 
1982, pp. 280-312). But if a newcomer is successful in establishing himself, he faces the 
same exit costs as the incumbents resulting from difficulties in hiding cheating. Such exit bar-
riers weaken the incumbents’ threat of aggressive post entry behavior. 
From an overall strategic perspective it is questionable if incumbents in the credit rating busi-
ness actively try to discourage entry by price policy. The structural entry barriers provide 
substantial advantages for the first movers. As a result, only very few newcomers will be able 
and willing to enter in the first place. It is not worth investing into a reputation for aggressive 
post entry behavior if the number of successful entrants is limited anyway. A superior strate-
gy is to wait and see while keeping prices high. If a newcomer is indeed able to successfully 
build up a good reputation and client base, it seems most profitable for incumbents to simply 
buy the newcomer or to merge with it rather than to engage in a price war. After the ‘grandfa-
thering’ of Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch as NRSRO in 1975, the next four recognized agencies 
Duff and Phelps, IBCA, Thomson Bankwatch, and McCarthy, Crisanti & Maffei were all ac-
quired and finally merged into the new Fitch (e.g., Dodd and Setty 2003, p. 7). 
It has been more attractive for the investors of the smaller NRSRO agencies to sell out to a 
bigger entity rather than trying to break into the highly profitable market of Moody’s and S&P 
on their own. This underlines the difficulty and risk of smaller agencies competing in the cre-
dit rating market. On the other hand, larger agencies have an incentive to acquire small 
agencies simply to prevent potential competition. In many cases, however, buying successful 
entrants is more than competition prevention. It has always been part of Moody’s and S&P’s 
business strategy to affiliate with or acquire small agencies in emerging segments and coun-
tries (e.g., Fight 2001, pp. 16, 32). Especially in unknown and volatile environments it is at-
tractive to move into the business via small but already proven agencies. Only when their 
international reputation was firmly established, did Moody’s and S&P fully integrate smaller 
agencies under their brand. In conclusion, one can note that entrants as well as incumbents 
have incentives to join forces in the credit rating business. It is highly unlikely that a competi-
tor to Moody’s and S&P could develop ‘organically’ into such a strong position. Fitch, the only 
agency in a position to compete against the two in all market segments, is a conglomeration 
of many smaller agencies. 
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5 Reasons for Regulation 
Chapters 3 and 4 have highlighted the special economics of the credit rating industry. The 
market is coined by limited competition and market power in that incumbents are able to 
generate sustained profits. Additionally, rating agencies hold an important ‘gatekeeper’ posi-
tion in financial markets – not least because of rating-based regulation. The questions in the 
remaining two chapters are if, why, and how the state should interfere with the market. There 
has already been a great amount of analysis, debate, and regulatory action in recent years. 
For an overview see e.g., Schwarcz (2001), Hill (2004), or Rousseau (2005). 
One of the main difficulties in the relationship between the state and the credit rating industry 
is the multiplicity of potential concerns. When considering rating agencies as normal compa-
nies from an antitrust perspective, monopoly power and efficiency arguments are of impor-
tance. Analytically less clear is the mostly political notion of ‘power’ which is attributed to rat-
ing agencies. From the perspective of rating-based regulation, the main goal is a functioning 
reputation mechanism providing for a high rating quality since the state explicitly relies on it. 
Rating agencies should also not exploit conflicts of interest, which is lastly also an issue of 
rating quality. In a wider framework, the efficiency and quality of not only the rating industry 
but also of the complete financial system must be considered. The state is anxious about 
structural risks. What combines all concerns from an economic perspective is the concept of 
‘market failure’, i.e. situations where state interference can improve the well-being of society 
at large. 
There are two scientific approaches for evaluating reasons for regulation: allocation and be-
havior. The allocation approach looks at the outcome of competition. It asks if there are 
quantity and quality reductions compared to a more competitive state. It also looks at the 
pace of innovations and structural effects of competition. The behavior approach, on the oth-
er hand, is based on the idea that specific actions of rating agencies can be harmful. This is 
especially the case when competitors are hindered and will usually involve the reduction of 
the rating quality. Hence, it is a key question if there are breaks in the market control of the 
industry creating scope for ‘bad behavior’. 
The behavior approach is academically straightforward. The state interferes to influence spe-
cific actions which in turn lead to a better (measurable) outcome. In a practical setting, 
though, it is sometimes difficult to prove criminal negligence since it is hard to single out the 
intent of specific actions. The allocation approach, on the other hand, is academically weaker 
than the behavior approach because it builds on a benchmark allocation for comparison. In 
order to evaluate a specific market outcome, the state needs to know what the outcome un-
der optimal conditions would be. In practice it is often easy to survey the necessary data 
such as market share or quantity and it is also possible to define a benchmark. However, 
such structural considerations can be misleading since strategic aspects are often ignored. 
Most regulatory bodies have been shifting away from allocation considerations to a more 
strategic approach by looking at the specific behavior of market participants. Nonetheless, 
the allocation approach can generate useful insights about the general state of competition in 
an industry. In political practice, too, the allocation approach has considerable weight. A 
good example is the American legislative initiative to reform the credit rating industry which 
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passed the US House of Representatives as the ‘Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act’ 
(US Congress 2006a). It implies that the duopolistic market structure is the principal source 
of problems in the industry. 
5.1 Allocation Effects of Rating Agency Competition 
5.1.1 Monopoly Power and Inefficiency 
Economic efficiency is one of the most basic concerns of the state. In the simplest form effi-
ciency can be described as “absence of waste” (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998, p. 744). 
The state aims to create market environments that enhance competitive processes which in 
turn strengthen efficiency – an area called antitrust (Viscusi et al. 2005, p. 61). Antitrust as-
sumes that functioning markets provide the best economic results. Two different notions of 
efficiency are relevant (pp. 79-80). The first concept is ‘static efficiency’60: the state is con-
cerned that the cost of producing a given output is as low as possible. Rating agencies 
should thus not be able to artificially limit the quantity or quality of ratings. The second area 
of concern is ‘technical progress’ or ‘dynamic efficiency’: the market should provide for conti-
nuous innovation. Antitrust policies boost efficiency if total economic surplus can be in-
creased, i.e. the society in sum should gain. 
The analysis of the rating industry’s structure and conduct in chapters 3 and 4 has involved a 
picture of an anticompetitive market. It is characterized by high concentration and sizable 
entry barriers. This gives rise to antitrust concerns per se, because the theoretical outcome 
of such a structure is collusion (Viscusi et al. 2005, pp. 62-66). As shown, the incumbents’ 
conduct can in most market segments indeed be described as in tactic collusion. Such a sit-
uation is the basis for welfare reductions, as the rating agencies can set prices above costs – 
they hold market power. In the following the question will be analyzed whether the rating in-
dustry’s performance does in fact give reason to antitrust concerns. 
5.1.1.1 Static Efficiency 
Monopolies are harmful if their price increases reduce quantities compared to a more com-
petitive state61. Such behavior can lead to an overall loss of welfare commonly called dead-
weight loss. While the surplus of the producer rises, the surplus of consumers falls dispropor-
tionately so that the total surplus is lower than in a more competitive situation. It is important 
to stress that the state is not inherently concerned with prices. Given a constant quantity, the 
price only determines the distribution of welfare, not its absolute size. Therefore, prices only 
matter if they have an effect on quantity. A dead weight loss only exists if issuers consume 
                                                
60  The notion of static efficiency should not be confused with ‘market efficiency’ which usually refers to ‘informa-
tional efficiency’. The question is how good a market (e.g., a stock market) does incorporate new information, 
affecting in turn the allocation of capital. This concept is not relevant from an antitrust perspective. It is implicit-
ly taken up in section 5.2.3 on rating quality, though. 
61  Welfare may be impacted by a reduction in quality, too, even if quantities stay unchanged. Rating agencies 
possessing market power might have an incentive to reduce quality in order to save costs. If the cost savings 
are smaller than the loss in utility for the issuers, welfare will be reduced. Quality concerns are indeed central 
in the rating industry. The real impact, however, does not lie in the cost savings but in issues such as uncom-
petitive behavior and consumer protection. Section 5.2.3 analyses the potential room for a quality reduction in 
detail. 
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fewer ratings compared to a different industry structure and conduct (e.g., Tirole 1998, pp. 
66-69). 
A good indication for potential inefficiency is profitability. Large and constant profits suggest 
high prices which in turn usually means that fewer customers buy the product. The monopol-
ist strikes the best balance between higher prices and fewer units. The reason for looking at 
profits and prices is the difficulty of measuring quantity effects. Most times it is not possible to 
clearly define the absolute size of a market and close substitutes make an analysis difficult. 
For the credit rating market, however, such practical limitations are less relevant. The abso-
lute size of the credit rating market is in most segments defined by the number of debt issues 
that could in principal be rated. There are as well no credible alternatives to bond ratings. 
Either a bond is rated or it is not rated. As a result, both price and quantity can easily be 
measured. 
On the one hand, as indicated by their sustained profitability the prices charged by Moody’s, 
S&P, and Fitch are well above costs (including reputation premiums). This could be a basis 
for antitrust concerns. On the other hand, however, Moody’s and S&P – the agencies with 
the highest prices – have a very high market penetration as well. In many segments such as 
US corporate bonds or sovereigns they virtually serve the complete market. Logically, there 
is no room for concerns about a reduced quantity with a 100 percent market penetration. The 
reason for this situation with high prices and high quantities is the low demand elasticity ana-
lyzed in section 4.1.1. Issuers are willing to pay prices above costs because they value rat-
ings so highly. From a welfare point of view, one sees a transfer of surplus from the issuers 
to the rating agencies. Such a pattern is common for markets with a low demand elasticity 
(e.g., Tirole 1998, p. 67). However, total welfare is not affected because the gains and losses 
in welfare are proportionate. There is no dead-weight-loss as the number of ratings is not 
lower than in a more competitive situation. 
The lack of a large number of competitors and many multiple ratings is also not an indication 
of a welfare loss. Superficially, one might argue that the absence of many big rating agencies 
indicates a suboptimal number of ratings. For instance, equity issues, in contrast to debt se-
curities, are often covered by ten or more analysts. Of course, such an argument does not 
stand up to economic scrutiny. Issuers base their decision to buy additional ratings purely on 
their added value – the price of ratings already received is irrelevant. Issuers see no benefit 
in buying many additional ratings even if they are substantially cheaper than their first and 
second ratings from Moody’s and S&P. Otherwise Fitch would rate practically every issue, 
too. Rating agencies selling their ratings directly to investors typically have a difficult time to 
profitably offer additional ratings. In sum, the low absolute number of competitors is unlikely 
to reduce welfare. 
There is, however, more to the question of static efficiency than to the analysis of the number 
of rated vs. unrated bonds. High rating prices might not directly reduce the number of ratings, 
but instead the number of bonds issued because rating fees are part of the cost of debt capi-
tal. Once the decision to issue debt has been taken, according to the analysis in section 
4.1.1, every issuer will buy ratings since the realized cost reductions outweigh the high rating 
prices – ratings produce a net benefit. There are some issuers, however, who basically 
would like to issue debt but the overall costs in doing so is too high. If ratings were cheaper, 
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though, the overall cost of debt capital would be just low enough to make a debt issue profit-
able for them. 
The result is analytically robust: A lower cost of capital is good for society. But the practical 
relevance is questionable. First of all, it is doubtful whether the rating fee of about three hun-
dreds of a percent will make any difference in a real capital allocation decision. Second, even 
if this were the case, the marginal issuers can hardly be identified so the effect is not mea-
surable. Lastly, the capital allocation decision is taken in the context of all possible kinds of 
capital including bank credit, equity, and other forms of capital. A focus on bonds is too nar-
row to evaluate the overall efficiency of the allocation process. Given these practical consid-
erations, the state cannot justify an intervention on the grounds of wanting to reduce the cost 
of capital. However, it is clear that lower rating fees will certainly do no harm. Therefore, the 
goal of a fee reduction can legitimately be part of a wider policy to increase competition in the 
industry. Even if nobody knows if there really is an effect, a better capital allocation would at 
least be a potential benefit. 
The last efficiency consideration in connection with high prices is the so called ‘X-
inefficiencies’ (Leibenstein 1966, pp. 392, 412). As competitive pressure is not high for Moo-
dy’s and S&P, the production of ratings might not be optimal. I.e. the market leaders incur 
unnecessary costs. Especially incomplete labor contracts and the division of management 
and ownership may be a source for such inefficiencies in the rating business. Employees and 
management might pursue private goals contrary to the profit maximization aim of the own-
ers. While such effects are certainly relevant, it is all but impossible to quantify their impact. 
Furthermore, the rating agencies business model implies strong internal quality controls, 
which should also detect major X-inefficiencies. Enhanced competition would certainly be 
beneficial from this perspective, too, but there is no basis for justifying antitrust measures. 
5.1.1.2 Social Costs 
There is potential for social costs in the credit rating industry, which often are described as 
rent-seeking-costs (e.g., Posner 1975, pp. 807-09). These costs are wasted from a welfare 
point of view as they do not create any utility by themselves. Classic examples are lobbying 
efforts, overcapacities or early entries. In the rating industry social costs are inherently 
present within the reputation mechanism. In order to overcome the informational asymme-
tries between issuers and investors there needs to be an investment in reputation which is 
compensated later by prices above costs. The investment is partly wasted since a high quali-
ty rating is produced, while the users of this rating assume a lower value (q0) than it actually 
has. Specifically, investors might incur costs to acquire information which they already have 
in the form of the entrants’ ratings. Of course the state cannot do anything about these infor-
mational imperfections in the market. On the contrary, the reputation mechanism is an effi-
cient instrument in overcoming existing informational asymmetries – the state could hardly do 
better. In order to enjoy the benefits of high quality ratings one has to accept this second-
best solution. Without ratings, overall welfare would be lower. 
Thinking further, there might be additional – and thus avoidable – social costs, notably in 
connection with the first mover advantage. If agencies race to develop their reputations, they 
cannot rely on efficient strategies such as reputation transfers between market segments. 
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This means that they have to provide many ratings for only little or no compensation in order 
to quickly create a reliable track record. It was argued that such investments into reputation 
today are very expensive for newcomers. Especially if they want to establish their reputation 
on a broad scale, a lot of economic waste can be expected. They incur costs for high quality 
ratings which are initially not followed by the market. From a welfare perspective it does not 
matter if the newcomers receive fees for their ratings. Relevant is only the disregard of the 
ratings by market participants. Apart from waste created through inefficient reputation build-
ing, there is further waste when young agencies fail to establish themselves on the market. 
The benefits of a good reputation are reduced if an agency is absorbed by another reputable 
player. In a case of market exit/bankruptcy all investments are lost outright– although this 
has traditionally played no major role in the credit rating industry. 
Here, too, the state has little room to act. The kind of waste described is hard to quantify and 
there are no tools to prevent private companies from entering the rating market. Even a strict 
state licensing – which seems to be a far too drastic measure anyway – is impossible as rat-
ing agencies can act from any geographical location as service providers. The issue of li-
censing is relevant, though, in the context of regulatory recognition. Admittedly, not as a 
measure to prevent waste, but as a mechanism to potentially increase waste. Since official 
recognition creates an economic value for a rating agency, there is an incentive to generate 
costs in reaching this beneficial status. Similar to the argumentation in the previous para-
graph, this is especially relevant if the number of recognized agencies is limited, leading to a 
race for recognition. Unproductive lobbying costs might also be involved. 
5.1.1.3 Dynamic Efficiency 
Besides static efficiency and the absence of waste it is also desirable to have a technologi-
cally progressive credit rating market. Financial markets are changing quickly, so rating 
agencies must be swift in adapting to new developments and in creating new services. The 
quality of existing services must also be enhanced. There is no general answer in terms of 
industrial organization as to what kind of market structure is best suited to ensure dynamic 
efficiency. Schwarcz (2001, p. 307), e.g., voices concerns about too little innovation by credit 
rating agencies in an anticompetitive environment. This corresponds to the idea of the ‘re-
placement effect’. Monopolies have few incentives to innovate if they just replace existing 
business (e.g., Tirole 1998, p. 392). Moody’s and S&P cannot acquire much new business in 
corporate ratings, e.g., because they already serve the entire market. The pressure to inno-
vate processes to increase market share is low. Nonetheless, the development of the credit 
rating industry has lead to many product innovations in recent decades (e.g., expansion of 
rating scales, new market segments/services). In order to find out if there were a reason for 
regulatory concern, one needs to analyze the incentives to innovate in more detail. 
It is helpful to highlight the role of credit rating agencies as information intermediaries. Their 
services are only valuable in the framework of particular informational asymmetries in finan-
cial markets. This means rating agencies cater to a very specific demand. While other com-
panies can develop completely new products or services which ‘create’ their own market, 
rating agencies have to fulfill set needs. The argument bears important consequences for 
product innovations (new services) in the core rating business: rating agencies must be inno-
vative along financial markets, but they cannot be innovative on their own. The emergence of 
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structured finance products is a good example. When issuers started creating asset backed 
securities, they needed credible outside help to evaluate or audit the risks involved. In fact, 
the whole rationale of such products is to structure assets in order to achieve a certain risk 
profile. Most structured finance products could not exist without credit ratings. However, it 
was not an innovation of the credit rating agencies themselves that created their present sin-
gle most important market segment – and it could have never been. They were simply follow-
ing the demand of financial market participants. This applies to ratings for collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs), as well, which have been criticized as instruments of pure regulato-
ry/rating arbitrage without any economic value (Partnoy 2006, pp. 73-80). Rating agencies 
were simply following the needs of investment banks. 
The emergence of structured finance ratings is also an interesting case study in product in-
novation dynamics connected to firm size and reputation. Generally, one can assume that 
any need for ratings by financial market participants will be met, since it means new business 
and profits for rating agencies. Rating agencies irrespective of size and age will gain a rela-
tive advantage over competitors by establishing a good reputation by being first with a new 
rating service. However, big reputable rating agencies face a trade-off. They risk their high 
reputation for incumbent rating services when they enter new risky market segments. Rating 
methodologies had not yet been perfected when structured finance products were introduced 
and the business environment was blurry. Smaller, younger agencies face this tradeoff to a 
much lesser extent. They have less to lose by entering an unknown business environment. In 
addition small agencies have the advantage of leaner organizational structures and are thus 
quicker to adapt to new needs. From this perspective, start-ups would be best suited to pro-
vide completely new rating services. 
Obviously, start-ups have not played a major role in structured finance ratings. In fact, there 
is no segment in today’s credit rating market other than some single countries/regions where 
real start-ups have acquired a strong market position. The simple reason is lack of reputation 
which has been described as the major entry barrier to the rating market. An unknown new-
comer needs to build up a reputation from scratch, which takes a substantial amount of time 
– any advantages over incumbent players are quickly lost. Despite facing the trade-off be-
tween reputation concerns and a quick entry, incumbent agencies have the edge in transfer-
ring existing reputation to new rating services. Theoretically, the most successful innovators 
are rating agencies that meet the minimum reputation requirement for a quick entry, but face 
comparably small risk for their incumbent business. The structured finance example confirms 
this theory. Fitch – which was assembled from a number of relative small but reputable un-
derdogs – has a comparably strong position in structured finance ratings today. Being first to 
market with new rating services is also the only realistic possibility to gain ground against 
Moody’s and S&P, which are well protected through the two-rating norm and switching costs 
in incumbent market segments. 
In sum one can note that concerns about too few core product innovations are unjustified. If 
financial markets ‘need’ a new rating service, they will get it. The only potential for relative 
welfare loss is a slow pace of product innovations if there are no suitable entrants to a new 
segment other than Moody’s, S&P and, increasingly, Fitch. Most likely to bring new services 
quickly to the market are mid-sized agencies that already have a reputation. Outside pres-
sure plays a small role because entry barriers are too high for start-ups. 
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A different issue in terms of product innovations is non-core innovations or ancillary services. 
Rating agencies can develop completely new services around their core ratings business. An 
example is rating advisory services. Rating agencies consult issuers prior to a rating on their 
probable rating and how they could improve this. Such services are not necessarily dictated 
by specific demand from financial markets, so a competitive environment should benefit. The 
importance of this aspect is limited, however, following the reputation-based business model. 
Rating advisory services, e.g., create obvious conflicts of interest which can be harmful to 
reputation. Credit rating agencies themselves are aware of this problem and critically eva-
luate their own attempts in the area (IOSCO 2003a, p. 11). In order to protect their integrity, 
rating agencies are unlikely to engage substantially in adjacent non-rating services. 
Another aspect of dynamic efficiency is process innovation, i.e. the improvement of existing 
rating services. From a welfare perspective it is desirable that companies become better over 
time. If costs decrease, prices will also deteriorate in a competitive market leading to a higher 
quantity and increased welfare. The credit rating industry is different from this textbook view 
in two respects: there is not necessarily strong competition and the demand function is in-
elastic in the relevant range. Especially the second aspect is relevant here. If credit rating 
agencies manage to lower their costs, no additional ratings will be sold because a price re-
duction has no meaningful quantity effect apart from a potential rise in bond issues due to 
lower costs of capital. Given the lack of competition, prices will not change at all. The result 
of process innovations is simply increased profits for the rating agencies. The welfare gain is 
largely confined to these extra profits. In its structure, the problem is identical to the X-
inefficiencies described above. 
Also relevant is the fact that the production technology does not offer room for drastic 
process innovations in the first place. There is generally less potential for improvement in 
services than in physical production. The rating process is heavily based on human capital. 
Process innovations are confined to improved obtaining and utilizing data. A substitution of 
human capital for more data seems unlikely because data-based services such as credit 
scoring cater to different needs. Another area of process innovations is the relationship be-
tween issuers and rating agencies. Issuers often “complain about the inordinate amount of 
time and resources involved obtaining or renewing a rating” (Ellis 1998, p. 38). They have to 
incur wasteful efforts in order to satisfy the information needs of rating agencies. The rating 
agencies’ costs to change such practices might be much lower than the benefits for issuers. 
Without competitive pressure, however, rating agencies are unlikely to change their methods. 
From a welfare perspective it is thus desirable to have smaller but reputable rating agencies 
that use process innovations to gain a competitive advantage. Incumbents are then likely to 
follow. Overall, however, concerns about innovation alone provide no convincing reason for 
state interference. 
5.1.2 Financial Market Instability 
Common goals of financial regulation have been described in the context of rating-based 
regulation in section 2.2. Ratings are used to limit systematic risk and to increase confidence 
in financial markets. These goals also apply on a much broader level: credit rating agencies 
are a part of the financial markets themselves. The state is concerned with the direct impact 
of ratings on financial markets since the actions of rating agencies can influence the behavior 
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of market participants. Curiously, rating-based regulation plays the role of an amplifier: some 
market participants only react to ratings because they are forced to by rating-based regula-
tions. While the individual action is intended by the regulatory rationale, the collective action 
of many market players might have an adverse effect. 
In this section, different patterns that structurally influence the financial system in connection 
with credit ratings will be briefly analyzed. However, these patterns cannot be described as 
externalities, as is often claimed in practical and academic discussions. Externalities are only 
present when someone’s production or utility function includes real variables whose values 
are determined by the action of rating agencies without the agencies’ attention to these ef-
fects (Baumol and Oates 1998, pp. 17-18). This definition explicitly rules out purely monetary 
effects. Nonetheless, the patterns analyzed potentially have an unaccounted for effect on the 
allocation of capital and might lead to disruptions in financial markets. It is the state’s incen-
tive to guarantee robust markets and smooth transactions. 
5.1.2.1 Procyclicality 
Credit rating agencies are usually not quick in changing ratings. One major reason is the 
‘through-the-cycle’ approach (e.g., Altman and Rijken 2004, pp. 2680-83; also see the dis-
cussion on timeliness in section 5.2.3.4). Ratings are intended to measure default probabili-
ties over long investment horizons, without considering short run market price movements62. 
This approach limits the danger of amplifying current markets trends (Löffler 2004, p. 719). In 
principle, the through-the-cycle approach should result in above average ratings in times of 
high credit risk and in below average ratings in times of low credit risk. Such a stabilizing ef-
fect is in the sense of the state, since excessive credit expansions and contractions become 
attenuated. 
However, once a rating change occurs, it might conceivably happen near the extreme point 
of the cycle since the pressure to initiate a rating action has been building up over some 
time. One sees a ‘rating overreaction’ parallel to short run market developments. This means 
that in times of bad credit risk ratings will tend to be too low, in good times they will tend to be 
too high. This translates – from the state’s point of view – into an undesirable credit expan-
sion effect: credit expansion is hampered in bad times, but assisted in good times because 
ratings are directly linked to financing costs. The state’s intention, on the other hand, would 
be to have the expansion effect the other way round in order to smooth economic cycles. 
This makes procyclicality a structural problem. 
There has been a lot of debate on this issue (e.g., ECB 2004, pp.18-19). It is generally ac-
cepted that ratings move to some extent with the business cycle despite the through-the-
cycle approach, but it is questionable whether they are assigned in a procyclical manner. 
Several empirical studies support the thesis that rating agencies overreact. Amato and Fur-
fine (2004), e.g., find a general procyclicality, especially for investment grade ratings, and 
                                                
62  Sometimes it is argued that issuers and many investors explicitly demand such an approach. In case ratings 
are quickly downgraded, a difficult financial situation for an issuer might get worse, while otherwise a recovery 
might have been possible. Investors, on the other hand, might be forced by legal obligations to sell when eve-
rybody sells in case a downgrade quickly follows new information (Hill 2004, p. 69-70). 
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Kräussl (2003b) finds procyclical effects in the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. Mora (2004), on the 
other hand, finds that ratings during the Asia Crisis were not procyclical but followed market 
developments and did not contribute to the crisis. 
Excessive procyclicality can become a practical problem with rating-based regulation. Even if 
market participants privately accounted for the fluctuating absolute default probabilities con-
nected to a specific rating, they could be forced by certain state rules to take counterproduc-
tive investment actions. In the long run, excessive procyclicality is unlikely to persist of 
course, because dramatically fluctuating absolute default probabilities would certainly harm 
reputation. The practical danger to financial market stability is therefore limited. In any event, 
the state has no plausible tool other than perhaps official recognition to affect the issue, since 
it would need to directly interfere with the rating methodology. 
5.1.2.2 Conformity Bias 
Moody’s and S&P employ very similar rating methodologies, leading to highly correlated rat-
ings; systematic differences for ‘third’ ratings can be explained by a selection bias and 
slightly different methodologies (Cantor and Packer 1996). It is obvious that high quality rat-
ings which reflect the same underlying fundamental information must be similar. However, in 
many cases it seems that ratings and especially rating changes are rather too similar. The 
Asian crisis of 1997/1998 is an example of very similar behavior of the rating agencies: rivals’ 
downgrades were issued late and within a small time frame (Radelet and Sachs 1998, p. 68). 
Critics attribute this phasing of the established agencies to the fear of getting out of line with 
their rivals’ opinions (Economist 1997). Presumably, the relative reputation gain from being 
first with a drastic rating change that proves correct over time is smaller than the relative rep-
utation loss from a drastic rating change that proves to be wrong. From this point of view it is 
safest for Moody’s, S&P and Fitch to stick closely to their rivals’ opinions, limiting the poten-
tial reputation loss relative to each other. Although rational, this behavior poses a structural 
risk as the incentive for parallel rating actions is highest in times of crisis (Kuhner 2001, p. 
20). The reputation mechanism is least effective when it is most needed (McNamara and 
Vaaler 2004, p. 699). 
The general concerns are that excessively similar ratings have a diminished information val-
ue and that information diffusion becomes rigid as no agency wants to make a first move. 
The market would be better served by more differentiated ratings. Informational quality in 
form of correlation studies does not need to fall with more diverse ratings because of its na-
ture as a statistical average. In fact, it might even rise. A certain heterogeneity of ratings re-
flects the ‘true uncertainty’ of the underlying information (Grundmann and Kerber 2001, pp. 
274-75). Unfortunately, the conformity bias comes to a large extent with the credit rating 
business model. Conformity (or ‘organizational isomorphism’) helps to develop and maintain 
reputation (Deephouse 1996, pp. 1033-35). At the same time, however, the reputation me-
chanism limits the problem of conformity per se. Even if ratings are similar, they cannot be 
broadly wrong. Otherwise the agencies would lose their reputation. 
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5.1.2.3 Rating Triggers 
Private debt contracts often contain rating triggers (for an overview see CESR 2005, annex D 
and Nicholls 2005, pp. 16-20). The practice permits investors to take actions against an issu-
er if a rating falls below a specified threshold (e.g., ECB 2004, pp. 12-15). Investors might be 
able to demand higher interest rates or – in the most extreme form – to demand the imme-
diate repayment of downgraded debt securities. Rating triggers function as safeguards for 
investors protecting them from an unexpected deterioration of creditworthiness. Issuers in 
return receive better credit conditions. However, rating triggers also pose a threat and pro-
duce unintended negative consequences. A downgrade by itself indicates a worsening finan-
cial situation which might then be amplified by obligations resulting from rating triggers. One 
speaks of ‘credit cliff’ situations (p. 14). Downgrades in such situations tend to be very sub-
stantial because negative effects from rating triggers are factored in ex ante. 
Especially in the short-term there is the risk of a liquidity crisis from unexpected debt repay-
ments which might lead to serious problems or even to insolvency. Rating triggers accele-
rated the downfall of Enron, for instance (Moody's 2001b, p. 8). The credit rating agencies 
themselves have become well aware of the risk and have started to explicitly consider rating 
triggers as a risk factor (e.g., Moody's 2002). Alongside the danger of a downward financial 
spiral for a single issuer there exists a wider structural risk. If issuers have close financial ties 
with widespread rating triggers, liquidity problems caused by a single issuer might spill over 
to others. Analogous to bank run theories, a domino effect might begin knocking out several 
issuers. 
Structural risks are inherent to rating triggers. However, full disclosure of triggers attenuates 
the problem as it makes visible all contingencies (ECB 2004, p. 15). Any trigger will be ac-
counted for in debt and equity prices, and market participants will take explicit risk provisions. 
On the other hand, the number of triggers will probably fall with increased transparency since 
the true cost of rating triggers becomes more visible. Transparency helps to internalize parts 
of the structural risk, in that a part of the rating trigger costs is borne by the issuers. Even if 
they get better credit conditions due to a trigger, their equity market value might fall. 
5.1.2.4 Parallel Investors Behavior 
A further structural risk is parallel investor behavior induced by rating-based regulation and to 
a lesser extent by similar private rules. If a security is downgraded past a regulatory thre-
shold, a large number of investors might be forced to sell in a short time period. This could 
lead to price-overreactions. One goal of rating-based regulation is to protect certain investors 
such as money market or pension funds from taking excessive risks. However, through the 
induced parallel behavior these investors are sometimes forced to take losses because they 
might have to sell when everybody is selling and prices are consequently low. Quotations 
often recover from such sell-offs. Those who profit from the rising quotations are the inves-
tors who are not covered by the regulation, whereas ‘safeguarded’ investors are stuck with 
their losses. This is a structural inefficiency in the system that increases the cost of rating-
based regulation for the regulated investors. 
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The reliance on ratings exposes the state to such effects independent of informational quali-
ty. A highly reputable agency occasionally makes mistakes, too. The case of ThyssenKrupp, 
which will be discussed in section 5.2.2.1, is a good example. Although a downgrade from 
S&P was neither reflected by general market opinion nor by other rating agencies, some in-
vestors were forced to sell. Consequently, ThyssenKrupp bonds recovered rather quickly 
after an initial loss, generating profits for unregulated investors who bought at low prices from 
regulated ones. The problem described cannot be fully avoided in a system with rating-based 
regulation, it can only be attenuated by its design. The time span before being forced to sell 
and clauses on which agency’s ratings to use are important factors. Also important are the 
timeliness of rating revisions and watch list periods on the rating agencies side. The state 
should design rating-based regulations in a way that they respond to different rating classes. 
The heavy reliance on the investment grade boundary is the major source of parallel investor 
behavior. It is to be welcomed that the investment grade boundary falls into a single risk 
bracket for most individual claims under Basle II recommendations (BIS 2004, §§ 53-89). 
5.1.2.5 Agency Failure 
The credit rating business is built on trust. If it falters, an agency will quickly go out of busi-
ness. The appraisal of the reputation mechanism in chapters 3 and 4 proves this argument 
from a theoretical perspective, the fall of Arthur Andersen after the Enron scandal is empirical 
evidence. While a deliberate milking strategy is implausible, agency failure might result from 
fraud or serious criminal negligence by a small group of agency employees. A single scandal 
then threatens the reputational capital of the whole agency. Even if the chance of Moody’s or 
S&P going out of business is small, it must be considered seriously since the result would be 
drastic. 
Credit ratings for big international debt issues are dominated by the duopoly of Moody’s and 
S&P. A failure of one would move the market to monopoly, potentially reducing efficiency. 
More disturbingly, market demand cannot be met if Moody’s or S&P breaks down as the two-
rating norm firmly is build on precisely these two agencies. In the short run this would cause 
a serious disruption of financial markets as the issuance of many debt securities would at a 
minimum be delayed. In the worst case scenario the world’s financial system might suffer 
from a liquidity and debt crisis, leading to global recession. Cementing the short-term risk is 
the supply side: even if there are other respected and officially recognized agencies such as 
Fitch, which could meet the demand created by the two-rating norm, they could not expand 
capacity quickly enough in such a crisis. After the breakdown of Arthur Andersen, its five 
global competitors quickly absorbed its client base, but in the credit rating market a single 
small player would need to stem the complete business of a much bigger company. 
Given the substantial cost of a breakdown, the inevitable question is how likely it is. As ar-
gued, the prevalent rating process of Moody’s and S&P has strong internal controls (Moody's 
1991, p. 88 and S&P 2006, pp. 9-10). The agencies actively try to minimize the risk of fraud 
or serious criminal negligence, in order to protect their profits. A different argument is that 
issuers, investors, and states would not let one of the incumbents go out of business, pre-
cisely because no one could fill the gap (Sinclair 2000, p. 495). Especially the state has an 
outright interest to preserve the status of Moody’s and S&P, even in the case of a major 
scandal. They are considered ‘too big to fail’. Continuous state support might be sufficient to 
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make up for a (temporary) loss of investor and issuer confidence, but the state is not able to 
stem a large-scale loss of trust. One can conclude that an agency failure poses a substantial 
structural risk. On the other hand, the likelihood of such an event is difficult to predict, al-
though it does seem to be very low. Overall, potential agency failure could best be atte-
nuated by a larger number of reputable rating agency, so that the state should take steps to 
increase competition. 
5.1.2.6 Information Provision 
Hitherto the aspects of financial market stability discussed all involved potentially negative 
effects. However, there are also structural benefits to ratings. Credit rating agencies realize 
economies of scale in information production. They produce information once and make it 
available to many. Because leading agencies are centrally paid by the issuers, ratings are 
freely available. Sometimes even detailed background information is published. The obvious 
benefit of freely available ratings is the spread of credit risk information. Investors would 
need to incur high costs to generate this information privately; instead, they can freely use 
available ratings. One can speak here of positive monetary external effects as the price of 
the information effectively falls to zero. Some authors even speak of credit ratings as public 
goods (e.g., Smith and Walter 2002, p. 293). Most formal models on information sharing 
support the idea (Jappelli and Pagano 2000, pp. 14-16). Freely available ratings enhance 
market efficiency. 
Rating agencies base their rating decisions not only on public information, but also on infor-
mation they receive in discussions with management. In the USA, e.g., issuers are explicitly 
allowed to provide any credit rating agency with private information, although a selective dis-
closure is generally forbidden by ‘Regulation FD’ (e.g., SEC 2003a, p. 22). The private infor-
mation is eventually released to the market via ratings. In doing this, only the expected re-
sults of an issuer’s business or investment strategy are released to the market, while the 
operative details remain hidden. Consequently, competitors cannot gain much from the in-
formation. Investors, however, gain through better information on creditworthiness.63 The 
rating agencies’ motive is of course to provide the best analysis possible in order to receive a 
high price from issuers. But one can still speak of a structural benefit, as it is not their goal 
per se to enhance the information available in the market. The advancement of overall infor-
mational quality comes as a ‘side effect,’ which should be protected by the state. 
5.1.2.7 Standardization 
A second structural benefit comes from the standardization function of credit ratings. Credit 
ratings “narrow the expectations of creditors and issuers to a well-understood or transparent 
set of norms shared amongst all parties” (Sinclair 2000, p. 496). It would be much more ex-
pensive if issuers were to provide credit information about themselves through changing sys-
tems and different methodologies. Investors would need to build up expertise in many differ-
ent areas. The credit rating agencies are only concerned with standards insofar as they help 
save costs and strengthen their market position by increasing lock-in. The two-rating norm, 
                                                
63  This is analogous to Campbell 1979, who argues that a mechanism to release private strategic information is 
valuable for the issuer. 
The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation 110 
e.g., is certainly in the interest of Moody’s and S&P. But standards produce more benefits 
than rating agencies can internalize. The same is true for the network value of ratings. The 
state, in turn, should not take steps to limit standardization. 
5.2 Behavior of Rating Agencies 
5.2.1 Anticompetitive Behavior 
Market power translates into the potential for anticompetitive behavior. From an economic 
perspective any rating action that hinders competitors by unfairly reducing their business 
opportunities is anticompetitive. An abuse of market power usually involves generating extra 
profits by pressuring issuers with (the threat of) excessively low ratings or not issuing ratings 
at all64. Extra profits are typically generated simply through additional rating fees. However, 
only if issuers have no other choice than to contract with the powerful incumbents is there 
likely substantial harm to society. The state, in turn, should mainly be concerned with active 
attempts to hinder competitors. But regulatory bodies disagree on whether there is anticom-
petitive behavior in the credit rating industry. The EU Commission (2005, p. 7) says “There is 
no indication of any anticompetitive practices in this industry (…)”. The US Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act, on the other hand, is based in part on the accusation of “anticompetitive 
practices, such as notching, tying, and unsolicited rating” (U.S. House 2005b, p. 2). 
Before looking at specific issues it might be helpful to limit the theoretical scope of anticom-
petitive behavior. First of all, rating agencies cannot employ contractual relations, i.e. there is 
no legal enforcement mechanism. Furthermore, per assumption the reputation mechanism is 
working well, i.e. rating quality is statistically measurable and a drop will be punished by mar-
ket participants and the state through the loss of business and official recognition respective-
ly65. Under this precondition it is impossible for rating agencies to systematically issue exces-
sively low ratings as a form of enforcement or punishment, and as a result any respective 
anticompetitive behavior is implausible. A plausible threat, on the other hand, is the refusal to 
issue ratings in order not to distort correlation and transition studies measuring rating quality. 
A more difficult issue is the mere threat of excessively low ratings. As just discussed it cannot 
be systematically carried out without detection. If every issuer were to act entirely rationally, 
no one would respond to such a threat – it would be empty. However, it could be effective if it 
were only carried out once in a while. In this case the statistical rating quality only suffers 
marginally or not at all. In this respect, the small chance of actually receiving a too low rating 
already creates a ‘psychological’ threat for some issuers. They know that there is a real dan-
ger of suffering a big disadvantage by a rigged rating, but there is no way to gain solid evi-
dence about an agency’s misbehavior. The expected loss from falling victim to a rigged rat-
ing might be so high that many issuers would rather give in to a rating agency’s demands. If 
a large enough number of issuers can be expected to behave in this way, fully rational issu-
                                                
64  The complement to market power is conflicts of interest, that is issuers and rating agencies collaborate to 
generate extra rents. This is not an uncompetitive behavior in its nature, as other rating agencies are not di-
rectly hindered. There is a short analysis on the matter in section 5.2.3.2. 
65  It will be analyzed in the quality section 5.2.3.1 if there could be factors infringing on the reputation mechan-
ism. If this is the case, the rating agencies threat would be boosted since they can safely issue some down-
ward biased ratings. 
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ers will also give in for the reason described above. They cannot prove anything against the 
agencies if they are the only ones actually receiving a too low rating. Seen from an economic 
perspective, the situation described is a problem of individual vs. collective action. If all issu-
ers collectively did not react to the threat, there is no problem since there is neither some-
thing to be gained for the rating agencies, nor is there any effective sanction. However, if 
some individuals suspect that many other issuers are giving in to such threats, they will also 
chose to react to the agencies’ demands. The equilibrium strategy thus tilts from ‘nobody 
reacts’ to ‘everybody reacts’. 
The threat of excessively low ratings might be especially strong for high risk issuers com-
pared to low risk issuers. This makes sense as the high rating categories lie closely together 
in terms of default numbers and probabilities, whereas low categories on the junk bond level 
feature larger differences (e.g., BIS 2000, p. 127). High rating categories are more specific 
than low categories. A few bad credit risks in a high category may jeopardize the relative 
ranking of correlation studies, while a few good risks in bad categories only change the abso-
lute number of defaults but not the relative ranking. In simple words, the measure for rating 
quality is less sensitive to rating actions in low rating categories. Similarly, potential reputa-
tion losses become smaller with lower rating categories, since getting ratings right is more 
difficult for high risk debt securities (Hill 2004, p. 77). 
5.2.1.1 Unsolicited Ratings 
An often controversially discussed topic is unsolicited ratings, Poon (2003, p. 593-96) gives a 
good overview66. They are neither authorized nor paid for by the issuer and are (largely) 
based on public information. Rating agencies might abuse unsolicited ratings as a threat to 
pressure issuers to pay for a ‘proper’ rating. Once a rating is paid for, the chance that an is-
suer buys a rating from a competitor is reduced. An unsolicited rating is ‘feared’ because it 
might put an issuer’s credit risk in a worse light than it actually is – with the justification that it 
only reflects publicly available information. Moody’s in particular has been accused of such 
behavior by individual issuers. The empirical evidence from a sample of unsolicited S&P rat-
ings is weak (p. 612-13): the fact that unsolicited ratings are generally low can be explained 
in large part by a negative selection bias, i.e. especially issuers with a bad credit risk choose 
not to pay for a rating. Although unsolicited ratings are on average still slightly below compa-
rable solicited ratings, Poon finds this effect to be significant only for Japanese corporate 
bonds. Butler and Rodgers (2003) also find no abuse of unsolicited ratings. The same is true 
for Behr and Güttler (2006) who find not much difference between unsolicited and solicited 
ratings. The opinion of practitioners supports this view: in a survey of 102 institutional inves-
tors, 89 percent said that unsolicited and solicited ratings have the same quality (Ellis 1998, 
p. 40). In a comprehensive study on unsolicited bank ratings from Fitch, however, Poon and 
Firth (2005) find a somewhat larger downward bias than in Poon’s 2003 study. 
Theoretically, the incentive for rating agencies to pressure issuers with too low unsolicited 
ratings that are merely ‘corrected’ if paid for is not compelling. Since the quality of unsolicited 
                                                
66  Most rating agencies have special terms for unsolicited ratings. Moody’s speaks of ‘investor-initiated ratings’, 
S&P of ‘public information (pi) ratings’, and Fitch of ‘shadow ratings’. 
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ratings as a subgroup can be measured ex post by correlation studies, any discrimination 
would be detected. In the best case, market participants would simply not value unsolicited 
ratings – so no pressure can be applied through them in the first place; in the worst case, the 
agency’s general reputation would suffer. This danger outweighs the potential of limited addi-
tional profits. Even if all unsolicited ratings were systematically too low so that the rank-
ordering of default risks is correct, reputation is endangered since market participants would 
clearly see the double standards. Why then issue unsolicited ratings at all? The standard 
answer is that investors expect big rating agencies to provide the complete picture, so they 
take the effort to issue unpaid ratings. For small agencies, on the other hand, unsolicited rat-
ings are a way to build up their reputation, since not enough issuers are initially willing to pay 
(e.g., Poon 2003, p. 594). Therefore, it is not amazing that in fact the vast majority of unsoli-
cited ratings, although not paid for, follow a rather normal rating procedure with at least some 
regular agency meetings (Fight 2001, p. 155). Rating agencies are clearly interested in deli-
vering high quality ratings. 
There might nonetheless be some limited room for rating agencies to abuse their powerful 
position. If the ratio of unsolicited to solicited ratings is insignificant, the statistical impact 
might not be observable in average rating data. Market participants understand this problem 
and have put pressure on Moody’s in particular to change its practice, contrary to most other 
agencies, of not tagging unsolicited ratings. Fearing that its reputation might be damaged, 
Moody’s began to tag all unsolicited ratings from 2000 on, so they could be scrutinized inde-
pendent of their relative frequency (Moody's 1999). In addition, Moody’s restricts its unsoli-
cited ratings to speculative grade issues. 
Despite transparency, a key problem remains: unsolicited ratings can work as an implicit 
threat which does not need to be carried out often, as discussed above. Issuers will be afraid 
of being disadvantaged by an unsolicited rating and will rather choose to cooperate and pay. 
Cantwell (1998) finds in his survey that about 90 percent of issuers whose initial rating was 
not requested subsequently paid for their rating (Fight 2001, p. 155). This means unsolicited 
ratings can indeed be a tool to gain additional business from unwilling issuers, but they offer 
no room for a lower quality. The ‘psychological’ threat can be upheld even with a small num-
ber of excessively low ratings. The cited empirical evidence that unsolicited ratings seem to 
be marginally too low on average supports this argument: the threat of a too low rating is 
apparently carried out in a few instances. This could be enough to force most issuers into 
‘compliance’, i.e. making them pay. A second potential argument is that rigged ratings in 
lower rating categories – in which most unsolicited ratings fall – are a comparatively small 
threat to reputation. 
There is no conclusive evidence on unsolicited ratings. Theoretically they are no threat to 
rational issuers. Indeed empirical research suggests that they are accurate. Practically, 
though, many issuers feel pressured by them. They choose to pay instead of receiving an 
unsolicited rating. However, rating agencies cannot openly threat issuers. A single case of 
such behavior – if made public – would be a serious harm to any agency’s reputation. It is 
noteworthy that the US Justice Department has found no evidence of such behavior by Moo-
dy’s in a three year investigation in the late 1990s (US Senate 2002, p. 103). At most, rating 
agencies could not take steps to remove the pressure felt by issuers. But even such ‘blurring’ 
of circumstances might be badly perceived by market participants, thus harming reputation. 
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In sum, the danger of unsolicited ratings is real, but it seems overestimated by many critics of 
the practice. Drastic measures such as forbidding unsolicited ratings are certainly exagge-
rated. Of course, potential anticompetitive behavior of the market leaders against smaller 
reputable rating agencies could be prevented. However, banning unsolicited ratings would 
erect a high entry barrier since it is a widely used tool for newcomers to enter the rating busi-
ness. It would also make investor-paid rating agencies technically impossible. More transpa-
rency and quality control, on the other hand, should help limit the danger of unsolicited rat-
ings without hindering newcomers and hampering different business models. 
5.2.1.2 Notching and Tying 
A further potential abuse of market power is seen in the practice of ‘notching’ (U.S. House 
2005b, p. 2). The term describes an established method of many rating agencies. Notching 
refers to “the practice of differentiating issues in relation to the issuer’s fundamental credit-
worthiness”, following a rather automatic procedure (S&P 2006, p. 46). An issuer with a B 
rating, e.g., can receive different ratings on single debt issues notched up or down. A highly 
secured bond would receive a higher rating, such as B+, an unsecured bond might be down-
graded a notch to B-. There is of course nothing wrong with this practice. 
Moody’s and S&P, however, have been accused of ‘punitive notching’, that is “automatically 
adjusting downward the ratings on structured finance bonds if they themselves did not origi-
nally rate those bonds” (Fitch Ratings 2002)67. Issuers fear such behavior and as a result 
choose to have all their bonds rated by the two market leaders rather than a competitor. The 
issuers’ cost is limited to the price difference between Moody’s/S&P and the competitors, but 
for the competitors it means the loss of business or even market exclusion. Fitch indicated in 
an SEC hearing that the introduction of the practice in 2001 led to a substantial (in part tem-
porary) drop in its commercial mortgage-backed securities market share, as many structured 
finance issuers chose to do all business with Moody’s or S&P rather than risking a notched 
down (unsolicited) rating (SEC 2003a, p. 24). Issuer and investor surveys also indicate con-
cerns on punitive notching (for the results of a Fitch-sponsored study see Fitch Ratings 2002, 
for a small independent study see TBMA 2006, pp. 8, 10). A Moody’s sponsored study by the 
National Economic Research Associates NERA (2003) finds no conclusive evidence of ab-
usive notching but concerns remain. 
In theory, punitive notching is a blunt sword. Notched down structured debt-securities can be 
easily identified by their high fraction of debt rated by other agencies than Moody’s or S&P, 
and most of these will be unsolicited, too. If the downward notching were to compensate 
more than a methodological difference between the agencies, the sub-sample of notched 
ratings would feature too few defaults. This is opposed to Moody’s and S&P’s claim of the 
comparability of all risks – the double standards would lead to a costly loss in reputation. 
Even if punitive notching is a mere threat carried out in very few instances, there might be 
statistical evidence. Asset-backed securities commonly are designed to receive high ratings. 
Contrary to unsolicited ratings, punitively notched ratings would therefore accumulate at the 
                                                
67  Fitch itself employs automatic notching of structured finance ratings, too, but to a lesser extent than Moody’s 
and S&P (Fitch Ratings 2002). 
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bottom. In practice, however, the low risk nature of structured finance products creates a real 
potential for punitive notching. A notched down rating is likely to make some asset-backed 
securities all but impossible to issue. Consequently, issuers will do everything to get the de-
sired rating or to prevent a notched down rating respectively. Moody’s and S&P’s might even 
actively refuse to rate some asset-backed securities as it leaves no room for a statistical test 
of criminal negligence. 
While the danger of punitive notching is real, the scope nonetheless seems to be limited. 
Issuers will only give in to pressure from Moody’s and S&P if the value of their structured-
finance ratings is clearly higher than the value of a Fitch rating. In other words, the larger the 
market power of Moody’s and S&P, the higher their potential for anticompetitive behavior. 
The value of Moody’s and S&P ratings depends, however, on their reputation. If there were a 
widespread fear of punitive notching – even if not statistically measurable – investors would 
value ratings from Moody’s and S&P less. This would make issuers confident in buying struc-
tured finance ratings from Fitch instead. If the two market leaders overdo it, Fitch and other 
agencies might actually benefit. Moody’s and S&P need to be very cautious if they do indeed 
use the anticompetitive practice of punitive notching. In any event, active steps against the 
practice on the part of the state are difficult, as restricting notching would essentially mean a 
direct influence on the rating methodology. 
‘Tying’ is another alleged anticompetitive behavior of credit rating agencies (U.S. House 
2005b, p. 2). It is a standard concept in antitrust economics which describes “the practice of 
a seller conditioning the purchase of one product on the purchase of another product” (Vis-
cusi et al. 2005, p. 266). Specifically, an agency might only issue a rating if the issuer also 
buys ancillary services. Another form of tying would be conditioning one rating on others, so 
an issuer effectively needs to buy all his ratings from the same agency. In this sense notch-
ing is a form of tying. The concern about tying is that it hinders competitors from accessing 
the market and that the free choice of issuers is limited (p. 271). 
Although at first sight it makes sense to tie ancillary services to ratings, upon closer inspec-
tion the prospects are limited. As argued in the innovation section 5.1.1.3, all non-rating ser-
vices to issuers are in practice a potential harm to the agencies’ reputation for independence. 
By tying services to ratings, this danger is magnified. Further, tying ancillary services is eco-
nomically equivalent to a price increase. If issuers want a rating, they pay a higher price for 
the rating bundled with another service, independent of their valuation and desire for the ad-
ditional service. Other rating agencies are not harmed by this behavior, but in fact helped in 
their core rating business since their ratings become relatively cheaper. An antitrust concern 
could then be found in a transfer of market power to the tied product. E.g., Moody’s and S&P 
might try to monopolize the market for rating advisory services. This, however, would hardly 
work, given their reputation-based business model. More relevant would be the case of ex-
clusive rating contracts, i.e. tying a rating to other ratings for the same issuer. Here, a similar 
argumentation as with notching applies. 
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5.2.2 Abuse of Power – the Political Dimension 
The big credit rating agencies are quite famously attributed possessing enormous power 
(e.g., Partnoy 1999, p. 620)68. Their rating discretion allows them to influence not only the 
issuers’ financing costs but to some extent they can also influence their clients’ actual busi-
ness behavior. Issuers often consider the impact on ratings as one important factor in stra-
tegic decisions. In a survey of 241 Japanese financial institutions over 90 percent of respon-
dents either have a good rating as a direct management goal or at least often consider their 
rating in management meetings (JCIF 2001, p. 4). This importance of ratings is seen as a 
(political) power factor – which is of course not all that remote from the more specific eco-
nomic concept of monopoly or market power which thus far has been at the center of the 
analysis69. 
From the economic perspective the concern with monopoly power is inefficiency and anti-
competitive behavior, while its threat is a debatable issue. From a political perspective, on 
the other hand, rent-seeking behavior is not the root of the problem. Here, the mere exis-
tence of power is a source of irritation since rating agencies can be seen as quasi-public au-
thorities (Sinclair 2001, p. 448). Politically it is not desirable that rating agencies can interfere 
with decisions of independent economic agents, e.g., through sovereign ratings. Govern-
ments want to set their own industrial policy agenda and prefer not to ‘surrender power’ to 
outside rating agencies. The power issue is of course analogous to the potential fields of an-
ticompetitive behavior analyzed above – powerful rating agencies can abuse their position. 
To avoid repetition only specific examples will be considered. 
5.2.2.1 Sources and Impact of Power 
Politically the source of this power is a crucial question. There are two sources: reputation 
and rating-based regulation. From the reputation perspective the judgment of rating agencies 
has become so important that it substitutes decisions by issuers or investors, who align their 
behavior to what rating agencies think. Regulatory induced power is much more specific. 
Here, market participants have to take (undesirable) decisions due to specific rating-based 
regulations. Powerful rating agencies can exercise influence on issuers or investors to follow 
specific policies. 
There are several documented cases where ratings explicitly moved prices of debt securities 
for regulatory reasons. One outstanding incidence is the downgrade of the German Thys-
senKrupp group analyzed by Gerke and Mager (2005). Based on a revaluation of pension 
liabilities, S&P downgraded several German companies in early 2003 without a prior watch 
list announcement. The downgrades were motivated purely by a change in the rating metho-
dology and not by fundamentally new information. The case of ThyssenKrupp was special, 
as its debt was moved from investment grade to junk status. One exemplary bond of the 
                                                
68  Partnoy quotes the journalist Thomas L. Friedman: “There are two superpowers in the world today in my opi-
nion. There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you 
by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear 
sometimes who’s more powerful” (p. 620). 
69  There has also been suspicion that politics influence rating agencies (Bottini 1993, p. 595-97). This idea cor-
responds to conflicts of interest analyzed below in section 5.2.3.2. 
The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation 116 
group immediately lost six percentage points and the credit spread jumped by two full points. 
The loss was caused by institutional investors who had to sell their positions, as they were 
not allowed to hold junk bonds – mainly because of rating-based regulations. It took about 
two months until the quotation recovered half of the loss and only after nearly two years did 
the credit spread fully recover to its old investment grade level. The rating at that time re-
mained at junk level with a positive outlook. This example clearly shows how rating agencies 
can influence quotations in the short run, even if they are based purely on a methodology 
change – i.e. there is no change in default risk. In the long run, however, markets return to an 
adequate valuation based on the best possible analysis of the available information. 
The quotations of other affected companies changed on a less dramatic scale since their 
debt stayed investment grade. This demonstrates that rating agencies possess regulatory 
induced power since many relevant regulations in this example concern investment grade 
boundary. Independent of potential underlying information, the raters’ opinion of investment 
grade or junk status can move markets. A rating change by itself becomes valuable informa-
tion because it changes the regulatory status of a bond (Hill 2004, p. 68). 
Although the ThyssenKrupp case illustrates the effect of regulatory induced power, it is not a 
case of abuse. S&P certainly influenced market prices strongly in the short run. In the longer 
run, however, market prices deviated from S&P’s analysis and reverted to the old level con-
sistent with the unchanged investment grade ratings of Moody’s and Fitch. S&P increased its 
ratings gradually back to investment grade over two years, albeit without market prices. The 
example encourages one to assume that S&P had to follow market prices and the other 
agency’s ratings. If S&P had stuck to its lone junk rating, issuers and investors would certain-
ly have questioned their rating quality, which could have impacted S&P’s reputation. The 
actual damage S&P took from the affair was small – if any. The market obviously did not in-
terpret S&P’s behavior as cheating. The systematic change in the rating method was aimed 
at improving the rating quality but ultimately proved to be deficient (Gerke et al. 2005, pp. 60-
61). One cannot speak of an abuse of power since there are neither indications of any kind of 
extra profits for S&P nor indications of hindering competitors. Even if the goal had been to 
systematically discriminate against certain companies, the practice could only have been 
upheld in the short run, while at the same time endangering the long-term business. 
The arguments concerning reputation induced power are more subtle than those just dis-
cussed. In the ThyssenKrupp example, S&P de facto had the power to coerce. With its rating 
decision, certain investors were forced to sell. In the absence of rating-based regulation, rat-
ing agencies do not explicitly have such power. They cannot formally force an investor or 
issuer to do something. There is, however, clearly some form of pressure. In order to receive 
a high rating, issuers may well have to adapt their business conduct to the beliefs of the 
agency. The same is true for investors, since many use ratings as a risk management tool 
(e.g., ECB 2004, pp. 8-9). If a rating is altered, some investors may react simply because of 
internal guidelines, regardless of any underlying fundamental data. Such powers are natural-
ly reserved to the most reputable agencies. Their long history as capable market leading 
agencies has out them into this position. 
It is often difficult to differentiate between the two sources of market power. Perceived power 
is ultimately a mutual phenomenon. This makes it more difficult to argue on the free will of 
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market participants. With their decision to buy ratings, e.g., issuers accept in principal the 
credit rating agencies’ strong position. In the absence of rating-based regulation any such 
endorsement of power would merely be a procedure operating in the market on the free will 
of its participants. In reality, of course, an issuer might buy a rating purely to comply with 
regulation, although he distrusts the power of the rating agencies. Similarly, investors might 
adapt their internal rules to ratings by Moody’s and S&P only because they have to use these 
ratings anyway by law. 
While the kind of power described is a fact, it is not of much use for rating agencies other 
than to generate ‘normal’ profits. It has been argued that it is difficult to threaten issuers with 
low ratings. A few low quality ratings might be enough to alienate investors, especially if 
there are specific clues of abusive behavior. Any abuse of power endangers the reputation 
base. Without reputation most power will immediately evaporate: issuers will not buy new 
ratings and the market will stop trusting in existing ones. Furthermore, the state is likely to 
withdraw its recognition. Seen in the reputation framework, the abuse of power is a milking 
strategy. It could only be profitable if carried out on a broad scale. However, if it were indeed 
more profitable to cheat than to produce high quality, the incumbents would long ago have 
milked and exited the market. The fact that rating agencies have enjoyed a constantly high 
reputation over a long time is proof that a systematic abuse of power has never been attrac-
tive. The economic reasons to abuse power are simply not convincing for rating agencies. 
Far from it, overall there is a strong incentive to avoid the impression that they are abusing 
their power. 
However, all of this does not change the reality of power. With their actions rating agencies 
do influence market participants – often in direct and sometimes dramatic ways: “Mass 
layoffs by firms or a reduction of state expenditure by countries, e.g., by cutting essential 
public services, is a common sacrifice that rating agencies demand for avoiding downgrades” 
(Kerwer 2002b, p. 43)70. This quotation reflects the negative tenor especially of many sociol-
ogists towards the power of rating agencies. However, from an economic point of view the 
facts must be interpreted differently. By definition, rating agencies are aligned to what is 
deemed correct by financial markets. Otherwise they could not forecast default probabilities 
and would not enjoy a high reputation. 
Credit rating agencies make risk assessments to their best knowledge. The basic rating me-
thodology and important factors influencing rating decisions are widely published. (In the 
ThyssenKrupp example S&P released detailed reasons for the downgrade.) If issuers re-
spond to rating actions, they do not do this to fulfill the demands of rating agencies. They 
react in order to influence the real default risk of their debt securities. Any issuer will balance 
the benefits of an increased rating (i.e. a lower default probability) against the cost of an 
awkward decision to achieve these benefits. It is not Moody’s or S&P who require that ex-
penditures be limited – the necessities of the financial markets are decisive. An issuer who 
wants to spend more money has to pay a higher price for it when his default probability rises. 
If the money spent is a worthwhile investment, there is of course no danger of a downgrade. 
The power of rating agencies is merely a catalyst making visible the demands of competition 
                                                
70  For similar older criticism see (Bottini 1993, pp. 597-98). 
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in a globalized economy. But the high visibility wrongly makes rating agencies a target for 
criticism. Their demands only display the realities of a market economy. They neither want to 
blackmail anybody nor are they the tool of a neoliberal elite. 
Given that power cannot be systematically abused, that it is furthermore a dubious economic 
concept, and that in fact it does not exist in the pure political sense, the question arises 
whether it should be a general issue of discussion at all. From an economic perspective the 
answer is ‘no’. Power is only relevant if the reputation mechanism fails. However, it is proba-
bly impossible to take the issue out of the political sphere, because rating agencies and their 
apparent power are easily visible and understandable. There will always be voices demand-
ing the limitation the agencies’ power. Of course, this makes little sense as power is not a 
bad thing if it cannot be abused. Further, power comes with the business model of rating 
agencies and cannot be abolished. The opinion of a reputable agency by definition counts in 
the market – it moves prices and influences decision makers if the credit risk is correctly re-
flected. Abolishing power would mean abolishing rating agencies. The matter is probably so 
intensely discussed since a part of market power is brought about through rating-based regu-
lation. Rating agencies are quasi-regulatory bodies (e.g., Sinclair 2001, p. 448). The claim is 
to control this public power in private hands. Here, the state indeed has the possibility to limit 
the agencies’ perceived power by limiting the use of rating-based regulation. 
5.2.2.2 Sovereign Ratings 
Sovereign ratings are probably the area most often cited in connection with the rating agen-
cies power (for an overview see Ferri and Liu 2003 or Reisen 2003). They are an important 
factor in a sovereign’s ability to access international capital markets. There are many exam-
ples of nations that criticize their sovereign ratings after downgrades have caused currencies 
and local debt and equity markets to depreciate (Sinclair 2000, pp. 496-98). However, actual 
credit spreads, especially on emerging market sovereign debt, have traditionally been on 
average somewhat below what sovereign ratings suggested, so it seems unlikely that rating 
actions caused the market movements (Cantor and Packer 1995, pp. 4-5). Nonetheless the 
rating agencies are criticized, mainly because of their high visibility. 
The maximum rating of an issuer’s foreign currency debt is often constricted by the country 
rating it operates in. This threshold is commonly called sovereign or country ceiling. The logic 
behind it is rather simple: an issuer with good credit risk receives a low rating on its foreign 
debt if the sovereign can impede international capital flows in time of distress. For a long time 
the sovereign ceiling was handled very strictly, acting “in virtually all cases as a ‘sovereign 
ceiling’ or cap on ratings of foreign-currency denominated securities (…)” (Moody's 1991, p. 
158). After continued criticism and – more importantly – some statistical evidence, the sove-
reign ceiling rule was eased over time, while it still applies for most issuers (e.g., Moody's 
2001a). Bonds from 38 companies were immediately considered for an upgrade when Moo-
dy’s eased the rule in 2001. Interestingly, the unexpected methodology change here had 
practically no impact on bond or stock prices, suggesting the market did not consider the 
sovereign ceiling for the respective bonds in the first place (Mora and Aintablian 2005, pp. 
12-13). This is another indicator that the rating agencies’ power is overstated. 
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Once again, in the short run the rating agencies might possess tremendous power. However, 
this power is safeguarded by the reputation mechanism as explained in different contexts 
above. No agency could systematically rate countries wrongly without losing its credibility 
and thus its power. The fact that the sovereign ceiling rule has been modified over time 
proves that the big rating agencies are responsive to quality concerns. If a rating cannot be 
understood by investors, even short run price movements might fail to appear. When sove-
reign ratings move national markets sustainably they can only reflect well scrutinized infor-
mation. It is not a rating agency’s action that puts issuers and the sovereign in an affected 
country into trouble – it is the financial situation and behavior of the sovereign itself. If there is 
no danger for national issuers by their government, the sovereign ceiling does not apply. 
If sovereign ratings are generally of bad quality, rating agencies will simply not enjoy reputa-
tion for them, so their ratings will have no impact on market prices. Empirical research has 
proven this link: sovereign bond yields deviate more often from ratings than corporate bond 
yields since sovereign rating are deemed less precise (Cantor and Packer 1995, pp. 4-5). In 
fact, the market is more pessimistic than the rating agencies, which also contradicts a power 
abuse through too pessimistic ratings per se. However, problems could arise in connection 
with rating-based regulations. If rating agencies enjoy little reputation for sovereign ratings, 
they might arbitrarily set ratings without punishment from the market. If there are market par-
ticipants that are forced to act according to specific regulations, rating agencies enjoy some 
power which could be abused. But overall this argument is weak. There are only few sove-
reigns, so real money could only be made from ratings for national corporate issuers. For 
these, the rating agencies enjoy a high reputation which they must protect. 
One of the few plausible ways for a reputable agency to abuse its power connected to sove-
reign ratings is much more delicate. If a country is rated by several agencies it might make 
sense for a particular agency to systematically place its ratings at the top or the bottom of its 
competitor’s ratings, depending on the potential scale of business in that country. Countries 
generating a lot of business would be rated above, countries of little significance below the 
competitors. On average, sovereign ratings would not be systematically higher or lower, nei-
ther would substantial absolute differences arise. Therefore, reputation should not be 
harmed. However, such a behavior might noticeably improve overall growth, because issuers 
are most likely to buy ratings from the agency that seems to be most positive on the country 
they operate in. Especially issuers with small issues that only seek a single international rat-
ing are likely to choose the most favorable agency – as long as its reputation is high. 
Empirically, such a pattern can indeed be proven: the more an agency focuses its business 
on a given geographic region, the more favorable are the agency's sovereign ratings in that 
region (McNamara and Vaaler 2000, pp. 343-44). Of course, this correlation proves no 
wrongdoing. It might simply be that the agencies are most positive on the sovereigns they 
know best. Their special regional knowledge allows them to do without a general risk pre-
mium which needs to be applied to less known rating market segments in order minimize the 
risk to reputation. In any case it is difficult to spot the pattern in aggregated sovereign rating 
data. In a sample of 1997 - 2000 emerging market sovereign ratings from Moody’s and S&P, 
differences are usually small and neither of the agencies assigns systematically higher or 
lower ratings (Kräussl 2003a, pp. 36-41). In a broader sample including 81 rated sovereigns 
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from June 2001, Moody’s and S&P differ in 28 cases, with Moody’s assigning a higher rating 
in 11 and S&P in 17 cases (Afonso 2003, pp. 58-60). 
5.2.3 Declining Rating Quality 
“Concern centers on the quality of credit ratings (…)”, says the EU Commission (2005, p. 4). 
It uses the concern for quality as synonym for many specific worries about the credit rating 
industry – and rightly so, because quality is a synonym for the reputation mechanism. 
In chapter 3 it has been concluded that the reputation mechanism is very robust. A reputable 
agency will never deviate from the high quality strategy; outright milking is not an option. 
What, however, if the reputation mechanism does not function properly? Then an agency will 
not be (fully) punished for a quality drop. The simplest reason for a rating agency to reduce 
quality is to save costs. More importantly, it has been shown above that a quality scope may 
lead to undesirable power abuses. Rating agencies could use too low ratings to hinder com-
petitors and to make extra profits. This potential for anticompetitive behavior is reason 
enough to analyze the issue in detail. 
Furthermore, the matter is also relevant from the perspective of rating-based regulation. The 
state is de facto a rating consumer relying on high quality. The goal of rating-based regula-
tion is to limit the systematic risk in financial markets by controlling risk taking and capital 
adequacy. A key issue in guaranteeing financial stability is supporting the confidence of mar-
ket participants, too. Both the direct limitation of risk and the indirect influence through confi-
dence are dependent on a high rating quality. Only if ratings adequately describe default 
probabilities, will rating-based regulations efficiently control risks as intended. In the same 
way, a high quality is needed to maintain the confidence of market participants. Ratings are 
only regarded as a reliable tool as long as there is continuous evidence of their correctness. 
In other words, rating-based regulation has no use or even backfires in cases of a low infor-
mational quality. Therefore, rating quality is a major concern of the state. Analogous to con-
sumer protection arguments the state must be protected from a low rating quality. This is 
especially the case if ratings are too high (contrary to the abuse of market power) as a result 
of collusion between issuers, investors, and rating agencies. 
On a broader level – independent of rating-based regulation – the state is interested in a high 
rating quality per se to foster market efficiency (Rousseau 2005, p. 39). As credit ratings are 
part of the information pool available in financial markets, a low informational quality could 
distort capital allocation and produce an economic loss if the agencies’ reputation (and there-
fore impact) remains high. 
5.2.3.1 Factors Overriding Informational Quality 
After having extensively shown the strength of the reputation mechanism it might seem ec-
centric to question it again. Despite all kind of frictions the basic economic incentives always 
stay in place. Empirically the enormous success of Moody’s and S&P and other reputable 
brands in many different markets is a proof. However, the credit rating industry is unique in 
that ratings have several different functions and are used by private and public actors alike. 
In this complex environment there might be external factors superposing reputation as un-
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derstood in the model. While the mechanism stays intact, an agency’s reputation might be 
impacted by more than rating quality. 
Sociologists and political scientists in particular try to explain how different internal and ex-
ternal factors in the credit rating industry could occur and influence reputation. Notably, it 
might be affected by ‘market authority’ (Sinclair 2000, p. 495). Market authority arises from 
reputation, but eventually exceeds it. Investors accept the big rating agencies as given au-
thority as they would accept a law. The leading rating agencies do not need to persuade is-
suers and investors, but their assessments are accepted for their importance in coordinating 
international debt markets. While reputation may vary over time, authority exists on a fixed 
level. The Asian crisis is an example cited for this argument. The reputation of the big credit 
rating agencies should have fallen because of low quality71. However, the reputation was 
empirically not effected at all. Eventually, authority will of course fall if quality is constantly 
low. But the reputation mechanism fails over a range of higher quality levels. Issuers and 
investors do not differentiate if an agency produces flawless ratings or if it makes a number 
of mistakes. Market authority absorbs fluctuations in quality. 
Connected to this argument is the view that rating agencies are standard setters (Kerwer 
2002a, pp. 297-99). They act as ‘coordination service firms’, establishing a common under-
standing of creditworthiness. From this point of view rating agencies are not primarily infor-
mation providers, but they offer a standard of creditworthiness that can be voluntarily 
adopted by the investors. The voluntary adoption is the crux of the argument. As standards 
are merely advice on action or on how to interpret information, the responsibility lies with the 
users, not the standard setter. It could thus happen that investors take the responsibility 
themselves for using low quality ratings, and do not blame the rating agencies. The latter 
could in turn permanently lower their quality. Lacking alternatives to credit ratings and being 
‘forced’ by rating-based regulation, respectively, investors will continue to use standardized 
ratings with a continuous high willingness to pay. 
The two arguments have in common that the issuers’ decision to buy ratings is influenced by 
factors other than informational quality. A free decision purely based on quality, however, is 
the crucial assumption of the reputation mechanism. When issuers are not able or willing to 
react to quality changes, the reputation mechanism indeed fails to provide sustained high 
quality. The argument can be compared to reputations such as corporate culture. It has been 
said that “reputations grow and die hard”, i.e. reputations are rather immutable (Kreps 1990, 
p. 128). This argument is based on an imperfect observation of actions and motives. If fac-
tors that are not as easily measurable, such as informational quality, become relevant in de-
termining agency reputation, something similar could happen here. Rating agencies might 
keep their high reputation, initially acquired for superior ratings, even if their ongoing informa-
tional quality deteriorates. 
The whole idea of the reputation model is built on the assumption −= 1t tR q . That is, an 
agency’s reputation equals the observed informational quality of the last period. The problem 
                                                
71  The major agencies were slow to downgrade bonds, too many highly rated issues defaulted. On the other 
hand the rating changes were not very differentiated, so that many ratings were in fact too low (e.g., McNa-
mara and Vaaler 2004). 
The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation 122 
becomes clear if one assumes the extreme case = maxtR q , i.e. the reputation reflects the 
highest quality that has been delivered at any point in time, no matter what quality is currently 
produced. A rating agency would be able to generate milking profits every period, offering 
ratings at q0 or even below, but charging maxp . Such a scenario practically means that issu-
ers are forced to buy ratings of a specific agency, because rational issuers would stop buying 
ratings once a low quality is observed. Of course there is nothing to force issuers, but the 
matter becomes relevant in alleviated form if issuers buy ratings not purely on the basis of 
informational quality. The concept of market authority describes the situation well. The open 
question is how exactly it arises. 
One of the most obvious candidates for creating market authority is state recognition for 
compliance with rating-based regulations. (For simplification other factors are initially ig-
nored.) Interestingly, the intent of rating-based regulation to guarantee high standards of cre-
dit analysis is perverted by this concept since rating-based regulation becomes the reason 
for deteriorating informational quality. In principal, rating-based regulation is not connected 
with the reputation mechanism. Official recognition simply increases the issuers’ willingness 
to pay for a rating, as has been shown during the analysis of demand in section 4.1.2. The 
reputation mechanism, on the other hand, is purely concerned with the informational quality 
of ratings which is untouched by rating-based regulation. Now, however, rating-based regula-
tion is considered as an exemplary factor in influencing the issuers’ and investors’ perception 
of quality. The state’s impact crystallizes in official recognition of a limited number of desig-
nated or registered credit rating agencies. By its very nature, official recognition creates a 
strong and visible break between designated and non-designated agencies. Issuers might 
initially want to buy a designated rating, while informational quality comes second. This cor-
responds to the regulatory license view already discussed in detail (Partnoy 1999, p. 683). 
The idea of market authority established through official recognition fits well into the model of 
status-based competition (Kerwer 2002b, p. 44). Podolny (1993) argues that all firms in a 
market are hierarchically ordered on the basis of status. Status is a socially defined position 
based on a producer’s perceived quality relative to its competitors. A higher status usually 
translates into better business opportunities and cost savings. Unlike the reputation model, 
status-based competition only assumes an imperfect link between quality and sta-
tus/reputation. Inter alia, a company’s status is impacted by its relations with others in the 
market. If, e.g., a rating agency serves the biggest and most reputable issuers, its status is 
considered high. Also ties to high status competitors or other third parties such as govern-
ments can increase status. State recognition clearly is a powerful driver of status. Under the 
approach taken by BASLE II recommendations and the past approach of the SEC, official 
recognition is per definition reserved for the most reputable rating agencies. The state rein-
forces the position of the best players. 
The argument now goes that issuers reach their purchasing decision by looking at the per-
ceived quality in the form of the status s and not by looking purely at the informational quality 
q. Specifically, an issuer looking for the ‘best’ rating will not simply analyze available correla-
tion, transition and impact studies to find out the agency with the historically best ratings. 
Instead, he will choose the agency which is generally considered to be number one in the 
market. The status of being the best agency is derived from several different factors as de-
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scribed above; reputation for high quality is only one among them. Certainly, the best agency 
will also be officially recognized by the state. The depicted issuer looking for the best rating 
will choose the agency which ranks highest compared to its competitors. The crux of the ar-
gument is that even if quality falls, the status of a given agency may remain unchanged be-
cause its ties with third parties – notably state recognition – legitimate its position in the mar-
ket. The issuer might buy a rating of an informational quality which is inferior by a maximal 
margin of ε . This results in a changed adjustment equation: 
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Equation (5.1) simply says that an agencies reputation equals its status in the prior period 
under the condition that the informational quality has not deteriorated more than ε  compared 
to the quality level ∗tq  which was provided in the period the agency originally reached its 
high status level and official recognition, respectively. Reputation has become ‘sticky’. Con-
sequently, a high status rating agency can reduce its informational quality by about ε  without 
losing its status. This results in cost savings of ε∗ ∗− − >( ) ( ) 0t tc q c q  per period. More impor-
tantly, it opens room for either pressuring issuers or to collude with them in order to hinder 
competitors and increase profits. 
Once again, the problem described is not a flaw in the reputation mechanism. The definition 
of rating quality is simply much narrower than the idea of status. The argumentation could be 
displayed by exchanging informational quality qi in the Shapiro framework by status s. The 
problem, however, is the measurability of status which is necessarily based on at least some 
qualitative factors. Even well established status rankings of investment banks leave some 
room for interpretation (Podolny 1993, pp. 848-66). In any case, status is always based on 
quality, while the link between status and quality is loose (pp. 831, 834). This means that a 
low quality producer can never have a high status. All status improving links – including state 
recognition – are based on quality. Therefore, status cannot fully override the reputation for 
quality which greatly limits the discussed problem. However, if issuers do indeed base their 
decisions on status, there is at least room for a limited quality deterioration in the market. 
The idea of market authority has been developed in the framework of status-based competi-
tion. On a broader basis the concept fits well with insights gained from behavioral finance 
research (Baker and Mansi 2002, p. 1371). Shefrin (2000) gives a good overview on the 
field. Behavioral finance transfers results of psychological research to investment decisions, 
which are structurally similar to the decisions to buy ratings considered here. Issuers and 
investors do not act entirely rational and are affected by psychological factors. Most impor-
tant are heuristic-driven biases (pp. 14-23). Market participants do not decide systematically 
but are guided by heuristics or ‘rules of thumb’ which simplify complex decisions. Issuers and 
investors are likely to judge an agency’s reputation on stereotypes such as agency size – a 
bias called ‘representativeness’. The biggest agency represents the highest reputation. Also 
relevant might be ‘aversion to ambiguity’. Issuers and investors play it safe choosing well 
known Moody’s or S&P. Cheaper or better ratings from lesser known agency cannot com-
pete because of the perceived quality risk. The arguments of behavioral finance essentially 
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soften the assumption on issuer and investor rationality. If irrationality is present, the reputa-
tion mechanism might be impaired. 
Apart from official recognition and irrationality there are other factors which might override 
the importance of rating quality. Specifically, network effects and the two-rating norm have 
been identified as demand drivers. Network effects emerge from the comparability of all rat-
ings from the same agency. However, comparability necessarily builds on consistency. If 
informational quality varies over time and between debt security classes, ratings are no long-
er fully comparable. That means network effects are quality dependent and therefore not a 
good explanation for a potential quality deterioration. The two-rating norm, on the other hand, 
has quality independent components. Like every standard, it reduces transaction costs, e.g., 
by investment guidelines that are tailored to Moody’s and S&P ratings. As it is cheaper to use 
these ratings, issuers disregard a limited quality deterioration. But one cannot generalize this 
result to the lock-in effects described in the supply section. Lock-in in the rating industry is in 
large part quality-dependent. It is very costly to change to a rating agency with the same or 
even less reputation. The market will, however, appreciate a change to an agency providing 
ratings of better informational quality. 
Looking at all the different factors, how much quality scope ε  do agencies have? Since there 
are quality independent factors such as parts of the two-rating norm determining status, ε  is 
certainly positive. A general irrationality of issuers and investors cannot be assumed, howev-
er, since many have the necessary analytical skills to judge ratings correctly. Further, official 
recognition – one of the most important status drivers – is at least indirectly dependent on 
informational quality because the state can in principal withdraw it. 
In sum one can conclude that the hazards of a deficient reputation mechanism are substan-
tial. On the other hand, it is unlikely that rating agencies have much quality scope in the long 
run since status is too much dependent on a high standard of analysis. In any event, the 
state should direct its policies at minimizing the quality scope ε . As it cannot abolish status 
or prevent issuers and investors from basing their decisions on it, the most sensible goal is to 
increase the dependence of status on quality, e.g., by linking official recognition more strong-
ly to informational quality. Today, there is definitely still a grey zone that allows the most re-
putable rating agencies to remain unaffected by single scandals. The Asian Crisis, Enron, or 
WorldCom hurt Moody’s and S&P much less than many would have expected. Given this 
real quality scope, the question arises whether it is large enough for an outright abuse or if it 
simply allows the agencies to get away with some laxity. The following section will answer 
this question. 
5.2.3.2 Conflicts of Interest 
Section 5.2.1 did not find much evidence for an abuse of power in the form of excessively 
low ratings – ε  seems limited from this perspective. The counterpart to power abuses is con-
flicts of interest of which there are many within the rating agencies’ business model (e.g., 
Smith and Walter 2002, pp. 309-11 or CESR 2005, §§ 42-86). An agency could use its quali-
ty scope to give arbitrarily high ratings to favored issuers to save costs and generate extra 
profits. Competitors, in turn, would lose their business opportunities through such rating ac-
tions. However, empirical studies find no evidence for conflicts of interest affecting business 
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behavior (Covitz and Harrison 2003, p. 23 and Butler and Rodgers 2003, p. 19). The results 
suggest that profits from misusing the quality scope ε  are smaller than potential costs. This 
is the relevant result for the state. 
Of course the absolute quality scope might be significant – i.e. rating agencies could make 
substantial profits by giving in to conflicts of interest – if the respective costs are high, too. 
Although rating agencies could in this scenario reduce quality substantially without losing 
status, they face even higher costs. There are several logical explanations that make it unat-
tractive to be responsive to conflicts of interest. First, there is always the danger of increased 
regulatory scrutiny or even the loss of official recognition once the state detects a quality re-
duction. Second, it is difficult to extract substantial extra profits from issuers. Both, pressuring 
issuers with too low ratings and colluding on high ratings, are difficult to hide. Third, by using 
its quality scope an agency gives in to outside interests. Suspicion about such behavior will 
harm its reputation for neutrality and independence even if there is no hard individual or sta-
tistical evidence of dishonest business behavior. Last, if there is some kind of evidence for 
giving in to outside interests, lawsuits against rating agencies could be triggered. All this will 
eventually reduce status and destroy the scope to lower quality. 
One can see that the incentives to uphold informational quality are strong – especially for 
recognized agencies. Rating agencies do not fall prey to short-term gains from using their 
quality scope but instead protect their long-term business. The four reasons cited can be 
condensed by the unique industry situation: “Most businesses are not scrutinized anywhere 
near as closely as are rating agencies, nor they are as potentially subject to loss of share-
holder value in the case of misconduct” (Smith and Walter 2002, p. 310). The reputation me-
chanism prevents collusion between agencies and market participants. 
This result stands against the continuous criticism of rating agencies lacking thoroughness 
because of their protected status. Especially in the Enron case rating agencies were criti-
cized. US Congressman Paul Kanjorski, e.g., quotes from a Financial Services Committee 
meeting: “The monitoring and review of Enron’s finances (…) fell far below the careful efforts 
one would have expected from organizations whose ratings hold so much importance” (U.S. 
House 2003, p. 2). Similar criticism has been voiced in connection with other scandals such 
as WorldCom and Parmalat, which were also rated investment grade only days before their 
collapse (e.g., AFP 2004, p. 1). Although they could not be blamed for legal wrongdoings, the 
large credit rating agencies did certainly do a bad job in all of these cases. 
However, there are thousands of other ratings where the agencies apparently did a good job 
(Hill 2004, p. 44). The agencies are blamed for single highly visible cases, from which they 
hardly could have profited. On the contrary, the massive public debate that was triggered 
represents a substantial danger to their reputation. No wonder that rating agencies accepted 
the criticism and actively tried try to improve – exactly as the reputation mechanism predicts 
(e.g., Moody's 2003). Historically, rating agencies have always taken steps to limit potential 
conflicts of interest, e.g., by ensuring that they not receive a substantial portion of revenues 
from a single client or by installing internal monitoring systems and information walls (IOSCO 
2003a, pp. 10-11). They obviously know that there is much more to lose by exploiting con-
flicts of interest than could be gained. The simple reason is that rating quality can be nearly 
perfectly measured ex post, thus revealing any major wrongdoing. 
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One of the few conflicts of interest not captured through informational quality is the use of 
private information on issuers or upcoming rating actions for insider trading or other illegal 
activities. Here, however, large reputation costs occur if an insider trading scandal becomes 
public. Additionally, there is usually a strict legal framework dealing with the matter in general 
that also applies to credit rating agencies (e.g., CESR 2005, §§ 121-52). 
Overall, conflicts of interest are an overestimated problem in the credit rating industry. In its 
long history, it has not seen a single major scandal that seriously damaged the reputation for 
independence and objectivity of a leading agency. Conflicts of interest probably get so much 
attention because they are so obvious. Of course, increasing transparency and reducing 
structural conflicts are welcome, but the absolute impact of such measures is likely to be 
small. While an abuse of power can work with only a few arbitrarily low ratings, colluding with 
issuers and investors would mean many factually wrong ratings. Consequently, rating agen-
cies cannot make much money from giving in to outside interests because any large scale 
action will be detected72. 
5.2.3.3 Rating Inflation 
Credit ratings are in their nature a relative risk measure. A bond rated ‘B’ is more risky than a 
bond rated ‘A’. In most cases, however, the absolute default probability is relevant, too. The 
BIS (2000) discusses the issue in detail (pp. 126-31). A fund manager wants to know how 
likely a default is for a given bond and which loss given default he has to expect. Default stu-
dies conducted by the rating agencies and independent researchers quantify the ordinal 
ranking of credit ratings. There are absolute default probabilities attached to rating categories 
and recovery rates are estimated for different debt classes as well. It is a general finding that 
the absolute risk attached to rating categories changes over time. Rating agencies are better 
at predicting the relative riskiness than at predicting the absolute riskiness. This can be main-
ly ascribed to the ‘through-the-cycle’ approach (for an overview see Altman and Rijken 2004, 
pp. 2680-83). Rating agencies concentrate on giving a correct ordinal ranking and try to 
avoid unnecessary rating changes. Macroeconomic cycles are not fully reflected by typical 
credit ratings. Therefore, “default rates exhibit a cyclical character roughly consistent with the 
credit cycle” (p. 127). 
The cyclicality of absolute default probabilities is ceteris paribus not in the interest of inves-
tors. They prefer stable values for better planning. However, changes in absolute rating 
probabilities are neither drastic nor abrupt. Sophisticated investors (who have several 
sources of credit information anyway) can therefore anticipate such fluctuations and adapt 
their behavior. Rating-based regulations, on the other hand, are hardly flexible since they 
directly refer to specific rating classes. This is a problem because the state is primarily con-
cerned with absolute credit risk. Capital adequacy rules, e.g., aim to secure against real de-
faults. If the absolute probability rises but the rating remains constant, there is a suboptimal 
                                                
72  What has been concluded for conflicts of interests applies in large parts to questions of fair presentation and 
rating methodologies, too (CESR 2005, §§ 87-120, 153-66). These issues are often displayed in the same 
way as conflicts of interests, in that agencies could save costs from lax internal standards. However, lax stan-
dards will result in low quality ratings which can be detected in correlation and impact studies. It is in the inter-
est of rating agencies to have consistent, timely and fair methods. 
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level of capital. The problem is cushioned because the changes in absolute rating probabili-
ties are not drastic. Furthermore, some rating-based regulations such as investment restric-
tions might do harm if they are too sensitive to short-term absolute default probabilities. If 
credit risk rises temporarily, many pension funds, e.g., might need to sell assets which they 
will buy back after the credit risk returns to a normal level. The through-the-cycle approach 
prevents costly short-term distortions. 
For the state, the danger of the relative nature of credit ratings lies somewhere else: i.e. in a 
‘credit rating inflation’ (e.g., Hill 2004, pp. 77-78). Rating-based regulation aims at structural 
benefits, while the individual issuers and investors have to bear the costs. They have an in-
centive to avoid rating-based regulations. An across-the board rise in ratings would offer 
such an opportunity, because regulatory burdens decrease with a higher absolute rating 
class. The information value of ratings does not suffer thereby, for the ordinal ranking re-
mains the same and only the absolute credit risk attached to rating categories rises. Conse-
quently, investors – anticipating an adjustment of absolute default probabilities – experience 
a constant informational quality. The reputation damage of a rating inflation might be limited. 
On the other hand, there is an increased willingness to pay for inflated ratings from issuers 
because their financing costs decrease. This not only increases the market leaders’ profits, 
but it also hinders competitors who have a harder time to deliver value to the issuers. The 
more important the regulatory value of ratings is, the higher the incentive for rating agencies 
to inflate73. 
The theoretical danger of a rating inflation is apparent. Empirical research, however, contra-
dicts the thesis. Ratings by Moody’s and S&P became systematically and steadily more con-
servative between 1978 and 1995 – a time during which many major rating-based regula-
tions were introduced (Blume et al. 1998, p. 1403, 12). One explanation is that rating agen-
cies are generally conservative to avoid any risk for their reputation, especially with innova-
tive financial products (Schwarcz 2001, p. 306). This cannot explain the empirical finding, 
though, that Moody’s is systematically more conservative than Egan Jones Ratings Compa-
ny, a reputable but not officially recognized agency (Beaver et al. 2006, p. 332). Moody’s 
seems to strive to satisfy its role as quasi-regulator which requires a certain level of conser-
vatism. Obviously, Moody’s finds it more profitable to be conservative than to inflate its rat-
ings. The general reasons against exploiting conflicts of interest discussed in the subchapter 
just above apply. Especially increased regulatory scrutiny and investor law suits are relevant 
(Hill 2004, p. 78). If investors can prove that a rating agency helps issuers to avoid regulatory 
limitations, this is a good basis for legal action. In the extreme case the state might withdraw 
official recognition. 
The fear of a rating inflation is not unfounded, though. It might become relevant if less reput-
able agencies receive state recognition. Since they have not invested a lot into reputation, a 
market exit would not destroy much value for them. Therefore, they might take the gamble of 
                                                
73  Jackson (2001, pp. 321-22) discusses the issue from the perspective of the Basle II framework. Here, states 
themselves might have an incentive to free themselves from the international capital adequacy framework. 
They could effectively release issuers in their jurisdiction from the strict rules by recognizing agencies with in-
flated ratings. The problem becomes attenuated by Basle II implementation guidelines such as the CEBS rec-
ognition guideline which feature a detailed mapping process (CEBS 2006, § 121-173). 
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losing recognition by inflating ratings to generate extra profits. To prevent such behavior a 
mapping process is necessary (e.g., BIS 2004, § 92). By mapping individual risk categories 
to a set of absolute risk weights, the relative level of ratings becomes ineffectual. 
5.2.3.4 Timeliness 
One of the oldest concerns regarding the quality of credit ratings is an alleged slowness of 
downgrades (for detailed examples from the 1980s and early 1990s see Bottini 1993, pp. 
584-94). Rating agencies should be quicker in scrutinizing new information and changing 
ratings accordingly. In defense of the rating agencies one has to accept that ongoing moni-
toring is very costly (Hill 2004, p. 71). Therefore, it seems acceptable that rating changes at 
times lag behind market developments. A second factor relieving rating agencies is the un-
predictability of certain events such as fraud or legal action which can cause sudden de-
faults. However, in cases such as Enron or WorldCom there were clear signs of trouble – not 
least in the form of falling bond and equity prices – which should have been taken up by all 
rating agencies. Nonetheless, the ratings by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch remained investment 
grade until a few days before default. Clearly, these ratings were of low quality at the time. 
The problem of timeliness becomes complicated because of three factors. First, ratings serve 
different functions as shown in section 2.1. From the perspective of the information function, 
rating changes should be as timely as possible, even if they are to be corrected soon after. 
From the perspective of the certification function, ratings should be more stable, because 
changes in the regulatory status of a security cause transaction costs for regulated entities. 
Second, rating-based regulation and private equivalents such as rating triggers create a cir-
cularity (e.g., Nicholls 2005 p. 17). The consequences of downgrades in particular have a 
direct negative impact on issuers that might lead to further downgrades or even default. It is 
desirable that rating agencies are not too quick with rating actions, so that no avoidable 
‘chain reactions’ are started. Third, issuers and investors have different needs from ratings 
(Hill 2004, pp. 70-71). Issuers favor slow downgrades and quick upgrades. Investors inter-
ested purely in the credit information – which should be the majority – generally favor quick 
rating actions, while investors subject to regulatory restrictions favor slow downgrades and 
quick upgrades. Whereas the first two factors describe the state’s perspective (informational 
efficiency vs. costs of quick downgrades), the third factor describes a trade-off for the rating 
agencies in maintaining their reputation. 
Survey results support the theoretical view: over 74 percent of investors believe rating 
changes are not timely, while 71 percent of issuers believe their ratings are up-to date (Baker 
and Mansi 2002, pp. 1389). Empirical research, too, is supportive. Beaver et al. (2006, 
p.304) find that “the properties of bond ratings are shaped by the institutional incentives 
placed on them by their clientele”. As cited above, the study shows that Moody’s is systemat-
ically more conservative than Egan Jones – a reputable agency not officially recognized in 
the USA. Specifically, Moody’s is slower with rating changes, including downgrades. Moody’s 
is concerned with satisfying its quasi-regulatory position in order to keep its high reputation. 
Eagan Jones only has the function of an information provider, so they serve their reputation 
best with timely rating actions. 
The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation 129 
In the definition of rating quality used in the reputation model, timeliness plays no explicit 
role. This is because it is implicitly covered by correlation studies, which map defaults against 
ratings referencing to different time frames. One year default rates, e.g., should be lower 
than five year default rates. Of course there are no studies on very short time frames, say a 
one month default rate for long-term debt. Such studies would likely be very random. High 
profile failures like Enron, WorldCom or Parmalat discussed in public are probably the only 
one month defaults in the investment grade area. But already one year default studies show 
that the rating agencies get it right in general. In conclusion one can hold that timeliness is to 
a certain extent already part of rating quality as defined in the reputation framework and un-
derstood by the market. Rating agencies face a trade-off between quick and slow rating ac-
tions, especially when they are officially recognized. The state likewise has opposing incen-
tives. Therefore, timeliness of rating actions should not be paramount in regulatory policy, but 
left to the rating agencies. They are as timely as it is best to maximize their reputation. After 
the Enron scandal, e.g., rating agencies often accelerated downgrades in response to market 
criticism, sometimes even so much that they were criticized for acting hastily (Hill 2004, pp. 
70-71). 
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6 Economic Assessment of Regulatory Options 
After having analyzed the economics of the credit rating industry in chapters 3 and 4, and 
potential forms of market failure in chapter 5, the last step to consider is if and how these 
problems should be tackled by the state. 
Figure 6.1 summarizes the results of chapter 5. The column ‘Impact’ describes how large the 
impact is of an area of concern on the state’s goals if the concern is indeed justified. The 
column ‘Probability’ gives an indication on the likelihood that a concern is justified or realized 
respectively. From the state’s point of view, the focus should be on the areas which have a 
high impact and where it is likely that problems occur, i.e. on areas posing a high ‘Threat’. 
The column ‘Measure’ contains the instruments which have been identified as most effective 
in attenuating the potential problems. It is the purpose of this chapter to show how the meas-
ures should be implemented. Operational details will be largely left aside and can be followed 
up in the cited literature. 
Area of concern Impact Probab. Threat Measure
Static efficiency Reduced quantity increase competition
X‐inefficiencies increase competition
Social costs easier official designation
Dynamic efficiency Few product innovations increase competition
Few process innovations increase competition
Financial market stability Procyclicality (regulate rating methodologies)
Conformity bias (regulate rating methodologies)
Rating Triggers increase transparency
Parallel investors behavior reduce rating‐based regulation
Agency failure increase competition
Information provision give access to private information
Standardization support standardization
Uncompetitive behavior Unsolicited ratings increase transparency
Notching / Tying increase competition
Political power reduce rating‐based regulation
Reputation mechanism 
(rating quality)
strengthen reputation mechanism,
increase transparency, make official 
designation more flexible
Conflicts of interest increase transparency
Rating Inflation risk mapping by regulators
Timeliness (regulate rating methodologies)  
Figure 6.1: Summary of regulatory concerns 
The large number of concerns causes the rating industry to appear prima facie as highly 
prone to state intervention. However, the analysis has shown that the actual threats are li-
mited. This is especially so because most concerns are just that – concerns. There is very 
little empirical evidence that things are actually going wrong. The largest threat stems from 
the reputation mechanism itself. If it is impaired, rating quality might fall without hurting repu-
tation. In this case, many of the described potential problems become much more likely, so 
the impact is very high. The main measures the state could take are increasing competition 
and transparency, and changing the system of official recognition. 
Not all concerns could be fully dealt with by intervening in the rating industry. Most notably, 
the danger of rating triggers results from private contracts outside the reach of rating agen-
cies (Nicholls 2005, p. 19). The state would need to increase reporting standards for all fi-
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nancial market participants. Several other issues, mostly structural risks, can either not be 
directly tackled at all or would require state interference into the rating methodology. This 
idea should be dismissed right from the beginning since it would effectively mean that the 
state itself engages in credit ratings. This cannot be the goal of regulatory policies as private 
ratings are used in rating-based regulation precisely because private actors are superior to 
the state in assessing credit risk. 
Many other concerns pose such a little threat by themselves that it is questionable if there 
would be a measurable effect on a market intervention. A regulatory regime must always be 
designed cost-efficiently, considering administrative and compliance costs alike (Rousseau 
2005, pp. 41-42). Most low level threats will likely not pass this hurdle in an empirical analy-
sis. Therefore, it is advisable not to concentrate too much on single threats but to look at 
measures which can improve conditions in many areas. 
Figure 6.1 shows that certain measures affect different areas positively, making it easier to 
implement them cost-efficiently. The state should firstly see that its regulatory legislation in-
creases competition and does not hinder it further. This is by far the single most important 
measure. Second, official recognition should be not too restrictive in order to encourage mar-
ket entries and to reduce the status gap between the market leaders and the rest. Third – as 
long as rating methodologies remain protected – it is advisable to increase transparency in 
various forms. Eventually of course, all these measures should be directed at strengthening 
the reputation mechanism, i.e. the market control of the credit rating industry. 
While it is simple to suggest to only correct market failures which can be tackled cost-
efficiently, one has to keep in mind that modern regulation theory convincingly points to ‘gov-
ernment failure’ (e.g., Viscusi et al. 2005, pp. 380-83): “Regulatory legislation redistributes 
wealth” as its primary purpose (p. 382). Since the profits of rating agencies are great and 
issuers and investors are strongly affected by rating-based regulation, the stakes are high. 
Furthermore, investors and issuers have powerful lobbies with good political connections. 
There is scope for political manipulation through regulation (Schwarcz 2001, p. 303). Also the 
fact that a state relies on private ratings is not a reason for government intervention per se. 
There must always be a clear perspective to correct market failures by either improving the 
rating agencies’ performance or by limiting negative influences of ratings on financial markets 
(pp. 301-302). In addition, one has to avoid short sighted regulatory overreaction in the light 
of highly visible ‘rating failures’. Further, legislation should not focus on Moody’s and S&P 
alone. The goal should rather be a common high quality standard in the rating industry. Last-
ly, any regulatory legislation should be coordinated on a worldwide basis. National solutions 
are often insufficient in dealing with a fully globalized industry. In extreme circumstances, 
rating agencies might avoid certain national regulation by relocating to a different jurisdiction. 
Before moving on the actual assessment of regulatory options, it is useful to point out recent 
regulatory developments. The question of credit rating agency regulation is discussed from 
two perspectives. On the one hand, attention focuses on the 2004 Basle II Capital Accord 
which suggests integrating credit ratings into the international capital adequacy framework – 
a development contrary to the critical attitude of some states. The EU Parliament (2006) was 
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the first legislative body to adopt Basle II in its Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) in 
200574. Among other things, recognition criteria for External Credit Assessment Institutions 
(ECAIs) are defined. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors CEBS (2006) has 
specified detailed implementation guidelines to achieve supervisory convergence on the na-
tional level. The second reason for public attention to credit rating agencies is an alleged 
carelessness of the agencies, which harms financial markets and the public at large. This 
discussion has gained momentum especially because of the weak performance of Moody’s, 
S&P, and Fitch in the wake of the collapses of Enron and other large companies in 2001 and 
2002. There have been numerous national and international regulatory initiatives since. 
Regulatory bodies worldwide tend to support international solutions to potential problems in 
the credit rating industry. The International Organization of Security Commissions (IOSCO) is 
used as the platform for this process. After more than a year of research and public discus-
sion the IOSCO formulated ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for the Credit Rating Agencies’ 
in late 2004 (IOSCO 2004). The code provides the credit rating industry with an international-
ly accepted framework of self-regulation. Most agencies – including the three market leaders 
– have implemented the code, often literally (e.g., CESR 2006a and CESR 2006b). There 
are, however, no enforceable rules resulting from the IOSCO framework and important is-
sues such as official recognition have not been covered. The question of national regulation 
remains largely unanswered. 
After the accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002 the US congress launched an inquiry into 
the role of auditing, investment and rating firms in these scandals. The resulting Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 introduced various substantial changes in financial regulation and several 
directives for further analysis (US Congress 2002). The Act did not include legislation con-
cerning credit rating agencies directly, but required the SEC to reexamine the role and func-
tion of credit rating agencies in the securities markets, a task which was already high on its 
agenda. Building on prior research, hearings, a concept release, and a substantial amount of 
public comments, the SEC proposed a rule in early 2005 which, among other things, defines 
the specifics of the NRSRO process (SEC 2005). 
Parallel to the proposed rule, the SEC testified in the third hearing on credit rating agencies 
before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services that “more expli-
cit regulatory authority from Congress is necessary” (U.S. House 2005c, p. 6). The Commit-
tee readily took up the request, rendering the proposed rule obsolete. Congressman Fitzpa-
trick proposed the ‘Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act’ which was controversially de-
bated in the next two Committee meetings on credit rating agencies (U.S. House 2005a,b). It 
was passed by the House of Representatives in June 2006 in a close vote divided along par-
tisan lines (US Congress 2006a). After certain changes by the Senate Banking and Urban 
Affairs Committee, however, the final bill was enacted into US law in September 2006 by a 
virtually unanimous vote as the ‘Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006’ (US Congress 
2006b). From 2008 on it replaces the NRSRO designation with a registration process, intro-
duces SEC oversight, e.g., in the form of disclosure requirements, and increases liability. 
                                                
74  In other regions the adoption of Basle II has been slower. The USA, e.g., postponed the process for a year 
and introduced a transition period (Federal Reserve Board 2005). 
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Rating agencies are now held accountable for satisfying their own standards filed with the 
SEC. 
Credit rating agencies have also been on the agendas of European institutions after the 
Enron scandal. In early 2004 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on rating agen-
cies and called on the EU Commission to assess the need for legislative actions (EU Parlia-
ment 2004). The Commission received technical advice from the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) in March 2005, which reflects the results of an intensive six 
month consultation process (CESR 2005). In line with the CESR advice, the EU Commission 
(2005) announced in December that it would not for the time being introduce any legislative 
proposals concerning rating agencies, but would rely on existing financial services directives 
and self-regulation on the basis of the IOSCO code of conduct. The CESR in turn began a 
dialogue with the big rating agencies to oversee the self-binding implementation process 
(e.g., CESR 2006a). 
One can see that the issue of rating agency regulation is high on the international agenda. 
However, the process is at an intermediate stage. There are several different approaches 
and certain areas have been left out by some regulatory bodies. What is needed to appraise 
the different approaches from an economic perspective is a coherent framework of regulatory 
options. Rather than analyze state interference in the classic framework of antitrust and regu-
lation, a more specific approach tailored to the credit rating industry will be taken here. 
Figure 6.2 indicates five major regulatory options and the approach currently taken in the EU 
under the Capital Requirements Directive and the USA under the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act. In the remainder of this chapter an economic analysis on the design of the dif-
ferent options will be conducted. 
 
Figure 6.2: Credit rating agency regulation in the EU and USA 
EU 
Use of ratings in 
regulation 
Competition 
Official 
recognition 
Civil liability 
Implementation 
method 
Use in bank regulation (Basle II); 
Further use by some members 
USA 
General rating-based regulation 
Neutral position 
Designation process 
Mostly protected from civil liability 
Self-regulation 
Strengthen competition 
Registration process 
First Amendment protection, in 
tendency increasing civil liability 
Direct supervision 
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6.1 Rating-Based Regulation vs. Market-Based Regulation 
Rating-based regulation has an important influence on the credit rating industry. It increases 
demand and potentially hinders supply, as not every rating can be used for compliance. 
Apart from informational quality, official recognition is the single most important factor in-
fluencing an agency’s perceived status in the market. It might therefore impede the reputa-
tion mechanism and advance a quality scope which is the basis for many concerns. Addi-
tionally, there are some direct problems such as parallel investor behavior. Quite naturally, it 
should therefore be one of the first questions of the state whether the additional complexity 
and problems of rating-based regulation are worth the effort. 
The question has been touched upon by several authors, but few discuss the issue in detail. 
Partnoy (2006, pp. 91-95) makes a strong case for replacing NRSROs with market-based 
measures in the USA. In a commentary, the investment banker Justin Pettit gives some di-
rect counter argumentation (pp.101-02). Löffler (2004) and Perraudin and Taylor (2004) ana-
lyze the issue empirically. 
Before evaluating rating-based versus market-base risk measures, one should ask a more 
fundamental question: Would it make sense to abolish credit risk-sensitive regulation? In this 
case most the discussed problems will be avoided. Unsurprisingly, the clear economic an-
swer to the question is no. The stability of the financial system can be greatly enhanced by 
containing risk: confidence increases and certain investors can be protected. It is worth size-
able effort to find a suitable credit risk measure. A second question follows: Should the state 
use external measures or should it generate its own credit assessments? An internal solution 
would mean state ratings, the use of which is dictated by law. There are some obvious prob-
lems with this solution. Even an independent body (alike some central banks, e.g.) is likely to 
be influenced by the legislator who in turn is influenced by interest groups. Furthermore, it is 
questionable if a state agency has the resources and capabilities for accurate risk assess-
ments. Without the profit incentive, a state body is likely to be slow to innovate, too. Although 
there might also be benefits, it seems rather clear that an external credit risk measure is 
needed. 
The two principal external credit risk measures are credit ratings – as used in rating-based 
regulation today – and market-based measures such as credit spreads, credit default swaps, 
or even equity prices. Figure 6.3 contrasts several aspects of credit risk measures and com-
pares how credit ratings and market-based measures compare to a hypothetical optimal risk 
measure. Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. The biggest advantage of 
market-based measures is their timeliness and flexibility. They can be updated daily, while 
being smoothed out over any time span through rolling averages. The problems of parallel 
investor behavior or credit cliffs would be eased since abrupt rating changes would be ruled 
out. The biggest disadvantage of market-based measures is their limited reach. There are 
many illiquid securities and new issues cannot be rated at all. Since a full reach is a knock-
out criterion for any stand-alone risk measure, there is no way to implement a system of 
purely market-based regulation. 
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Aspect Optimal for Use in Regulation Credit Ratings Market‐Based Measures
Breadth Every debt security Every debt security; including 
new issues and illiquid junk 
debt**
Only traded (debt) securities
Informational 
quality
All available information Incorporate public and private 
information, no (detailed) audit 
of issuer‐provided
Include all available information in 
the market* (all public, potentially 
some private)
Timeliness Timely ratings reflecting mid‐
/long‐term developments
Through‐the‐cycle approach, but 
not always timely
Timeliness/volatility can be explicitly 
chosen through rolling averages*
Independence Independent from all involved 
parties
Reputational capital guarantees 
independence
Liquid securities: competitive 
pricing/no manipulation possible*; 
Illiquid securities: price manipulation 
possible
Risk measure Absolute measure of credit risk Relative credit risk measure, 
absolute risks can be mapped to 
rating classes 
Absolute risk measure, but 
influenced by other factors than 
credit risk such as liquidity or taxes 
(less relevant for CDS)
Clearness Clear‐cut data Clear‐cut rating classes, but 
absolute risk needs to be 
mapped to classes
Because of differences in markets, 
complex definitions might be 
necessary
Costs Low costs Moderately expensive for 
issuers, but freely available to 
the public
Mostly cheap, easy to calculate
Market 
neutrality
No 'unintended' distortion of 
capital allocation
Incentives for regulatory 
arbitrage, e.g., in CDO markets*
No regulatory arbitrage*
* Partnoy 2006, ** Pettit 2006 (in Partnoy 2006)
Figure 6.3: Credit ratings vs. market-based measures in credit risk-based regulation 
The scores in Figure 6.3 reflect the results of the analysis in the previous chapters. Critics 
will likely attack the high scores of informational quality and independence for credit ratings. 
Empirical research, however, finds that the informational content of credit ratings and market-
based measures is similar (Perraudin and Taylor 2004, p. 2768). Consequently, neither is 
superior for portfolio governance rules (Löffler 2004, p. 2742)75. Furthermore, it has been 
shown that the issue of rating agency independence is overestimated, especially under a 
well functioning reputation mechanism. Market-based measures, on the other hand, are 
prone to manipulation for illiquid securities. 
In conclusion one can hold that substituting rating-based regulation is neither possible nor 
advisable. However, there are clear benefits of market-based ratings. Private rating agencies 
have in many cases recognized the potential and offer corresponding services. Moody’s, 
e.g., has established an important business field in quantitative credit analysis with the pur-
chase of KMV, today known as ‘Moody’s KMV’ (e.g., Moody's Corporation 2006, p. 24). It is 
advisable for the state to explore the possibilities of actively utilizing market-based ratings. 
One promising opportunity is to officially recognize quantitatively oriented rating agencies 
which translate market data into common ratings. Since such agencies are only one type 
among several, the liquidity-based selectiveness of their ratings is no problem. 
                                                
75  Another argument brought forward is that private parties would use market-based measures instead of ratings 
as legal triggers if the former would be the better instrument (Nicholls 2005, p. 20). This argument can be at-
tacked, however, since rating triggers perfectly measure changes in the regulatory status of bonds which is 
very important for counterparties. The information value might be second-rate. 
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One problem could arise from the business model of quantitatively oriented rating agencies 
though. Since no data from the issuers is used to compute ratings, it stands to reason that 
especially new agencies will (initially) chose an investor paid business model. This would 
conflict with the free availability of ratings needed to comply with rating-based regulation. If 
the market fails to create free market-based ratings, the state could award subsidies for re-
spective agencies. Alternately, the state might consider setting up a public credit rating 
agency to provide exclusively market-based ratings. A set of clearly defined mechanical rules 
(minimum liquidity, exact computation of ratings, etc.) would be needed to guarantee inde-
pendence. While certainly viable, such an approach hinders private competition in the field, 
potentially crowding out better solutions. 
6.2 Fostering Competition vs. Restricting Competition 
The credit rating industry is characterized by high entry barriers and limited competition – 
tactical collusion is likely as shown in section 4.3 on strategic interaction. The analysis in 
chapter 5 has shown, however, that several potential problems of efficiency and anticompeti-
tive behavior would be attenuated by more competition. Given these results, two questions 
emerge: Why should one consider limiting competition as a policy option in the first place, 
and, how could the state increase competition given the limiting market forces? 
The principal fear of increased competition is a breakdown of the reputation mechanism 
leading to deteriorating quality. Kranton (2003, p. 399) shows in a general model that re-
stricted entry can enhance quality. Butler and Rodgers (2003, p. 2) reason in an empirical 
study that high rents as a result of limited competition increase the amount of ‘relationship 
rating’ which in turn increases overall informational quality since it includes private informa-
tion. However – even if quality increases in tendency with higher profits – it does not mean 
that more competition reduces it. In section 3.6 it has been shown that Kranton’s assumption 
on the possibility of strategic pricing does not apply to the rating industry. In the absence of 
rating-based regulation, the analysis in chapter 4 has shown that there is no incentive for 
reputable incumbents to reduce their quality, while newcomers, too, have no choice other 
than to produce high quality. 
Nonetheless, the fear has been voiced that “excessive market fragmentation could have ad-
verse consequences”, namely “undue pressure to issue favorable ratings in order to attract 
clients” (EU Commission 2005, p. 7-8). Conflicts of interest might become more significant if 
the market is less concentrated (Hill 2004, p. 45)76. There might be ‘a race to the bottom’ in 
rating standards. 
The argument takes the perspective of rating agencies trying everything to gain business 
with issuers. When taking the perspective of the investors, though, it becomes clear that the 
argument is exclusively based on the existence of rating-based regulation. If the benefits of 
ratings were purely informational and reputational, a favorable rating has no value at all be-
cause it neither carries information nor reputation. Respective agencies would go out of 
                                                
76  Mariano (2006) tries to theoretically explain how competition can lead rating agencies to deliver low quality. 
While the model is conclusive, several assumptions such as the two period timeframe and quality believes 
which are still imperfect ex post do not hold. Therefore, the argumentation is not convincing. 
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business. Only if there is a license value of ratings do the voiced concerns make sense in the 
first place. Practically though, it is doubtful if they are justified. McNamara and Vaaler (2000, 
pp. 343-44), e.g., find in their empirical study on sovereign ratings that ‘insurgent’ rating 
agencies are more conservative than incumbents in order to gain reputation. Increased com-
petition reduces this conservatism bias, but insurgents are still more conservative on an ab-
solute scale. Incumbents, on the other hand, are not significantly affected by the number of 
competitors. 
One can now answer the initial question. It only makes sense to consider limiting competition 
as a policy option if distortions resulting from rating-based regulation can be expected. Under 
the traditional restrictive NRSRO designation in the USA this seems not to have been a prob-
lem. The analysis in section 4.1.2 on the impact of rating-based regulation on demand, how-
ever, provides a theoretical basis for quality concerns. Rating agencies might very well have 
incentives for sham ratings. Furthermore, the considerations in section 5.2.3.3 on rating infla-
tion show that it is in principal possible for rating agencies to provide a high informational 
quality for investors and to exploit rating-based regulation at the same time. However, this 
potential downside of increased competition is not a problem of competition per se. It is a 
question of the recognition procedure, which will be analyzed in the following section. 
Assuming that official recognition prevents any major downside of competition, one can now 
look at the second question: How could the state increase competition? One tool is again 
official recognition. It can be a major entry barrier to the industry. However – as summarized 
in Figure 4.9 – there are also plenty of ‘natural’ factors limiting competition in the credit rating 
industry. The part of the competitive process hindered most is market entry – the credit rating 
industry is not contestable (e.g., Viscusi et al. 2005, p. 172). First, entrants are likely to face 
high direct entry costs and the users of ratings have a clear preference for incumbents. As it 
is costly to overcome such preferences (e.g., the two-rating norm), entrants face a disadvan-
tage vis-à-vis incumbents. Second and most importantly, time lags in reputation building 
make it virtually impossible to enter quickly, no matter how much money is spent. The third 
condition necessary for contestability is the absence of sunk costs. This condition is met best 
by the credit rating market, but because of substantial exit costs when cheating it is also 
missed. 
Because there is little outside pressure, the state should focus its efforts on increasing the 
number of players, i.e. the ‘inside pressure’. Economic regulation and antitrust policy are the 
two tools at hand. Bar official recognition, there is little room for economic regulation though. 
One of the few possibilities would be to subsidize young rating agencies. In the section im-
mediately above, e.g., supporting innovative investor-paid rating agencies has been consi-
dered. In principal, however, subsidies are seldom a good solution to economic problems 
since they are, among other things, prone to rent-seeking. Further, increasing entries into the 
credit rating industry will not do. It has been shown in section 4.3 that it is a mutually attrac-
tive strategy for small successful entrants and big incumbents to merge with each other. 
At this point antitrust considerations come into the game. The state can influence the industry 
structure by interfering with mergers and acquisitions. Admittedly, this may be in many cases 
legally difficult as acquisitions of small entrants hardly hinder competitors. Rather, society 
forgoes benefits from a higher competitive pressure in the mid and long run. Besides this 
The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation 138 
technicality, a second question arises: Which mergers are harmful and which increase com-
petition? In section 5.1.1.3 on innovation it was concluded that midsized agencies pose the 
highest competitive threat for large incumbents, because they still have the flexibility of a 
young organization while already possessing the needed reputation. It would therefore be a 
sensible policy to only allow mergers among smaller agencies. This is how Fitch developed 
into its strong position as third player today. Overall, however, one has to accept that the 
credit rating industry is framed by exceptionally strong forces hindering competition – it is a 
natural oligopoly at best. No policy will ever bring about strong competition. But it goes with-
out saying that the state should at least try to foster competition as much as possible. 
6.3 Official Designation vs. Registration 
The issue of official recognition for compliance with rating-based regulation has been dis-
cussed in many studies such as CESR (2005, §§ 256-68), Blaurock (2006, pp. 10-13), or 
Schwarcz (2001, pp. 307-309). Following the argumentation on rating-based regulation in 
section 3.1.2 it does not wonder that practically all authors see a need for some kind of offi-
cial recognition. Only Brookfield and Ormrod (2000, p. 326) argue with a large data set that 
official recognition is duplicative and therefore not needed. However, they base their analysis 
on the assumption that official recognition perfectly reflects reputation/informational quality 
and that there are no issuers interested in buying sham ratings. Beaver et al. (2006, p. 332) 
show empirically that official recognition under the original NRSRO process correlates with 
rating agency properties. 
How should an optimal recognition system look? Should it be a restrictive designation 
process such as the original NRSRO designation in the USA or should it be a simple regis-
tration process as employed under the Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006? It has been con-
cluded already in the previous section that there is an antitrust/competition component and a 
regulation component to the question. From the perspective of competition, the system 
should not set additional limits to the already anticompetitive nature of the industry. It would 
be welcome, on the other hand, if competition is stimulated. The Rating Agency Reform Act 
of 2006 aims in this direction. The regulation component is important, too. An optimal recog-
nition system must guarantee a high rating quality, neither making possible sham or inflated 
ratings, nor creating leeway for a quality scope which is in turn the basis for anticompetitive 
behavior and conflicts of interest. The original NRSRO process has been justified by such 
argumentation. 
Traditionally, official recognition worldwide has been heavily based on market recognition, 
while lacking transparent operational criteria (BIS 2000, pp. 44-50). Market recognition is 
equivalent to agency status as described in section 5.2.3.1. The agencies most widely used 
and praised in the market become recognized (SEC 2005, p. 21312). The principal benefit of 
the approach is its ease of implementation since there is neither a difficult initial analysis nor 
much oversight needed. There are, however, deficiencies in the approach. Most importantly, 
there is a circularity. Market recognition or status is strongly influenced by official recognition. 
As soon as an agency is officially recognized it receives a boost in its status perceived in the 
market. Because of the newly acquired license value, the agency’s ratings immediately gain 
more impact. 
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This causes two problems. First, it becomes more difficult for new agencies to enter the rat-
ing industry. To become accepted in the market, official recognition is needed but to become 
officially recognized market acceptance is needed. The circularity constitutes a direct entry 
barrier: newcomers must build up a good reputation by issuing many low-paid ratings for 
several periods. They have to incur costs which the incumbents – who were ‘grandfathered’ 
into their position – never had to incur to such an extent (Beales 1980, p. 135). The second 
problem is that official recognition itself might increase status to such an extent that rating 
agencies gain a quality scope ε  (see section 5.2.3.1). Even if informational quality falls, 
market acceptance stays high because of state recognition, and state recognition remains 
because of high market acceptance. The rating agencies in turn can come away with lax 
standards to save costs or even with anticompetitive behavior or the temptation to exploit 
conflicts of interest, which both become much easier if rating quality can fall a bit without pu-
nitive action. 
One can conclude that founding official recognition on market recognition/status, although 
attractive in theory, has turned out to be deficient in practice because status is not fully based 
on quality. The system neither fulfills the demand of not limiting competition nor of guarantee-
ing high quality. Therefore, official recognition should be based on other principles. Possible 
criteria fall into two categories: input measures and output measures. 
Input criteria are very common in regulation. Examples are driving licenses, professional 
qualifications, or capital requirements. The IOSCO code of conduct, e.g., focuses largely on 
input criteria such as systematic rating methodologies or independence in promoting a high 
rating quality (IOSCO 2004). Input criteria have the benefit of guaranteeing a minimum quali-
ty level. When the basic reputation model has been developed in section 3.1, it has been 
argued that, e.g., the qualification of employees observed by issuers guarantee a minimum 
quality q0. If the state gives detailed guidelines on input factors, it can likely guarantee also 
higher quality levels > 0sq q , not least because it can demand access to confidential internal 
operations of rating agencies. The analysis of demand in section 4.1.2 has later shown that it 
is (under normal circumstances) sufficient for the state to only guarantee a medium quality 
level qs. Figure 4.3 shows that sham ratings are effectively prevented. Above a certain quality 
level the market functions well. Demand ‘automatically’ concentrates on the high quality le-
vels, which is the goal of the state. From this perspective, input regulation seems to be well 
suited for official recognition. 
On closer inspection, input regulation is deficient though. Figure 4.4 shows a scenario cor-
responding to the ‘regulatory license view’. If the license value is relatively high compared to 
the information/reputation value, the market might not function above the regulatory thre-
shold qs as intended. In the depicted extreme case, demand would concentrate on the lowest 
‘allowed’ quality. Although this scenario has been rendered implausible, it is not completely 
irrelevant, as discussed at the end of section 4.1.2.3. The license value might well be high 
enough so that certain issuers – who do not care at all for the reputation value – buy the 
cheapest available ratings. A pure input regulation cannot avoid the problem since it reaches 
its limit at some point. In other words, even if the best inputs are employed, one can never 
tell if an agency really produces the highest possible informational quality. To lessen the 
problem, an input oriented recognition system should aim at guaranteeing a quality level qs 
as high as possible. 
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There are further problems with a recognition regime purely based on inputs. As the elasticity 
of substitution between production factors is partly high, only a comparatively low quality lev-
el qs can be guaranteed at best (Beales 1980, pp. 128-29). Highly qualified employees, e.g., 
might only spend very little time per rating, i.e. analytical thoroughness gets substituted by 
high qualification. Further, any input control necessarily builds on standards, say on the or-
ganizational structure of rating agencies. Such standards limit entrepreneurial freedom which 
potentially deters new innovative rating methods and business models (White 2002, p. 54). 
This is especially a problem for newcomers who have little chance to differentiate them-
selves. Input regulation can be a barrier to entry. An input oriented recognition system should 
therefore make sure that key areas such as rating methodologies remain flexible. 
One sees that input measures cannot guarantee a high rating quality in all circumstances. 
The obvious solution is measuring output, i.e. rating quality. Contrary to many other areas, 
rating quality can be measured very well through correlation, transition, and impact studies77. 
Output control is economically preferable to input control, not least because it allows for con-
tinuous monitoring (Beales 1980, p. 134). The original NRSRO approach of matching official 
and market recognition tries to proxy quality, however, with the described problems. It is 
much more advisable to directly make official recognition dependent on observed rating qual-
ity. A major benefit of such a system is that it places no limits whatsoever on rating metho-
dology. Successful quantitatively oriented agencies, e.g., could easily be recognized. Fur-
thermore, the state can map the different rating scales against a common standard so that a 
rating inflation is impossible. Another benefit specific to the rating industry is the limited 
downside of output control. Restricting a market to high quality usually creates an economic 
loss because consumers preferring low quality are hurt (p. 133). But in the rating case there 
is no demand for low informational quality. Additionally, there is always the possibility to op-
erate a non-recognized rating agency producing any quality level desired. 
It seems incomprehensible that states worldwide have never taken a clear and direct output 
oriented approach. The most likely explanation is the increased efforts needed to define and 
control quality. However, the efforts are not immense and the potential benefits are large. 
There are already correlation, transition, and impact studies by the rating agencies them-
selves which are routinely checked and expanded by independent scholars. The state would 
in most cases not need to conduct own studies, it would be sufficient to define a set of specif-
ic existing variables measuring rating quality. Alternatively, one could take an ‘exclusion ap-
proach’ by making recognition dependent on a continuous track record of independent stu-
dies proving high quality. 
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 in the USA has been the first attempt world-
wide incorporating clear output oriented measures (US House 2006b). Applicants for official 
registration must provide “credit ratings performance measurement statistics over short-term, 
mid-term, and long-term periods”. Further, applicants confidentially must give proof of their 
market acceptance by filing a list of paying clients and statements from these clients about 
the rating quality. This approach is much clearer than the previously used ‘market recogni-
tion’. The limitation to the 20 largest clients without any further restrictions also leaves room 
                                                
77  The output of other experts, be it doctors or auditors, is much more difficult to measure – if possible at all. 
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for small low cost agencies to register. However, there is still the potential of significant input 
control, since the registration can be denied if an “applicant does not have adequate financial 
and managerial resources (…)”. As argued, such input oriented measures are an unneces-
sary limitation, since there are already better output oriented measures in place. There are 
many further input-oriented requirements. However, they pose no substantial limitation, since 
they largely aim at transparency regarding conflicts of interest and similar issues. The SEC is 
asked under section (n) to detail several aspects of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act by 
new provisions and a review of existing regulations. It should see to it, that the input require-
ments stay limited. More importantly, it should only very carefully use its power under section 
(i) to “prohibit any (…) unfair, coercive, or abusive act (…)” of rating agencies. As argued at 
several points, any direct regulation of rating methodologies is dangerous, since quality might 
be reduced and innovative business models hindered. It is much better to increase transpa-
rency and competition in order to prevent potential misbehavior. 
A potential problem of pure output measures is that they can again be an entry barrier for 
young agencies. Freshly issued ratings can initially just be checked against market data (i.e. 
for minimum quality q0) and only after several years meaningful correlation studies are avail-
able. Hence, early clients could be wrong in their initial judgment on a new agency – or they 
might even be biased because of favorable ratings. Hence, the reliance on a client track 
record is not enough. Since minimum quality ratings are a threat to the effectiveness of rat-
ing-based regulation, the state is rightly reluctant to officially recognize unknown agencies. 
There is a tradeoff between more newcomers and late recognition. More newcomers mean 
more competition, but older and more reputable agencies are a safer bet for high quality rat-
ings, because they have more to lose from a recognition withdrawal. It is a good solution to 
recognize new agencies at first conditionally based on input factors. Such a control can 
guarantee a quality level > 0sq q , reducing the danger and impact of cheating. Once output 
oriented measures are available, input oriented regulation can be dropped. Such a regime 
also limits the disadvantage of innovative rating agencies which employ different or far less 
resources than traditional rating agencies. They fail qualifying for recognition only during an 
initial phase. If the input requirements are upheld lastingly, on the other hand, they might 
never become recognized. 
The Credit Rating Agency Reform act strikes a balance between more newcomers and late 
recognition by allowing official registration only after at least three consecutive years of offer-
ing a credit rating service. This is in principal a sensible idea. However, it is a duplication giv-
en the input requirements already in place. The time restriction is simply a stricter criterion to 
prevent mischief by unknown agencies. Therefore, the input restrictions on financial and ma-
nagerial resources could be dropped, as long as good statistical proof on the rating quality is 
available after the three years. Alternatively, input restrictions could fully substitute the re-
quired time in the market. 
Another important point of the registration regime is recognition withdrawal. So far, there has 
not been a single significant case worldwide, which is consistent with the reputation model 
(cheating is not attractive). Nonetheless, the state should see that there is a real danger of 
losing recognition because it is a powerful threat to agencies not to engage in uncompetitive 
or quality reducing behavior. On the other hand, a recognition system must avoid volatility. 
Issuers and investors prefer stable rating relationships. A recognition withdrawal – even if 
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only partly – will most likely hurt reputation fatally, causing unwanted disruption in the market. 
There are also social costs, for the investments in reputation are lost once an agency goes 
out of business. It is most advisable that the state defines clear output oriented benchmarks 
that automatically lead to a withdrawal procedure. Just being subject to potential withdrawal 
is already a high threat, while the actual procedure can consider the specific situation pre-
venting any unjustified withdrawal.  
The analysis has so far concentrated on the question of how official recognition should be 
designed to prevent additional entry barriers. But it can also be a tool to foster entry. Analog-
ous to the thoughts in section 3.3, the state can transfer reputation to young agencies. A 
quick recognition will reduce the needed investments into reputation, making newcomers 
more competitive against the long time incumbents. Especially the recognition of different 
agencies in different countries might generate strong national players with a chance to even-
tually compete internationally. The Japan Credit Rating Agency, e.g., was recognized early 
on from the Japanese regulator helping the company to quickly gain ground (e.g., Fight 
2001, pp. 84-90). 
In conclusion, a clear advice on how to design a good recognition system can be given, al-
though there is no perfect solution. The system should be directly based on rating quality and 
not on proxies such as market recognition. A transparent registration process with conti-
nuous oversight and mapping is preferable to an opaque official designation. For young 
agencies a provisional recognition based on input criteria makes sense. A minimum reputa-
tion/time in the market might be considered, too. The Credit Rating Reform Act has rightly 
identified and abolished several problems of the original NRSRO designation. Given the prior 
concern for quality, though, it wonders why it is not directly based on statistical quality con-
trol. The focus on inputs and the minimum of three years to market should prevent the emer-
gence of new agencies trying to exploit regulatory benefits by issuing sham ratings. Overall, 
these measures even seem to be a bit overdone, since they make market entry unnecessari-
ly difficult. Overall, however, the Credit Rating Reform Act is a very good piece of legislation, 
given the results of this study. The EU should use the Act as prototype for its own legislation. 
The European ECAI guidelines are too much focused on preventing abuse. Rather, the EU 
should take a clear position to foster rating agency competition. The reliance on ‘credibility 
and market acceptance’ is inferior to a pure quality measure as suggested above. 
6.4 Limited Liability vs. Full Liability 
The question of civil liability for credit ratings has been extensively discussed. Husisian 
(1990) was one of the first scholars to analyze the issue in detail, concluding that economic 
and legal arguments speak against strong civil liability of rating agencies. Bottini (1993 pp. 
609-10), although in principal in support of increased oversight, agrees. On the contrary, 
Partnoy (2006, pp. 83-89, 95-96) makes a case for increasing liability. Blaurock (2006, pp. 
16-25) gives a good neutral overview on civil-law liability issues concerning rating agencies 
with reference to several different jurisdictions. 
Traditionally, rating agencies have enjoyed a high level of protection from civil liability world-
wide. They are usually only held accountable for bad faith or recklessness, but not for negli-
gence as most other financial market participants. In the USA, e.g., ratings are considered as 
The Credit Rating Industry: Competition and Regulation 143 
opinions protected by the First Amendment and rating agencies enjoy exemption from ‘Sec-
tor 11’ on negligence liability under the Securities Act of 1933. Liability has increased some-
what with the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 since rating agencies are now held 
accountable for satisfying their own standards filed with the SEC. But the level of care is still 
below to what other financial market intermediaries such as equity analysts and especially 
auditors are held accountable for. 
Based on the prior analysis, this section examines whether there are significant economic 
differences between rating agencies and investment banks or auditors. Without relevant dif-
ferences, a special legal treatment cannot be justified. For discussions on the general pros 
and cons of civil liability, on the specific impact of civil liability on the rating industry, and on 
tools to control liability (e.g., First Amendment Protection, security laws, or burden of proof) 
see the cited literature. Figure 6.4 displays a rough structure of the business models of rating 
agencies, equity analysts, and auditors. All three act as information intermediaries. They 
analyze their clients’ information and publish an assessment of the information which is 
bonded by their reputation78. There is no difference between the three business models. 
However, this structural similarity does not necessarily mean a similarity of economic func-
tions which is decisive. 
Figure 6.4: Business structure of rating agencies, equity analysts, and auditors 
There are two clear differences between rating agencies and equity analysts on the one 
hand, and auditors on the other. While the former follow individual (i.e. non-standardized) 
methodologies, the latter gear their analysis strictly to fixed accounting standards. Further, 
auditors – as their name says – produce an audit with full access to client books, while rating 
agencies and equity analysts explicitly disclaim taking information as received without audit. 
Consequently, auditors should be subject to increased liability because of the very nature of 
their analysis. People rely on audits as true, given a certain set of accounting rules. Most 
wrongdoings of auditors can be proven against the accounting standards. In contrast, a court 
would have difficulties to judge the quality of a rating methodology and the importance of its 
different parts (Husisian 1990, p. 443). 
                                                
78  Equity analysts of investment banks might also use a financial interest in the issuer as additional bond. 
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It is important to look closely at the nature of ratings versus investment recommendations 
and audits. Audits prove that a company has kept its accounts according to the standards – 
they are absolute statements or facts. Equity analysts do not produce absolute statements in 
this sense, but their assessments have the nature of an absolute recommendation. Their 
(fundamental) analysis calculates a fair value of an equity, reflecting the likelihoods of all re-
levant events. Given the current market price, an equity is either over- or undervalued. Rat-
ings are similar in that they are the outcome of a fundamental analysis reflecting all available 
information and uncertainties. Because of this similarity, Partnoy says, “credit ratings are not 
really just opinions any more than fairness opinions of investment banks, audit opinions of 
accounting firms, [or] buy-sell ratings of security analysts (…)” (U.S. House 2005a, p. 9).This 
opinion is supported by the fact that ratings substitute private information, e.g., in the USA 
explicitly under the exemption from regulation FD (Schwarcz 2001, p. 308). Investors cannot 
prove this information but must rely on it. 
However, ratings are in their nature a relative statement, since they primarily aim to give a 
rank-ordering of default risks. The same debt security might be a good or bad investment for 
different investors. Further, given all rated securities in the same rating class, a certain num-
ber of them must default. Given all buy recommendations, in contrast, none should turn out 
to be wrong. Nonetheless, Partnoy has a good point because ratings factually also indicate 
an absolute risk level and thereby point to an over- or undervaluation. On the other hand, 
ratings are much more specific than equity research. They only display credit risk, while equi-
ty research displays all pricing/value relevant factors. An investor could of course buy a bond 
on a single rating opinion, but he then ignores information on factors such as taxes, currency 
risks or liquidity. Admittedly, for many investors these factors are at best secondary. 
Altogether, the nature of ratings is a decent but not particularly strong basis to argue for less 
civil liability for rating agencies. In any event, it looks very unpromising to demand compen-
sation on the simple basis of a default because any rating necessarily describes a real 
chance of default. In other words, a default per se says nothing on the quality of the rating 
analysis. More relevant is the timeliness of rating reviews which has been a major imputation 
by critics of the rating agencies. The matter has been discussed in section 5.2.3.4. It leads to 
a second area where rating agencies potentially differ from other financial information inter-
mediaries. The discussion of timeliness has shown that there are contrary expectations to-
wards ratings. The same can be said for the tenor or general level of ratings. Figure 6.5 dis-
plays how the users of ratings differ in their expectations: 
Player Tenor on Ratings 
Rating 
level 
Timeliness 
Upgrades Downgrades 
State conservative low ambivalent 
Issuer progressive high quick slow 
Investor – confined by 
regulatory restrictions progressive high quick slow 
Investor – not subject 
to regulatory restrictions conservative low quick quick 
Figure 6.5: Demands on ratings 
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The state employs rating-based regulation and most investors who are interested in the in-
formation value of ratings prefer a conservative approach to ratings. Issuers and investors 
who are subject to rating-based restrictions generally prefer a more progressive approach to 
ratings, i.e. in doubt the higher rating should be assigned. In the same manner, the different 
players prefer different levels of timeliness, which are well reflected in survey results (Ellis 
1998, p. 41). The benefits of the through-the-cycle approach, namely the decrease of rating 
induced transactions and the prevention of avoidable negative chain reactions, speak for 
slow rating revisions. Quick rating reviews, on the other hand, reflect the underlying informa-
tion much better. 
In principal, the demands towards equity analysts are ambivalent, too. Issuers prefer a bene-
volent analysis, investors prefer a conservative approach. However, there is a key difference: 
there is no equivalent to rating-based regulation. Ratings carry a much higher impact than 
recommendations of equity analysts. There will hardly be an investor interested in a delayed 
update of equity research. Quick information does no harm because there is no distinct serial 
dependency of equity recommendations. The situation is very different for ratings: a quick 
rating downgrade may lead to serious disadvantages for issuers and investors. Such rating-
induced disadvantages might well be avoidable if the reasons for the downgrade are only 
temporary. Importantly, issuers and investors can easily provide ‘evidence’ for the harm done 
by the rating in form of falling debt and equity prices and might try to bring a respective liabili-
ty case. A different scenario would be that a rating agency is slow in downgrading since it 
assumes that the negative conditions are only temporary. If this belief turns out to be wrong, 
the negative effects of a downgrade would be especially pronounced. Parties such as the 
state or active investors might then bring a case because of the sluggishness. Here, too, 
easy evidence would be available as ratings lack behind market prices. 
The example shows that a rating agency might become subject to a justified liability case no 
matter how it behaves. Ex post – when all information is available – it might appear quite 
obvious where the agency was wrong, while the respective factors were not as clear ex-ante. 
This applies to both, the rating level and the timeliness of rating changes. Therefore, one can 
attest a clear difference between the rating industry and the equity research profession. Is-
suers, investors, and states are stronger impacted by ratings than by equity research opi-
nions and have at the same time more contrary demands and interests. 
In conclusion one can hold that it is justifiable to treat rating agencies legally different from 
other financial information intermediaries. Auditors clearly differ because of the factual nature 
of their assessments. The nature of ratings is also different to equity research opinions. But 
what really matters is the combination of high rating impact and opposed demands on what 
ratings should be. Rating agencies serve different masters. If more liable, they might become 
subject to a large number of ‘false’ litigation cases. The social costs of such a system are 
likely larger than potential benefits. This conclusion is of course against conventional wisdom 
which would say rating agencies must be especially liable because they wield so much pow-
er. One solution would be to make liability exemption dependent on high quality, a system 
which could be introduced along with a respective recognition system. Contrary to audits, 
rating quality can be exactly measured ex-post. If there are serious distortions of average 
rating data, i.e. if rating quality is low, doubts about a low standard of care or even bad faith 
are justified. Overall, however, it is difficult to argue for higher rating agency liability, especial-
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ly in an environment which has tended toward reduced liability related to security research 
and sales in recent years (Fisch 2004). It makes more sense to strengthen the reputation 
mechanism. 
6.5 Self-Regulation vs. State Regulation 
There are many different substantive suggestions on rating agency regulation – including the 
ideas developed in chapters 5 and 6 of this study. The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 
in Europe and the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 in the USA are important pieces 
of recent legislation implementing several ideas. In this last section it will be analyzed how a 
good implementation policy should be constructed. The focus is again on the principal eco-
nomic arguments and not on a detailed analysis of specific legislation. Most authors con-
cerned with the regulation of the rating industry have put forward more or less specific im-
plementation ideas. The CESR (2005, §§ 187-245) discusses in detail four regulatory options 
concerning rules of conduct and registration. Rousseau (2005, pp. 50-62) critically analyses 
implementation options concerning accountability, rules of conduct, and entry. Blaurock 
(2006, pp. 28-36) looks at different regulation issues and implementation methods against 
the background of individual national approaches. 
The question of regulatory implementation is most important for the area of official recogni-
tion. But it is also relevant for several other issues, especially business conduct. There are 
two basic implementation methods: self-regulation and regulation by a state authority. The 
meaning of state regulation has already been touched in the introduction to this chapter. The 
state can impose limitations on the rating agencies such as certain minimum input require-
ments or restrictions on business behavior, e.g., the use of unsolicited ratings. These limita-
tions are supported by a threat of sanctions. Self-regulation, on the other hand, means that 
the rating agencies directly or indirectly set their own rules. It is similar to state regulation in 
that it also limits the discretion of the rating agencies. However, it differs in two points. First, 
there is no coercive power. Instead of state sanctions, self-regulation relies on supervision by 
the rating agencies themselves and outside parties such as market participants or the media. 
Secondly, self-regulation is less strict. If a rating agency departs from self imposed restric-
tions, it can often please outside parties by clarifying its action. One speaks of a ‘comply or 
explain’ mechanism. 
Concerning state regulation, a general danger of government failure has already been 
pointed out in the chapter introduction, because there are strong interests among the well 
organized parties in the rating industry. This is a first reason why a far-reaching regulation is 
problematic. Secondly, it was argued that the state can hardly manage the core rating 
process efficiently. To decide on the best methods, the state would need to be a better rater 
than the rating agencies themselves. Thirdly, the credit rating industry has an exceptional 
position compared to other industries because of the dual interest of the state. On the one 
hand, the state employs credit ratings in rating-based regulation and is concerned with the 
general impact of ratings on financial markets; on the other, it is subject to ratings itself. This 
second point makes the difference: alike rated private parties, rated public bodies might have 
an incentive to avoid negative ratings. In contrast to private players, though, public bodies 
can indeed exert influence by means of regulation. All three reasons, but especially the 
second and third, speak for a light touch of state regulation. The core rating methodology or, 
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even worse, single ratings must not be subject to state regulation. Deviating demands of 
some authors do not withstand principal economic arguments (e.g., Bottini 1993, p. 613, de-
manding SEC influence on ‘wrong’ ratings). 
The described problems – except of government failure – are far less relevant in those areas 
of rating agency regulation which do not deal with the core business. Most notable this is true 
for official recognition, especially if it is based on rating quality. Here, the state has no inhe-
rent self interest but wants to design a system which maximizes welfare. It is in principal the 
right body to implement oversight. Nonetheless, potential costs of state regulation must be 
considered. The recognition system suggested in section 6.3, e.g., needs a substantial 
amount of oversight in measuring rating quality. Additionally, the financial markets are com-
plex and fast changing, so there are either inefficiency costs of outdated regulatory proce-
dures or administrative costs of constantly implementing new ones. 
After this short appraisal of state regulation self-regulation needs to be looked at. As de-
scribed, self-regulation has the major deficiency of being voluntary. The success of any self 
regulatory regime stands or falls with the question of control. First, there needs to be effec-
tive supervision that reveals deviations from the self entailed rules. Secondly, there must be 
a mechanism which sanctions deviations. Self-regulation in the credit rating industry can only 
be considered if it fulfills both requisites. The obvious supervision tool is rating quality. Con-
trary to many comparable industries, the output of rating agencies is very well measurable. 
As described in chapter 5, many practices and effects disliked by the state go along with a 
deteriorating quality. Additionally, rating agencies are well observed by scholars, financial 
market participants, and the media, because of their high visibility and perceived power. The 
big accounting scandals have brought an additional advance of public scrutiny which is likely 
to even uncover deviations from self imposed rules which are not reflected in quality, e.g., 
pressuring issuers with the mere threat of negative rating actions. The second requisite is 
also met in form of the reputation mechanism. Rating agencies are highly sensitive to a re-
duced informational quality and to proven anticompetitive behavior, since both lower the is-
suers’ willingness to buy ratings. A loss of reputation endangers the very business of any 
rating agency, so it is a highly effective sanctioning mechanism. 
In sum, the credit rating industry is particularly well suited for self-regulation. Above all, this 
result is important for regulating the core business of rating agencies. It has been shown that 
there is no natural outside party to do the job – the state is neither neutral nor capable. The 
rating agencies, on the other hand, are certainly capable of defining a sensible business be-
havior, and the market is by definition a neutral supervisor. Therefore, the state is well ad-
vised to encourage the implementation of a business code of conduct for rating agencies. 
The IOSCO Code of Conduct is exemplary: it was developed in a broad consultation process 
including many rating agencies themselves and then implemented de facto internationally as 
part of the European CRD. The benefit of such a code of conduct is not only the direct con-
trol of specific business behavior – it has been shown that several problems are in fact over-
stated. Much more important is the reinforcement of the reputation mechanism. By commit-
ting themselves to a business code the rating agencies further raise their stake in the game. 
On the one hand, they become even more scrutinized, on the other, they set very specific 
rules to be judged against. Reputation will not only fall when quality drops, but also when the 
rules of conduct are violated. 
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Apart from controlling business conduct, self-regulation could play a role in the recognition 
process as well. It has been argued that the state is the natural body to administer recogni-
tion, but there are costs in establishing and supervising the standards. If recognition is based 
on an objective ex post quality measure, this part of the process might be outsourced to rat-
ing agency self-regulation, too. The agencies have traditionally kept very well track of statis-
tical rating quality. Instead of direct control, the state could rely on such data – not least be-
cause it is difficult to manipulate – and content himself with crosschecks from independent 
scholars. The state would still grant the actual recognition, but employ data directly delivered 
from the rating agencies. In such surroundings the suggestion of employing a credit rating 
industry association makes a lot of sense (Rousseau 2005, pp. 51-55). An industry associa-
tion could develop and update common rating quality standards. This would ensure consis-
tency while at the same time guaranteeing flexibility and minimizing costs for the state. Fur-
ther, an industry association would guarantee an international solution, preventing regulatory 
fragmentation or even a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’. 
In a survey of 41 issuers and 51 investors about of 80-90 percent answered that the rating 
agencies kept their level of scrutiny or even increased their performance in 2005 in every 
single area the survey asked about (TBMA 2006, p. 22). The agencies scored the best re-
sults for the ‘transparency of processes and methodologies’ which was criticized most after 
the big accounting scandals in the prior years. The rating agencies are obviously very res-
ponsive to criticism – the reputation mechanism is working. These anecdotal findings go 
along well with the recommended implementation of regulation. The state should build on the 
self regulatory potential of the industry with a focus on further strengthening the reputation 
mechanism. 
Figure 6.6 summates the recommendations on the five regulatory options discussed: 
 
Figure 6.6: Regulatory recommendations 
 
Recommendation 
Use of ratings in 
regulation 
Competition 
Official 
recognition 
Civil liability 
Implementation 
Yes: Rating-based regulation creates benefits. Market-based risk meas-
ures are not sufficient 
Strengthen competition 
Registration process based on rating quality 
Limit civil liability 
Self-regulation 
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7 Summary 
Credit rating agencies are widely discussed because of their importance in financial markets, 
but the economics of the industry are not always well understood. In principal, rating agen-
cies serve as information intermediaries between debt issuers and investors. They scrutinize 
issuers and specific debt-securities resulting in a simple letter rating certifying their credit 
worthiness on a relative scale. This is done for a rating fee paid by the issuer. The investors 
value this information and accept a lower interest rate since the rating agencies are believed 
to be honest and capable. The reduction in borrowing costs more than offsets the rating fee. 
Apart from the information function, credit rating agencies have two additional major roles. 
On the one hand, rating agencies fulfill a certification function since their ratings are used as 
a benchmark for complying with rating-based regulations and similar private arrangements. 
On the other hand, credit ratings have a standardization function. They are an important con-
vention in the process of issuing debt and allow the global comparability of credit risks 
among all kinds of debt instruments. 
A lot of the attention to the credit rating industry stems from the use of ratings in state rules 
and regulations which are designed to protect different financial market participants against 
too much risk and to increase overall confidence. Many states worldwide employ rating-
based regulation, because ratings have proven to be a good measure of credit risk, are rea-
dily available, and can easily be monitored. Historically, regulatory systems employing rat-
ings have restricted the number of recognized agencies. In the USA, only ratings from ‘Na-
tionally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ (NRSROs) were allowed to be used for 
compliance since 1973. The opaque NRSRO designation has only recently been replaced by 
a more open registration system under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. 
The credit rating industry has been dominated by two agencies throughout its history. Moo-
dy’s and S&P hold a nearly duopolistic position with about 77 percent of worldwide credit 
rating revenues. The remaining business is dominated by Fitch holding another 15 percent. 
Despite the enormous growth of the industry – which has multiplied its revenues many times 
to over $4 billion in 2005 – no significant new player managed to enter the global rating mar-
ket. Meanwhile, Moody’s and S&P are highly profitable with operating margins well above 50 
percent. 
The multiplicity of rating functions paired with their importance for financial markets and the 
agencies’ obvious market power as a matter of principle give rise to concerns. This explains 
the wide attention of researchers and regulatory bodies to the credit rating industry. To gen-
erate well-founded conclusions, a thorough analysis of the credit rating economics is neces-
sary. As a starting point, credit ratings are classified as experience goods. On issuance it is 
only possible to see if they are of a minimum quality, either by comparing them to market 
data such as stock quotes or by analyzing the inputs of the rating process such as the quali-
fications of the involved personnel. The true quality of an agency’s ratings, however, can only 
be checked after a substantial amount of time by statistically correlating the ratings with ac-
tual defaults. Because of the relative nature of the rating scale, the highest rating category 
should have the lowest default probability and the bottom category the highest. This, in turn, 
means that the quality of a single rating cannot be judged against the fact of default, since 
there are – and must be – defaults in any rating class. 
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Agencies with a strong correlation build up reputation with issuers and investors for their ac-
curate risk assessments. Reputation is the single most important economic concept for un-
derstanding the credit rating industry. Because of the good reputation, investors believe in 
the rating quality ex ante and value the agencies’ analysis highly. The issuers in turn seek 
ratings from agencies with high reputation, because their ratings promise the largest reduc-
tion in borrowing costs. Thus, reputable rating agencies can demand a high price for their 
rating assessment, generating above market returns compared with a situation without repu-
tation. In any period, rating agencies could deceive issuers and investors by an unsound 
analysis, either to save costs or to generate extra fees through favorable ratings. The rating 
agency would earn an extra profit in the period of deceit, but would lose the rents generated 
from its reputation in the following periods. If this one-time gain cannot offset the reduced 
profits in the future, rating agencies will always produce high quality ratings in order to keep 
and strengthen their reputational capital. The equilibrium price is capped by potential en-
trants. They could initially sell high quality ratings below cost in order to build up a reputation. 
These losses offset the discounted future gains in equilibrium so entry is not attractive below 
a certain price. 
In principal, reputation does not need to carry market power. In the credit rating reality, how-
ever, it does. There is not a distinct equilibrium price, but the incumbents enjoy a price 
scope. One likely reason is the changing informational environment over time. While ratings 
of minimum quality had value at the inception of the industry in the early 19th century, un-
known newcomers today have a harder time to compete against free market data from com-
pany reports or stock exchanges. It is also likely that the costs to generate high quality rat-
ings have risen over time with the increasing complexity of financial markets. While all rating 
agencies benefit from increased prices reflecting the increased costs, incumbents are advan-
taged, because they built up their reputation with comparably smaller investments. 
A key aspect of reputation is its transferability. Incumbents can use their good reputation in 
one segment of the rating market to enter another segment. In this case, issuers and inves-
tors believe in a quality higher than the minimum quality, because the agency has proven 
capable in a very similar field. New entrants to the rating market – even those with a back-
ground in related fields – have a more difficult time to leverage their general reputation for 
analytical thoroughness. They face high conflicts of interest and it is questionable if their ex-
isting services are similar enough to ratings. The transfer of reputation creates a competitive 
advantage, since it reduces the investments into reputation when expanding. The largest 
agencies can expand fastest, since they have the most difficult time to hide a cheating strat-
egy. For them it is not an option to offer minimum quality in a new market segment at a rela-
tively high price. Although they would generate one time profits, they cannot easily milk the 
reputation of their incumbent businesses, because such deceit could be detected premature-
ly. This risk makes cheating so expensive that investors are safe to believe in honest high 
quality ratings. Such reasoning even applies in existing market segments. Many issuers do 
not demand an initial discount at all when buying first time ratings from one of the market 
leaders. Hence, the rating agencies become more profitable with increasing size, because 
they can spread their fixed investments into reputation to more units. 
The stability of the reputation mechanism in principal opens up a broad quality spectrum. 
However, demand for credit ratings concentrates exclusively on the very high quality level. 
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This is because issuers use ratings as a signal to financial markets which is free for inves-
tors. In order to get attention in the widths of investment opportunities, they need to be as 
professional as possible. Investors only choose among the best investment alternatives 
which feature a high quality rating. Likewise, the debt securities compete against each other 
in efficient financial markets. Since most issuers have similar informational asymmetries to 
overcome, they value ratings equally. This translates into a low price elasticity of demand in 
the relevant range. The same is true for the cross-price elasticity between different quality 
levels. Low quality ratings are no substitute for high quality ratings. 
A key question of the demand analysis is the impact of rating-based regulation. Generally, 
state recognition adds a quality independent license value to ratings. Issuers have less re-
porting costs and the debt-securities become eligible for a large number of regulated inves-
tors. Some issuers have incentives to buy sham ratings at very low cost certifying their debt 
securities the best possible credit risk. To prevent this, the state must make recognition de-
pendent on a certain higher quality level. If the license value is small compared to the infor-
mation value of a rating, the market will automatically swing into a high quality equilibrium. If 
the license value is substantive compared to the information value, however, the market 
might settle at a lower quality close to the quality necessary for state recognition. The dis-
cussion on the importance of the license value is still open, but the arguments are strongest 
for a limited impact. 
Large rating agencies enjoy a boost in demand because of network effects. Investors value 
the comparability of many different debt securities. In a wider framework, network effects are 
part of the ‘two-rating norm’. It describes the fact that today most debt securities have two 
ratings: one from Moody’s and one from S&P. The two-rating norm is a de facto standard 
based on a host of factors. Therefore, it is very stable and constitutes a substantive competi-
tive advantage of the two market leaders. 
Important economic forces on the supply side of the rating industry are first mover advantag-
es and lock-in effects. The first agency in a market segment can acquire customers early on 
so that entrants face a smaller number of unserved clients and would need to reduce their 
price in order to lure away some of the first mover’s clients. In the long run, lock-in effects 
become even stronger. Issuers that put themselves under the scrutiny of the best rating 
agencies – which usually are Moody’s and S&P – face a loss of trust in financial markets 
when changing to an equally or even less reputable agency, because such a move looks like 
‘shopping’ for a better rating. Agencies with a low reputation, on the other hand, are less pro-
tected by lock-in effects, since financial markets do not disregard an issuer changing to an 
agency of higher reputation. 
Also relevant for the supply of credit ratings are economies of scale. From a pure production 
point of view size does not matter much, but it is beneficial in reputation building and risk 
diversification. Larger rating agencies can leverage their reputation when growing in existing 
market segments or entering new ones. Smaller agencies have to invest more to gain a 
comparable position. Additionally, smaller agencies could be hit by random credit events that 
distort rating quality statistics as there might be only a small number of ratings in a given rat-
ing class. For large agencies such effects average out, so rating quality measures are more 
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precise. Size also matters in internal monitoring efforts which become relatively cheaper in 
larger organizations. 
In terms of market segmentation the credit rating industry offers few strategic options. Con-
trary to other industries, there is only demand for a very high service quality and it is no op-
tion to concentrate on debt issues with a certain level of credit risk. A plausible differentiation 
can only happen in terms of geography or product class. However, such strategies face ob-
stacles, too. Along with financial markets, credit ratings are addressed to a global audience. 
Further, ratings explicitly make the credit risk of all kinds of debt securities comparable. Moo-
dy’s and S&P quite successfully claim competence in any market and for any debt instru-
ment. Nonetheless, the only successful entrants over time followed a niche strategy focusing 
on a region and/or industry. 
In sum, the analysis of the credit rating economics confirms and explains the market power 
of Moody’s and S&P. Large credit rating agencies have cost advantages over small agencies 
and face higher demand. Further, long established rating agencies with the highest reputa-
tion have advantages over newer competitors. Lastly, factors such as official recognition and 
the structure of demand limit the strategic options of rating agencies. As a result, the compe-
tition within the rating industry is limited – it can best be described as a collusive oligopoly. 
Potential newcomers have little chance to break into the oligopoly because of the high entry 
barriers. In case a newcomer none the less manages to build up a reputation and client 
base, it is mutually beneficial for the incumbents and the newcomer to merge with each oth-
er. 
The market power and importance of rating agencies raise regulatory concerns which can be 
grouped into unwanted allocation effects and, more directly, harmful behavior. Against popu-
lar opinion, the economic analysis provides few strong starting points for regulatory interfe-
rence, although many topics pose at least a certain threat. 
Efficiency in the classic sense should be no major issue for the state. Despite the mostly an-
ticompetitive environment there is little welfare lost due to monopoly power since issuers are 
willing to pay high prices. The potential effect of lower rating fees on the number of debt-
issues is impossible to quantify. There are some social costs in connection with the build-up 
of reputation, but there is no basis on which to argue for any specific antitrust measure. The 
structure of the business model as information intermediary is a guarantee for necessary 
product innovations. In sum, monopoly power in the credit rating industry does little harm 
compared to traditional (non-natural) monopolies. There are, however, at least some benefits 
of competition to Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch by smaller agencies. Since such competition could 
hardly do any harm from the allocation perspective, it is certainly sensible for the state to 
take competition increasing measures, even if there is no single reason justifying a specific 
action. 
There are several concerns on the effect of ratings on financial market stability. Some prob-
lems such as the potential for a pro-cyclical impact on the credit cycle or a limited breadth of 
information because of overly similar ratings could only be dealt with by directly regulating 
rating methodologies. Other threats such as the spreading use of rating-triggers and parallel 
investor behavior can be tackled by increased transparency and less rating-based regulation. 
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The structural risk with the highest impact is a potential breakdown of Moody’s or S&P which 
would cause disruption in financial markets. Although very unlikely, the state should pay at-
tention and aim to increase competition. Overall, however, there is no concern posing a sub-
stantial threat for financial market stability. 
One of the key allegations against Moody’s and S&P, especially in the USA, is anticompeti-
tive behavior. The economic analysis is ambiguous, though. First of all, there are no contrac-
tual relations manifesting an anticompetitive behavior. The objected practice of notching is 
part of the rating methodology, and rating agencies have not been found to have exclusivity 
or tying agreements with issuers. Further, the scope of anticompetitive behavior is generally 
limited because rating agencies are very well scrutinized by the public. Additionally, the 
threat of too low ratings cannot be executed since rating quality is statistically measurable. 
Therefore, it is hard to effectively pressure issuers to do something ‘against their will’. In sum, 
there is no strong basis for the state to interfere despite the practical allegations. Especially 
any direct regulation of rating methodologies is inappropriate without proven wrongdoing of 
the rating agencies. Instead, potential measures should aim to increase transparency and 
competition in general. 
Many practitioners and scholars translate the rating agencies monopoly power into a form of 
political power in that rating agencies can directly affect decisions of rated issuers. From an 
economic perspective, the concept of political power is empty, though. The credit rating 
agencies simply make visible the demands and standards of international capital markets – 
they have no discretionary power. The analysis falls back to the potential for anticompetitive 
behavior. With a bad rating analysis, rating agencies can move markets at maximum in the 
short run, while prices will revert in the long run and the agencies’ reputation falls. A good 
example of the fallacy of political power are sovereign ratings, which have traditionally been 
highly criticized although their impact on market prices is limited. The only way that rating 
agencies indeed have discretionary power over issuers is a quality scope. 
If it is possible to punish issuers by giving them low ratings or to reward them by giving artifi-
cially high ratings without losing reputation, rating agencies can profitably engage in anti-
competitive behavior. The rating quality should therefore be at the center of state concern, 
not least because rating-based regulation is directly dependent on a high informational quali-
ty. While the reputation mechanism is very robust in itself, market participants are likely to 
derive reputation not only from the perfectly measurable informational quality, but also from 
softer factors. Investors and issuers rank rating agencies based on their perceived ‘status’. 
State recognition or the relationships to high profile issuers, e.g., make up for a limited dete-
rioration of quality. Overall, however, the quality scope is limited in the credit rating industry 
since reputation is too much dependent on quality in the long run. The state should nonethe-
less try to minimize the existing grey zone by increasing transparency and strengthening the 
reputation mechanism. 
An important aspect connected to rating quality are conflicts of interest of which there are 
many within the credit rating industry. However, the practical impact of conflicts of interest is 
limited by the narrow scope for actually assigning favorable ratings. Further, few businesses 
are scrutinized as closely as rating agencies, so it is hard to hide any wrongdoing. Although 
the problem of conflicts of interests is generally overstated, the state does no damage by 
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helping increasing transparency. Another potentially harmful behavior concerning rating qual-
ity is a rating inflation, i.e. all ratings rise while the relative ranking remains constant. To pre-
vent a negative impact on the effectiveness of rating-based regulation, the state should map 
the different rating scales against absolute default levels. A third issue on rating quality is the 
timeliness of rating changes. Rating agencies are often blamed for slow downgrades. How-
ever, there are good reasons for a certain sluggishness. The state should therefore not inter-
vene. 
The large number of concerns let the rating industry appear prima facie as highly prone to 
state intervention. However, the actual threats are limited. This is especially so because most 
concerns are just that – concerns. There is very little empirical evidence that things are ac-
tually going wrong. The largest threat stems from the reputation mechanism itself. If it was 
impaired, rating quality might fall without hurting reputation. In this case, many potential prob-
lems become much more likely. The main measures the state should take are increasing 
competition and transparency, and installing a registration system for the compliance with 
rating-based regulation. A far reaching intervention into the business of rating agencies is not 
justified, though. 
The state must decide on five policy areas. The most basic decision is between rating-based 
regulation and the use of market-based risk measures. Both methods have their strength and 
weaknesses. However, if the state decides to use risk-based regulation in principal, there is 
hardly a way to avoid a form of ratings, since market based measures are limited to traded 
securities. A second basic decision concerns competition between rating agencies. Since the 
fear of a downward spiral of quality standards in a highly competitive environment is econom-
ically unfounded, the state serves its interests best by fostering competition. Regulatory entry 
barriers should be reduced; it makes also sense to closely study the effects of rating agency 
mergers. 
The stance on competition is an important input for the decision on the process of state rec-
ognition for the regulatory use of ratings. In principal, recognition can be based on a designa-
tion regime or the free registration of rating agencies. Since competition is good for the in-
dustry, a registration regime is the best choice. It should explicitly be dependent on statistical 
rating quality and not on input measures. The US ‘Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006’ 
– although still relying on factors other than rating quality – is broadly in accordance with the 
economic recommendations. On the other hand, the European recognition approach under 
the ‘Capital Requirements Directive’ implementing Basle II is too restrictive and leaves room 
for improvement. 
A controversially discussed policy option is the stance on civil liability. Rating agencies are 
special compared to similar businesses such as auditors or equity analysts, because ratings 
bear an enormous influence while the demands on rating properties such as timeliness and 
conservativeness are opposed between different affected groups. Increased civil liability of 
rating agencies would do more harm than good. 
The last decision of the state is between explicit regulation and self-regulation. Explicit regu-
lation suffers from the potential of ‘government failure’ because of the strong interest groups 
involved. Secondly, the state is subject to ratings itself, so any direct influence on the agen-
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cies could be misused. Rating agencies themselves are far more efficient in setting rating 
methodologies than the state. Therefore, explicit regulation is only advisable in areas that do 
not touch the core business conduct – most notably official recognition. On a general level, 
the state should better count on international self-regulation such as the ‘IOSCO code of 
conduct’. Rating agencies are particularly well suited for self-regulation, since their output is 
statistically measurable and the industry receives a lot of attention. 
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8 Appendix: Literature Review 
There is a vast literature on credit ratings and their role in international financial markets, 
mostly focusing on quantitative, empirical methods. More relevant to this work is theoretical 
research on the industrial organization and regulation of the credit rating industry. In the fol-
lowing, major contributions will be briefly reviewed. The largest group consists of studies by 
law and economics scholars. There are also relevant articles from a sociological and political 
perspective. Several surveys among investors and issuers provide practical insights. There is 
also a large amount of relevant governmental research and legislation. Furthermore, individ-
ual publications from rating agencies as well as student papers are reviewed. 
Author Type Contents/Conclusions 
Scientific Research: Law & Economics 
BIS 2000 Paper - One of the most extensive papers on credit rating 
agencies 
- Supporting the revision process leading to Basle II 
- Facts and economics of the credit rating industry 
(including an extensive list of international rating 
agencies and their regulation) 
- Summary of empirical credit rating research (especially 
default and recovery studies) 
- Complementary sources of credit information 
Blaurock 2006 Conference 
Paper 
- General report on credit rating agencies to the 2006 
Congress of the International Academy of Comparative 
Law, Utrecht 
- Based on nine national reports from Belgium, Canada, 
France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Swit-
zerland, and the USA79 
- Short overview on principals of the rating market 
- Focus on regulation: current legal framework, current 
initiatives 
- Conclusion: more substantive regulation advisable 
Bottini 1993 Paper - Problems with rating agencies: timeliness, politics, 
unsolicited ratings, lack of disclosure 
- Rating-based regulation 
- Proposal: agency registration and limited oversight 
- Protection of First Amendment rights 
Cantor and 
Packer 1994 
Paper - Description of the rating industry’s economics and the 
use of rating-based regulation 
- Focus on rating reliability: rating differences in time 
and between agencies 
- Conclusion: efficiency of rating-based regulation 
endangered by multiplicity of agencies and scales 
Covitz and Har-
rison 2003 
Working 
paper 
- Discussion of conflicts of interest 
- Empirical test for conflicts of interest 
- Conclusion: credit rating agencies are generally driven 
by reputation concerns and do not give in to conflicts of 
interest 
                                                
79  The national reports are available at http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/index1.asp 
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ECB 2004 Paper - Examination of the credit rating literature available in 
mid 2003 (consideration of numerous empirical stu-
dies) 
- The increased significance of credit ratings and their 
impact on market dynamics 
- Discussion of the challenges for rating agencies 
Fight 2001 Book - Extensive profiles of eight big rating agencies, limited 
information on several more 
- Methodologies and characteristics of the rating proc-
ess 
- Discussion of several surveys 
- Analysis of regulatory issues (especially NRSRO) 
Fisch 2004 Paper - Discussion of calls for regulatory reform after the 
Enron and WorldCom scandals. 
- Role of rating agencies, valuation of their services by 
market participants 
- Conclusion: immediate action only on NRSRO 
designation and agency liability advisable 
Frost 2006 Working 
Paper 
- Validation of widespread criticisms of rating agencies 
on the basis of existing empirical evidence 
- Issues: Disclosure practices, conflicts of interest, anti-
competitive practices, diligence and competence 
Hill 2004 Paper - Analysis of the need for increased regulation of the 
credit rating industry after the Enron scandal 
- Overview on the industry’s history, business model and 
current regulatory framework 
- Detailed appraisal of the agencies’ performance 
- Conclusion: Only selected fields such as the NRSRO 
designation need quick reform as overall performance 
is good 
Husisian 1990 Paper - Function of credit rating agencies 
- Detailed economic and First Amendment evaluation of 
expanding liability 
- Conclusion: extending liability is problematic from ei-
ther perspective 
Jackson 2001 Book Chap-
ter 
- Analysis and critique of the role of ratings in the Basle 
II proposals 
- Possible alternatives to credit ratings in capital ade-
quacy 
Levich et al. 
2002 
Anthology - History, value, and structure of the rating industry 
- Empirical evidence on pricing and regulatory aspects 
- Empirical evidence on performance 
- Policy issues facing rating agencies and regulators 
- Includes: Sylla 2002, White 2002, Smith and Walter 
2002 
Nicholls 2005 Conference 
Paper 
- Background information on industry and current dis-
cussions 
- Analysis of public and private uses of credit rating 
- Alternatives to credit ratings and liability issues 
- Detailed overview on rating-based regulations in Can-
ada 
- Conclusion: No significant regulation should be intro-
duced in Canada 
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Partnoy 1999 Paper - Detailed description of the industry’s history 
- Empirical findings casting doubt on the reputation me-
chanism as main driver of the rating business 
- Rating-based regulation as major industry driver 
- Proposals: substitute ratings through market-based 
measures in regulation, increase liability 
Partnoy 2006 Book Chap-
ter 
- Analysis of rating agencies as gatekeepers, differenc-
es to other gatekeepers (investment banks, auditors) 
- Analysis of profitability, conflicts of interests and espe-
cially the role of rating agencies in the market for colla-
teralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
- Proposals: reduce value of regulatory license, increase 
liability 
Rajeshwer and 
Jutur 2005 
Anthology - Anthology of mostly published papers/working papers 
such as Sylla 2002 or Reisen 2003 
- Introduction on the rating industry 
- Sovereign ratings 
- Corporate ratings 
Rousseau 2005 Conference 
Paper 
- Canadian report to the 2006 Congress of the Interna-
tional Academy of Comparative Law, Utrecht 
- Short overview on the rating industry 
- Accountability concerns: potential market failures, legal 
and institutional control mechanisms 
- Regulation to increase accountability: regulatory goals, 
the IOSCO and the SEC proposals, implementation 
- Proposal: disclosure strategy 
Schwarcz 2001 Book Chap-
ter 
- Identification of “a de facto control of rating agencies 
over international debt markets” (p. 301) 
- Analysis if regulatory bodies should try to actively curb 
and control this power 
- Conclusion: States should only focus on optimizing the 
existing NRSRO designation 
Smith and Wal-
ter 2002 
Book Chap-
ter 
- Conflicts of interest in the credit rating industry 
- Focus on the structure of the major industry players 
and their relation to each other and the state 
- Conclusion: reputation mechanism is a strong deter-
rent of misbehavior 
Sylla 2002 Book Chap-
ter 
- Extensive analysis on the rating industry’s history 
- The very origins 
- The early phase from 1909 to the 1960s 
- The globalization of the industry since the 1970s  
White 2002 Book Chap-
ter 
- Short but comprehensive industrial economics analysis 
of the credit rating industry in the ‘structure, conduct, 
performance’ framework 
- Discussion of several policy issues such as the 
NRSRO designation and the Basle II proposal 
Scientific Research: Sociology/Political Economy 
Kerwer 2002a Book Chap-
ter 
- Analysis of rating agencies as private standard setters 
for creditworthiness 
- The role of rating-based regulation 
- Result: systematic deficit in rating agency accountabili-
ty (‘accountability gap’) 
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Kerwer 2005 Paper - Analysis of rating agencies as informal ‘non-
majoritarian regulators’ 
- Lack of rating agency accountability modeled in a 
modified principal agent framework 
- Conclusion: limit scope of rating agency operations 
King and Sinclair 
2003 
Paper - Short introduction on the role of rating agencies and 
public-private relations 
- Analysis of the Basle II proposal 
- Conclusion: the reliance on ratings in the Basle II 
framework will weaken financial market stability 
Sinclair 2000 Paper - Analysis of rating agencies as ‘embedded knowledge 
networks’ 
- Short history of rating market 
- Epistemic authority of rating agencies 
- Government relations 
Sinclair 2005 Book - Detailed analysis on the history, function and role of 
rating agencies in financial markets 
- Separate chapters on corporate rating, municipal rat-
ing, and sovereign rating from the viewpoint of ‘rating 
agency power’ 
- Analysis of recent rating challenges and crises 
- Conclusion: Rating agencies act as private policy 
makers deriving their power from epistemic authority, 
not superior analytical skills 
Surveys 
AFP 2002, 2004  Paper - Participants: senior level corporate practitioners and 
financial professionals 
- Sets between 9 and 17 questions 
- 715 surveys received in 2002 and 230 in 2004 
- Focus: accuracy and timeliness of ratings, the state’s 
role 
Baker and Mansi 
2002 
Paper - Participants: 474 US industrial firms and 387 corporate 
bond funds 
- Set of 15 questions 
- Focus: the optimal number of ratings, rating accuracy 
and differences between the agencies, the timeliness 
of rating revisions 
- Interpretation of the answers in the light of numerous 
empirical studies 
Cantwell 1998 Paper - The last of several surveys on credit ratings since 1996
- Participants: 300-400 international issuers 
- Focus: issuer-agency relationship centered on the rat-
ing process 
- Reprinted in Fight 2001, pp. 151-172 
Ellis 1998 Paper - First survey of issuers and investors at the same time. 
- Participants: 102 rated utilities and 205 institutional 
fixed income investors 
- Focus: the number of ratings, unsolicited ratings, rating 
accuracy, factors influencing ratings 
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JCIF 2001, 
2000, 1999 
Paper - Surveys of Japanese issuers and institutional investors 
- Around 250 participants per year 
- Questions on rating agencies recognized in Japan and 
major international agencies 
- Focus: the uses of ratings by Japanese market 
participants, assessment of several performance 
TBMA 2006 Paper - Poll of 41 issuers and 51 investors 
- Set of 28 questions 
- Focus: industry regulation 
- Single questions covering a broad array of other issues
Governmental Research, Legislation 
AFTE 2004 Code of 
Conduct 
- Code of Standard Practices for Participants in the 
Credit Rating Process, introduced by several private 
financial professional associations 
- Similar to the IOSCO code, based on work from the 
Association Française des Trésoriers d’Entreprise 
- Includes guidelines for states and issuers 
AMF 2005 Report - International rating business, market impact, regulatory 
environment 
- French market for financial ratings 
- Value of the agencies from the different players’ points 
of view 
- Rules of conduct and transparency 
BIS 2004 Policy 
Framework 
- Basle II Capital Accord 
- First incorporation of credit ratings into worldwide 
banking regulation 
- Minimum capital requirements can be calculated under 
the ‘standardized approach’ of the first pillar from credit 
ratings 
- Technical detail on individual claims and credit risk 
mitigation 
- Implementation considerations (consistently use of 
ratings from officially recognized ‘External Credit 
Assessment Institutions’ (ECAIs) 
CEBS 2006 Guideline - Committee of European Banking Supervisors Guide-
lines on the recognition of External Credit Assessment 
Institutions for implementing the CRD on the national 
level 
- Focus: the general recognition process, the specific 
implementation of the CRD recognition criteria, and the 
criteria for mapping external credit assessments to the 
CRD 
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CESR 2005 Report - Technical advice from the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators to the European Commission on 
possible measures concerning credit rating agencies 
- Based on 34 public comments, an early consultation 
paper, and an open hearing80 
- Short summary of relevant regulatory initiatives 
- Extensive discussion of the agencies’ business model 
and rules of conduct 
- Overview on the use of ratings in European legislation 
and private contracts, and on aspects of competition 
- Conclusion: Rely on existing financial service direc-
tives and encourage self-regulation on the basis of the 
IOSCO code of conduct 
- Evaluation of four implementation options 
- Conclusion: just monitoring market developments is 
best suited for the moment 
EU Commission 
2005 
Report - Report in response to the European Parliament re-
quest for an industry assessment 
- Adoption of the CESR proposal, no introduction of any 
new legislation 
- Reference to existing financial services directives and 
the IOSCO code of conduct (implementation was mo-
nitored by the CESR, e.g., CESR 2006a) 
EU Parliament 
2004 
Resolution - European Parliament resolution on credit rating agen-
cies 
- List of concerns and acknowledgements towards rating 
agencies 
- Calls on the EU Commission to assess the need for 
legislative actions 
EU Parliament 
2006 
Directive - European Parliament Capital Requirements Directive 
(CRD) 
- Transfer of Basle II proposals into EU law 
- Section 3 outlines the use of ratings from External 
Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIs) and respective 
regulatory procedures, annex IV goes into detail 
- Part 1 of the annex deals with risk weights, part 2 with 
recognition criteria for ECAIs, and part 3 with imple-
mentation details for credit institutions 
IOSCO 2003a Report - IOSCO report on the activities of credit rating agencies 
- Summary of questionnaires send to all IOSCO mem-
bers and four international rating agencies 
- Focus: regulatory processes, competition in the indus-
try, business model details and respective problems 
- Identification of key issues for security regulators 
- Proposal of principals regarding the activities of credit 
rating agencies (also separately published: IOSCO 
2003b) 
                                                
80  Consultation paper: CESR (2004), comments: http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=responses&id=53 
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IOSCO 2004 Code of 
Conduct 
- IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rat-
ing Agencies 
- Based on the IOSCO report and comments 
- Guidelines on the quality and integrity of the rating 
process, on agency independence and responsibility, 
and on disclosure/market communication 
- Enforcement is left to national regulators and rating 
agencies themselves 
SEC 2003a Report - Comprehensive SEC report as requested by section 
702 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
- History of the NRSRO designation process and details 
on recent inquiries and initiatives concerning credit rat-
ing agencies 
- Discussion on the role and importance of rating agen-
cies in financial markets 
- Information dissemination, entry barriers, conflicts of 
interest 
SEC 2003b Concept 
Release 
- Concept release on the use of credit ratings in federal 
security laws 
- Build on the 2003 SEC report, the first committee hear-
ing, and public comments 
- 48 public comments were received on the concept 
release81 
SEC 2005 Proposed 
Rule 
- Proposed rule on the NRSRO Definition build on the 
concept release, hearings and comments 
- Detailed history on the NRSRO process 
- Explicit definition of what a credit rating is and what 
market acceptance means 
- Guidelines on the rating agencies business conduct 
- 32 public comments were received on the proposed 
rule82 
U.S. House 
2005a,b,c, 2004, 
2003,  
Hearing 
Notes 
- Hearings before the ‘Capital Markets, Insurance and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises’ subcommittee of 
the ‘Committee on Financial Services’ of the US House 
of Representatives 
- Very broad professional discussion on credit rating 
agencies, and the rating market and its regulation 
- Participants: US representatives, rating agencies, 
regulators (SEC), investors, issuers, professional 
associations, scholars 
- Introduction and discussion of the Credit Rating Agen-
cy Duopoly Relief Act (4th and 5th hearing) 
- Notes include many prepared statements 
US Congress 
2002 
Legislation - Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
- Result of a US congress survey on the role and 
possible failures of auditing, investment and rating 
firms after the Enron, WorldCom and other scandals in 
2001 and 2002 
- No details concerning credit rating agencies 
- Section 702 demands a commission study and report 
regarding credit rating agencies 
                                                
81  http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71203.shtml 
82  http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405.shtml 
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US Congress 
2006a,b 
Legislation - Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2006; Cre-
dit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 
- In force from 2008 on 
- Replaces the NRSRO designation with a registration 
process 
- Introduces SEC oversight 
- Increases liability 
Rating Agency Publications 
Moody's 1991 Book - In depth description of Moody’s rating methodology 
- Details on nine different industries/security classes 
- Introduction on the role of ratings and the industry 
S&P 2006 Report - In depth description of S&P’s rating methodology 
- Updated yearly 
Student Papers 
Asgharian 2005 Master The-
sis 
- Theoretic framework: extended Principal-Agent model 
- Overview on business model and market 
- Short analysis of several issues concerning regulation 
- Specific reform proposals 
Champsaur 
2005 
LL.M. Paper - Credit rating market and business model 
- Multiple values of credit ratings 
- Regulatory intervention (reasons plus specific options) 
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